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I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the development of the law of the special
circumstances in California death penalty cases.' Since special cir-
cumstances were created by the death penalty statutes, the task of
elaborating the law regarding the special circumstances has been ex-
clusively undertaken by the courts of California.' The job initially
fell on the shoulders of the Bird court, for it was during the Bird
court's tenure that the 1977 Legislation and the 1978 Initiative be-
came effective.' After the Bird court's tenure lapsed, the task was
taken up by the Lucas court.
This article examines the work of the first year of the Lucas
court with respect to special circumstances, and compares the Lucas
court's development of special circumstance doctrine with the devel-
opment of special circumstance doctrine by the Bird court. Part II
chronicles the adoption of the concept of the special circumstances as
a device to define death eligibility in the context of the capital pun-
ishment controversy in California. Part III examines the general the-
ory of the special circumstances and it explores their purpose, struc-
ture and function, and the fundamental principles governing their
interpretation. Part IV analyzes the specific law of the special cir-
1. For a general discussion of this area of law see Poulos, Capital Punishment, the
Legal Process, and the Emnergence of the Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
157 (1990). This article traces the history of the capital punishment controversy in California
through the retention election of 1986, the decline of the Bird court, and the emergence of the
Lucas court in California. It also identifies the changes in the way the two courts have handled
automatic appeals under the two statutes (the 1977 Legislation and the 1978 Initiative). It
analyzes the way this change was produced, and the voting behavior of each of the justices of
the Lucas court. The article ends by assessing the question of whether the Deukmejian ap-
pointees have produced this change illegitimately or by the permissible application of the rele-
vant legal principles in a way quite different from the way they were applied by the Bird
court.
2. As of March 25, 1988, the last day of the first year of the Lucas court's tenure, the
1978 Initiative had not been amended.
3. Part of this task, of course, was also discharged by the various courts of appeal in
California. This occurs when the defendant is prosecuted for first degree murder and a special
circumstance and the punishment imposed is life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
When this occurs, the appeal is to the appropriate division of the court of appeal. Since this
article is exclusively concerned with the Supreme Court of California, the doctrine elaborated
by the courts "of appeal is beyond the scope of this article.
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cumstances as articulated by each court, and compares the two dif-
ferent bodies of law, whenever it is appropriate to do so.
During its first year, which began March 26, 1987, and ended
March 25, 1988,' the Lucas court decided sixteen automatic ap-
peals.5 In eleven of these sixteen cases the court disposed of special
circumstances issues raised under both the 1977 Death Penalty Leg-
islation and the 1978 Death Penalty Initiative.' None of these deci-
sions were written on an entirely clean slate. Nearly a decade of
death penalty litigation under both the 1977 Legislation and the
1978 Initiative provided the decisional environment and precedent
for the Lucas court's work this initial year. These eleven special cir-
cumstance cases, together with the special circumstance precedent
furnished by the Bird court, provide the raw material for this study.
This article has two goals: To analyze and compare the concep-
tion of the special circumstances held by the Bird and Lucas courts;
and to critically evaluate the specific law of the special circumstances
4. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 220-21.
5. Listed in the order in which they were decided, these sixteen cases are: People v.
Hendricks, 43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987) (hereinafter Hendricks
1); People v: Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 929 (1988); People v. Anderson (James), 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 585 (1987); People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988); People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241
Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987), modified, 44 Cal. 3d 241a, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1038, reh'g denied
487 U.S. 1246 (1988); People v. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d 137, 745 P.2d 573, 241 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1987), reh'g granted, Jan. 28, 1988; People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 746 P.2d 452, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1987); People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842
(1988), modified, 44 Cal. 3d 1254c, cert. denied, - U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988); People
v. Kimble, 44 Cal, 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1988), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988); People v. Hale, 44 Cal. 3d 531, 749 P.2d 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. 114
(1988); People v. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d 543, 749 P.2d 776, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1988), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988); People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d 854,
244 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 186 (1988); People v. Hen-
dricks, 44 Cal. 3d 635, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988), modified, 44 Cal. 3d 1254a,
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 247 (1988) (hereinafter Hendricks II); People v. Mel-
ton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1988), modified, 45 Cal. 3d 648c, cert.
denied, __ U.S. -_, 109 S. Ct. 329 (1988); People v. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d 883, 751
P.2d 395, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 249 (1988) ;
People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1988), modified, 45 Cal.
3d 648a, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 248 (1988).
6. These eleven cases are: Hendricks 1, Ghent, Anderson (James), Gates, Miranda,
Howard, Kimble, Hendricks II, Melton, Williams, and Wade.
Hendricks II is not an automatic appeal from the retrial of Hendricks 1. Edgar Hendricks
was charged with having committed two first degree murders in San Francisco with several
special circumstance allegations, and with having committed two first degree murders in Los
Angeles with, several special circumstance allegations. Hendricks I is the automatic appeal
from the judgment of death imposed in the Los Angeles County prosecution and Hendricks II
is the automatic appeal from the judgment of death imposed in the San Francisco prosecution.
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as articulated by each court.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE As A
DEVICE To DEFINE DEATH SENTENCE ELIGIBILITY
A. The Historical Background
When California adopted its first penal statutes in 1850, mur-
der was defined as a single offense punishable by a mandatory sen-
tence of death.' Six years later, in 1856, following the example set
by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1794,8 California divided murder
into two categories: first and second degree murder.' These two de-
grees of murder were distinguished from one another by the same
criteria used in the original Pennsylvania statute.10 The definitions
7. An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, CAL. COMP. LAWS, ch. CXXV §§ 19-
21 (1850-1853). The statute was enacted on April 16, 1850. Id. These sections read as follow:
Section 19. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any
of the various means by which death may by occasioned.
Section 20. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away
the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances ca-
pable of proof.
Section 21. Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears,
or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart. The punishment of any person convicted of the crime of murder shall be
death.
Id.
8. Pa. Laws 1794, ch. 257, § 2. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creat-
ing Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 764-73 (1949); Poulos, The Supreme Court,
Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory
Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 147-48 (1986) [hereinafter Poulos].
9. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments,"
Ch. CXXXIX § 2, Cal. Stat. 219 (1856). Section 2 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section twenty one of said Act is amended so as to read as follows: . . . All
murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in.wait, torture,
or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which
shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree; . . . Every per-
son convicted of murder of the first degree, shall suffer death, and every person
convicted of murder of the second degree shall suffer imprisonment in the State
Prison for a term not less than ten years and which may extend to life.
Id.
10. The Pennsylvania statute provided, in relevant part, as follows:
That all murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any ar-
son, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and
all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree. . ..
Pa. Laws 1794, ch. 257, § 2.
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of murder in the first and second degrees as well as the mandatory
punishment of death for first degree murder, as provided in 1856,
were adopted in the Penal Code of 1872 with only minor changes in
phrasing."1 Two years later, in 1874, California adopted an innova-
tion first created in Tennessee in 1838.2 Mandatory capital punish-
ment for first degree murder was abolished, and in its place the sen-
tencing authority, whether judge or jury, was given unfettered
discretion to choose between the penalty of death and a term of im-
prisonment."3 Although, from time to time, there were changes in the
definitions of the degrees of murder, 4 the basic structure of the sub-
stantive law governing the death penalty for first degree murder re-
mained unchanged for nearly 100 years. I" Eligibility for the death
Aside from the omission of the word "by" in front of the phrase "lying in wait," and the
spelling of "willful," the only meaningful difference between the original Pennsylvania statute
and the California version is the addition of torture as one of the means by which a murder is
classified as first degree rather than second degree murder. See supra note 9. This method of
classifying murders is commonly known as the "Pennsylvania formula."
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-190 (Bancroft & Co. 1872). These sections read as
follows:
Section 187. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice
aforethought.
Section 188. Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
Section 189. All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated kill-
ing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson,
rape, robbery, or burglary, is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of
murder are of the second degree.
Section 190. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death,
and every person guilty of murder in the second degree is punishable by impris-
onment in the State Prison not less than ten years.
12. Act of Jan. 10, 1838, ch. 29, 1837-38 Tenn. Laws 55-56. See Poulos, supra note 8,
at 149-55.
13. 1873-74 Amendments to the Codes of Calif., Penal Code at 314. (Bancroft & Co.
1874). As amended in 1874, Section 190 read as follows:
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree, shall suffer death or confine-
ment in the State Prison for life, at the discretion of the jury, trying the same; or
upon a plea of guilty, the Court shall determine the same; and every person
guilty of murder in the second degree, is punishable by imprisonment in the
State Prison not less than ten years.
Id.
14. For example, the same year that mandatory capital punishment was abolished for
first degree murder, the legislature changed the definition of that offense by including a homi-
cide committed during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the felony of mayhem within
the first degree felony-murder rule. Id. at 314.
15. Since the sentencing decision was discretionary with the sentencing authority, there
were no substantive or procedural constraints on the sentencing authorities decision with re-
19901 THE LUCAS COURT & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 339
penalty was determined by the substantive law of the capital offense
of first degree murder, and the death penalty was imposed by the
exercise of virtually unfettered discretion in the sentencing
authority."1
There was, however, one significant change made in the proce-
dures for invoking the death penalty. In 1957 capital trials were bi-
furcated. The sentencing portion of the capital trial was severed from
the guilt determination process. The determination of guilt or inno-
cence of the capital offense, first degree murder in our present in-
quiry, was determined first. If the jury convicted of first degree mur-
der, then there was a subsequent penalty proceeding before the same
jury (unless certain specified situations occurred) to determine the
punishment."' These two portions of the capital trial were commonly
referred to as the "guilt phase" and the "penalty phase."
Societal attitudes about capital punishment slowly changed. Be-
ginning in the late 1950's challenges to the constitutionality of both
capital punishment and the structure of the law devised to impose it
were made in the state and federal courts. 8 These challenges were
universally rejected by the courts until 1972.19 On February 18 of
that year the California Supreme Court, in People v. Anderson, held
that capital punishment was invalid per se under the California
Constitution.2" Just over four months later, in Furman v. Georgia,
spect to capital punishment. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
16. E.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
17. An Act to Amend Section 190 of, and to add Section 190.1 to, the Penal Code,
Relating to Punishment for Offenses for Which the Penalty is Death or Imprisonment for
Life, ch. 1968, 1957 Cal. Stat. 3509 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1). Except
for the short period of time in which California operated under a mandatory capital punish-
ment statute (see infra text accompanying notes 36-62), since 1957 California has continuously
decided the question of the imposition of the death penalty in a bifurcated trial. The two
portions of the bifurcated capital trial are known as the "guilt" and "penalty" phases. It
should be noted, however, that if the defendant also enters a plea of "not guilty by reason of
insanity," then the capital trial is trifurcated. The determination of the sanity issue is held in a
separate proceeding which follows the guilt phase and precedes the penalty phase of the capital
trial. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1(c) and 1026 (West 1988). This phase of the trial is gener-
ally known as the "sanity phase."
18. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 146-72, for a general discussion of this evolution in the
thinking about capital punishment.
19. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 146-72.
20. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972). In
Anderson, Chief Justice Wright wrote for a nearly unanimous court:
We have concluded that capital punishment is impermissibly cruel. It degrades
and dehumanizes all who participate in its processes. It is unnecessary to any
legitimate goal of the state and is incompatible with the dignity of man and the
judicial process. Our conclusion that the death penalty may no longer be exacted
in California consistently with article I, section 6, of our Constitution is not
340 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
the Supreme Court of the United States held that unguided jury dis-
cretion in capital cases violated the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the eighth amendment as made applicable to the states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.21
The process of restoring capital punishment in California began
immediately after the Anderson opinion was announced on Febru-
ary 18, 1972. A proposed initiative amendment to article I, section 6
of the California Constitution, which would expressly authorize cap-
ital punishment and thus overrule Anderson, began circulating
within weeks. 22 The initiative qualified for the ballot on June 28,
1972, as Proposition 17.28 It was approved by 67 percent of those
voting in the general election on November 7, 1972.24 Accordingly,
with the passage of Proposition 17, the death penalty was no longer
per se unconstitutional under the California Constitution.25
Having removed the impediment created by the California Con-
stitution, the Legislature turned its attention to drafting a death pen-
alty statute which would comply with the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause of the eighth amendment as interpreted in Furman.
Furman was unequivocal on only two points: unguided discretion to
impose capital punishment upon conviction of a capital offense vio-
lated the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause;
grounded in sympathy for those who would commit crimes of violence, but in
concern for the society that diminishes itself whenever it takes the life of one of
its members. . . . Insofar as Penal Code sections 190 and 190.1 purport to au-
thorize the imposition of the death penalty, they are, accordingly,
unconstitutional.
Id. at 656-57, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Anderson was decided on February 18,
1972 (Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152) and Furman was decided
on June 29, 1972 (Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
22. See People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal. 3d 797, 808, 647 P.2d 76, 82, 183
Cal. Rptr. 800, 806 (1982).
23. Proposition 17 read as follows:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I, Sec. 27. All statutes of this
state in effect on February 17, 1972, requiring, authorizing, imposing, or relat-
ing to the death penalty are in full force and effect, subject to legislative amend-
ment or repeal by statute, initiative, or referendum.
The death .penalty provided for under those statutes shall not be deemed to be,
or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the mean-
ing of Article 1, Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be
deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution.
Proposed Amendments To Constitution, Propositions And Proposed Laws Together With Ar-
guments, General Election, Tuesday, November 7, 1972, Part 11-Appendix, at 20.
24. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 446 n.1, 556 P.2d 1101, 1117 n.1, 134
Cal. Rptr. 650, 666 n.1 (Clark, J., concurring).
25. People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1982).
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and under the federal constitution, unlike the Constitution of the
State of California as interpreted by the Anderson court, capital
punishment was not per se invalid.26 Capital punishment could thus
be restored in California, so long as the sentencing authority was not
given unfettered discretion to choose between life and death. Still un-
resolved, however, was whether any discretion could be conferred on
the sentencing authority after Furman.2"
Two very different interpretations of Furman emerged in the
legislative halls of the states wishing to restore capital punishment.
One view emphasized the fact that the discretion conferred in the
pre-Furman death penalty legislation was virtually unfettered. Ac-
cording to this view, it was the unguided nature of the discretion that
produced the constitutional flaw. Since individualized capital sen-
tencing demands a measure of discretion, such sentencing would be
constitutionally permissible so long as a way could be found to limit
the sentencing authorities' discretion by appropriate legal
standards.28
These states looked to the American Law Institute's Model Pe-
nal Code for guidance, and patterned their new death penalty legis-
lation after section 210.6 of the Code.29 Between June 29, 1972, the
date Furman was announced, and July 2, 1976, the date the United
States Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of the
death penalty legislation enacted in response to Furman, twelve
states enacted legislation patterned after Model Penal Code section
210.6.3" California was not one of these states.
In contrast, the National Association of Attorneys General"'
and a majority of the state legislatures focused on the existence of
any discretion to impose capital punishment on some, but not all,
who were convicted of a given capital offense.32 Under their analysis
of Furman, "a mandatory death penalty for specified offenses" was
the "alternative considered most preferred as best withstanding con-
26. The concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that capital
punishment was per se unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). The three remaining opinions supporting the Court's terse per curium opinion reached
different conclusions. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
27. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 172-80.
28. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 180-200.
29. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 192-200.
30. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 199.
31. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 198-99.
32. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 186-92, 198-200.
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stitutional attack.""3 Individualized sentencing for capital murder,
first begun in Tennessee in 1838," would have to be abandoned for
it is dependent upon a measure of discretion and, according to the
majority's analysis, the cruel and unusual punishments clause em-
bargoed all discretion in capital sentencing. Following this second
view of Furman, twenty-two states reverted to the common law
model: everyone convicted of a capital offense would be automati-
cally sentenced to death.8"
B. The 1973 Legislation
Following the interpretation of Furman which prevailed in
most of the states, California enacted a mandatory capital punish-
ment statute in 1973.36 Since the enactment of the first penal laws in
California in 1850, eligibility for the death penalty for a homicide
was determined by the definition of the capital offense of murder,
and later by the definition of first degree murder. When the legisla-
ture wished to alter the scope of death eligibility for the crime of
murder, this was accomplished by an amendment of the substantive
offense.
The 1973 mandatory death penalty statute formally departed
from this traditional way of defining death eligibility. The definition
of first degree murder was not changed. Instead, death eligibility
turned upon a conviction of first degree murder committed in one or
more of five enumerated "special circumstances." 3 To be death eli-
gible for a homicide, a defendant must first have been convicted of
first degree murder. 8 Then if one or more of the enumerated "spe-
cial circumstances" were charged in the accusatory pleading, the
"truth" of the charged special circumstance was to be determined in
a further proceeding in which the burden of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt was born by the prosecution. 9 Upon a finding by the trier
33. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SUMMARY OF PROCEED-
INGS 1973, at 21.
34. See supra note 12.
35. Poulos, supra note 8, at 199.
36. Act of Sept. 24, 1973, ch. 719, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1297 (codified as former CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 190, 190.1, and 190.2 (West 1979)) [hereinafter "1973 mandatory death penalty
legislation"].
37. Id. §5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1979)).
38. As amended by the 1973 legislation, section 190 provided as follows: "Every person
guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death if any one or more of the special circum-
stances enumerated in Section 190.2 have been charged and found to be true in the manner
provided in Section 190.1" Id. §2 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1979)).
39. Id. § 4 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1979)).
[Vol. 30
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of fact that a special circumstance was true, the defendant would
automatically be sentenced to death."
Though the terminology was different and the truth or falsity of
the charged special circumstances were determined in a proceeding
which followed the determination of guilt of first degree murder,' 1
the five enumerated special circumstances functioned in precisely the
same way as the definitional elements of the crime of first degree
murder. They defined eligibility for the death penalty in exactly the
same way as the elements of first degree murder defined death eligi-
bility under the law as it existed on the day that the Penal Code of
1872 became effective. 2 Moreover, since the punishment flowed axi-
omatically from a finding of the "truth" of a charged special circum-
stance, the special circumstances were undeniably rules of substan-
tive law just as the definitional rules that distinguish murder in the
first degree from murder in the second degree are rules of substan-
tive law.
In other words, the special circumstances functioned to divide
the crime of first degree murder into a capital crime and a non-
capital crime in precisely the same way the rules of first degree mur-
der served to divide the old capital offense of murder'3 into a capital
offense (first degree murder) and a'non-capital offense (second de-
gree murder). The newly defined offense of first degree murder with
a special circumstance found to be true could just as well have been
called "capital murder." In the words of the California Supreme
Court, "the 'special circumstances' enumerated in section 190.2 are
• . . aggravating factors creating categories of first degree murder for
which death is the prescribed penalty."'"
Furthermore, the special circumstances enumerated in the 1973
mandatory capital punishment statute were structured in a manner
similar to a rule of substantive law defining a given offense.' 5 Addi-
tionally, they are litigated in the courtroom in. the same way as are
40. Id. §5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1979)).
41. This subsequent proceeding became known as the "special circumstance phase" of
the capital trial.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
43. See supra text accompanying note 11.
44. The full quotation is as follows: "The People do not claim that the 'special circum-
stances' enumerated in section 190.2 are other than aggravating factors creating categories of
first degree murder for which death is the prescribed penalty." Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18
Cal. 3d 420, 429, 556 P.2d 1101, 1105, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 654 (1976).
45. 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1979)).
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substantive rules of law."' But whether the special circumstances are
appropriately classified as "crimes," and the consequences that clas-
sification would have on the law of capital punishment in California,
will be discussed further below.4 7
As prosecutions under the 1973 mandatory death penalty stat-
ute were working their way to the California Supreme Court,48 in
1976, the United States Supreme Court decided the constitutionality
of the death penalty legislation enacted in response to Furman in
Georgia,49 Florida, 0 Texas,"' North Carolina,"2 and Louisiana.68
The Georgia, Florida and Texas statutes followed the minority view
identified above. 4 They retained individualized capital sentencing,
but these statutes limited the sentencing authorities discretion by the
use of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances as guidelines."'
These statutes were upheld. 6 On the other hand, North Carolina
and Louisiana followed the majority reading of Furman,7 and en-
acted mandatory death penalty legislation. 8 The Supreme Court in-
validated these mandatory statutes on the ground that the eighth
amendment's proscription on cruel and unusual punishments re-
quires individualized capital sentencing in which factors mitigating
both the crime and the personal turpitude of the offender are taken
into account. 59
46. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 145-72.
48. See, e.g., Significant Court Actions, 7 CALIF. J. 284 (1976); Salzman, A Personal
Perspective, 7 CALIF. J. 288 (1976).
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
50. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
51. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
52. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
53. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
55. Although the Texas statute differed materially from the statutes enacted in Georgia
and Florida, the Court treated the Texas statute as though it expressly provided for a sufficient
measure of individualized capital sentencing to pass muster under the cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause of the eighth amendment. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Whether the
Texas statute does, in fact, provide for a sufficient measure of individualized capital sentencing
is a question that has not yet been fully resolved. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, No. 87-6177,
now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States.
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
58. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 200-26 (discussing the mandatory capital punishment
legislation enacted in North Carolina, Louisiana and the other twenty states that adopted
mandatory capital punishment in response to Furman).
59. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (A statute must provide a "meaningful
opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented by circumstances of the particular
crime or by the attributes of the individual offender." Id. at 333). Woodson v. North Carolina,
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Shortly after the Supreme Court filed its opinions in the 1976
cases, the California Supreme Court pondered the question of the
constitutionality of the 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation.
The court framed the issue as follows: No argument was made that
the "special circumstances" delineated in section 190.2 failed to meet
the court's criterion that those aggravating circumstances which war-
rant capital punishment be specifically set forth. The inquiry was
therefore directed to whether the "sentencing authority" is given the
opportunity to consider mitigating as well as aggravating factors and
whether it has sufficient guidance as to what mitigating factors
should be considered, in deciding whether to impose the death pen-
alty. It follows that it must also be determined whether the defend-
ant was afforded adequate opportunity to present evidence and argu-
ment regarding these mitigating factors and their relevance to the
appropriate penalty to the sentencing authority.6
The court rejected the Attorney General's suggestion that the
mandatory death penalty legislation be amended by judicial decision
to meet the requirements of the eighth amendment.61 Finally, the
428 U.S. 280 (1976) ("[Iln capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part
of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Id. at 304).
Three reasons were articulated for the Court's holdings in Roberts and Woodson that
mandatory capital punishment was unconstitutional: (1) mandatory capital punishment ex-
ceeded the limits imposed by contemporary standards of decency; (2) mandatory capital pun-
ishment did not resolve the question of unbridled sentencing discretion, but simply "papered
over" the problem; and, (3) mandatory capital punishment eschews individualized sentencing
where factors mitigating both the crime and the personal turpitude of the offender may be
taken into account in assessing the penalty. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 226-34 (discussing
Woodson and Roberts and their impact on mandatory capital punishment statutes). Neverthe-
less, the principal reason for invalidating mandatory capital punishment schemes is "the con-
stitutional mandate of heightened reliability in death-penalty determinations through individu-
alized-sentencing procedures." Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987). See Poulos, supra
note 8, at 232-34.
60. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 420, 439-40, 556 P.2d 1101, 1112-13, 134
Cal. Rptr. 650, 661-62 (1976).
61. Id. at 438-45, 556 P.2d at 1112-16, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 661-65. Even the concurring
opinion of Justice Clark, which was joined by Justice McComb, rejected the Attorney Gen-
eral's submission:
As Justice Holmes observed, hard cases tend to make bad law. Because our
Legislature so clearly intended to enact a constitutional death penalty statute,
and because its failure to do so was so clearly caused by the Furman Court's
failure to provide intelligible guidelines for legislation, one is tempted to accept
the Attorney General's frank invitation to save the law by rewriting it under the
guise of interpretation. However, the courts must not, in this case or any other,
act as a super-legislature.
Id. at 448-49, 556 P.2d at 1118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Clark, J., concurring).
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court concluded that because sections 190 through 190.3 fail to pro-
vide "for consideration of evidence of mitigating circumstances as to
the offense or in the personal characteristics of the defendant, and
afford no specific detailed guidelines as to the relevance of such evi-
dence in determining whether death is an appropriate punishment,
they permit arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."6"
C. The 1977 Legislation
In 1977 the California Legislature enacted death penalty legis-
lation specifically designed to comply with the 1976 decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States.6" The penalty phase of the cap-
ital trial introduced into California law in 195764 was, of course,
repealed by the 1973 mandatory death penalty statutes.65 The 1977
Legislation restored the penalty phase as a pivotal feature of capital
cases.66 Using the pattern established by the 1973 statute,67 eligibil-
ity for the death penalty was based upon a conviction of first degree
murder coupled with a finding of truth of at least one of the enumer-
ated special circumstances. 68
The special circumstances enumerated in the 1977 Legislation
were substantially similar to or identical with the special circum-
stances defined in the 1973 mandatory statute. Both defined special
62. Id. at 445, 556 P.2d at 1116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
63. Act of August 11, 1977, ch. 316, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1255 (hereinafter cited as 1977
Legislation).
64. An Act to Amend Section 190 of, and to Add Section 190.1 to, the Penal Code,
Relating to punishment for Offenses for Which the Penalty is Death or Imprisonment for
Life, ch. 1968, 1957 Cal. Stat. 3508 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1). See
supra text accompanying note 17.
65. 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 3, p. 1298. The penalty
phase, being entirely superfluous in a mandatory death penalty scheme, was repealed. The
"special circumstance phase" replaced the penalty phase of the capital trial. Id. § 4. The
purpose for routinely litigating the "truth" of the charged special circumstances in a separate
proceeding which followed the determination of guilt of first degree murder is not apparent to
me. Furthermore, I have been unable to discover a reason for using this procedure indicated in
either the legislative history or the case law discussing this point.
66. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, §§ 7, 11-12 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.1, 190.3, 190.4 (West 1979)).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
68. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, §7 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1
(West 1979)).
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circumstances for a contract killer,69 the killing of a peace officer, 0
69. The provision in the 1977 Legislation reads as follows: "(a) The murder was inten-
tional and was carried out pursuant to agreement by the person who committed the murder to
accept a valuable consideration for the act of murder from any person other than the victim."
1977 Legislation, supra note 63, §9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (a) (West
1979)).
The equivalent provision in the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute provided:
(a) The murder was intentional and was carried out pursuant to an agreement
with the defendant. "An agreement," as used in this subdivision, means an
agreement by the person who committed the murder to accept valuable consider-
ation for the act of murder from any person other than the victim.
1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1979)).
I find both of these provisions ambiguous with respect to the liability of the person hiring
the actual killer. Given the fact that all of the remaining special circumstances in the 1973
legislation were limited to a defendant who "personally committed the act which caused the
death of the victim," there is a strong argument that both the person who hires the killer and
the hired killer fall within the scope of the "contract killer" special circumstance. (1973
mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a) (West 1979)). Otherwise there would be little point in placing the "contract killer"
provision in a separate subsection from the remaining special circumstances. The same argu-
ment applies to the 1977 Legislation. All of the other special circumstances apply either to a
defendant who "physically aided or committed such act or acts causing death" (1977 Legisla-
tion, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1979)) or
require that the defendant be "personally present during the commission of the act or acts
causing death, and with intent to cause death [the defendant] physically aided or committed
such act or acts causing death ...." Id. (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)
(West 1979)). In addition, see infra text beginning at note 624.
It would thus seem that the purpose served by placing the "contract killer" special cir-
cumstance in a separate subsection would be to permit application of that special circumstance
to the person who hires the killer, even though he or she is not personally present or did not
physically aid or commit the act or acts causing death. Thus, despite the change of wording in
the "contract killer" special circumstance between the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute
and the 1977 Legislation, arguably they had exactly the same scope: both the hired killer and
the person who hired the killer fall within this special circumstance. The California Supreme
Court has reached the same conclusion in a dictum statement, though the court does not re-
vealing its reasoning. People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 750 n.11, 691 P.2d 994, 1006 n.l 1,
209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 339 n.l (1984).
70. The provision in the 1977 Legislation reads as follows:
(1) The victim is a peace officer as defined in Section 830.1, subdivision (a) or
(b) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 830.3, or subdivision (b) of
Section 830.5, who, while engaged in the performance of his duty was intention-
ally killed, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such
victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.
1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(1)
(West 1979)).
The equivalent provision in the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute provided:
(1) The victim is a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, subdivision (a) of
Section 830.2, or subdivision (b) of Section 830.5, who, while engaged in the
performance of his duty, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that such victim was a peace officer engaged in
the performance of his duties.
1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
the killing of a witness,7 1 a murder during one of five enumerated
felonies," a prior murder conviction,7 3 and a multiple-murder .7  The
CODE § 190.2(b)(1) (West 1979)).
The special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation was apparently copied from the 1973
mandatory death penalty statute with one amendment. The definition of "peace officer" was
expanded in the 1977 Legislation by including the officers defined in subdivision (b) of Section
830.2, and in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 830.3. Otherwise the two provisions use pre-
cisely the same language.
71. The provision in the 1977 Legislation reads as follows:
(2) The murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated; the victim was a wit-
ness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his
testimony in any criminal proceeding; and the killing was not committed during
the commission or attempted commission of the crime to which he was a
witness.
1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (c)(2)
(West 1979)).
The equivalent provision in the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute provided: "(2) The
murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated and the victim was a witness to a crime who
was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceed-
ing." 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(b)(2) (West 1979)).
These two provisions are nearly identical except for the last qualifying phrase in the 1977
provision. This phrase significantly narrows the scope of the 1977 special circumstance.
72. The provision in the 1977 Legislation reads as follows:
(3) The murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and was committed
during the commission or attempted commission of any of the following crimes:
(i) Robbery in violation of Section 211;
(ii) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or 209. Brief movements of a victim
which are merely incidental to the commission of another offense and which do
not substantially increase the victim's risk of harm over that necessarily inherent
in the other offense do not constitute a violation of Section 209 within the mean-
ing of this paragraph.
(iii) Rape by force or violence in violation of subdivision (2) of Section 261; or
by threat of great and immediate bodily harm in violation of subdivision (3) of
Section 261;
(iv) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child
under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288;
(v) Burglary in violation of subdivision (1) of Section 460 of an inhabited dwell-
ing house with an intent to commit grand or petit larceny or rape.
1977 death penalty legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(c)(3) (West 1979)).
The equivalent provision in the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute provided:
(3) The murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated and was committed
during the commission or attempted commission of any of the following crimes:
(i) Robbery in violation of Section 211.
(ii) Kidnapping, in violation of Section 207 or Section 209. Brief movements of
a victim which are merely incidental to the commission of another offense and
which do not substantially increase the victim's risk of harm over that necessa-
rily inherent in the other offense do not constitute kidnapping within the mean-
ing of this paragraph.
(iii) Rape by force or violence, in violation of subdivision (2) of Section 261; or
by threat of great and immediate bodily harm, in violation of subdivision (3) of
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1977 Legislation added two special circumstances not found in the
1973 statute: murder perpetrated by means of a destructive device or
explosive,75 and murder by torture. 76
The 1977 Legislation also expanded the scope of the special cir-
cumstances in another important way. In the 1973 mandatory capi-
tal punishment statute, with the single exception of the contract
killer,77 the special circumstances applied only to defendants con-
victed of first degree murder who "personally committed the act
which caused the death of the victim." s7 8 With a similar exception for
Section 261.
(iv) The performance of lewd or lascivious acts upon the person of a child under
the age of 14, in violation of Section 288.
(v) Burglary, in violation of subdivision (1) of Section 460, of an inhabited
dwelling housing entered by the defendant with an intent to commit grand or
petit larceny or rape.
1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(b)(3) (West 1979)).
These two special circumstances are identical.
73. See infra note 74.
74. The provision in the 1977 Legislation reads as follows:
The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of
murder of the first or second degree, or has been convicted in a prior proceeding
of the offense of murder of the first or second degree. For the purpose of this
paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in
California would be punishable as first or second degree murder shall be
deemed to be murder in the first or second degree.
1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(5)
(West 1979)).
The equivalent provision in the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute provided:
(4) The defendant has in this or in any prior proceeding been convicted of more
than one offense of murder of the first or second degree. For the purpose of this
paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in
California would be punishable as first or second degree murder shall be
deemed to be murder of the first or second degree.
1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(b)(4) (West 1979)).
The ambiguity in the 1973 statute was virtually eliminated in the 1977 provision.
75. This special circumstances is defined as follows: "(b) The defendant, with the intent
to cause death, physically aided or committed such act or acts causing death, and the murder
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and was perpetrated by means of a destructive device
or explosive." 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(b) (West 1979)).
76. "(4) The murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and involved the inflic-
tion of torture. For purposes of this section, torture requires proof of an intent to inflict ex-
treme and prolonged pain." 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(4) (West 1979)).
77. 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1979)). See supra note 61.
78. 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1979)).
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the contract killer 9 and for murder by means of a destructive device
or explosive,"0 the 1977 Legislation expanded the remaining special
circumstances to include defendant's who were "personally present
during the commission of the act or acts causing death, and with
intent to cause death physically aided or committed such act or acts
causing death."8" The 1977 Legislation thus expanded the scope of
the special circumstances by including defendants who were person-
ally present and who "physically" aided the commission of the act or
acts causing death."a "Accomplices" were not liable for the death
penalty under the 1973 mandatory death penalty law. 3 They were
eligible, under specified conditions, for the death penalty under the
1977 Legislation. 4
Despite the specific changes in the reach of the special circum-
stances defined in the 1977 Legislation as compared to the 1973 stat-
ute, the purpose and function of the special circumstances are pre-
cisely the same in both statutes. They define eligibility for the death
79. See supra note 37.
80. See supra note 37. The reason for not requiring the defendant to be personally*
present for this special circumstances should be quite obvious.
81. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(c) (West 1979)).
82. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 9 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(c) (West 1979)). It is conceivable, but not obvious, that the 1977 legislation also might
have narrowed the scope of the special circumstances set forth in the 1973 mandatory death.
penalty statute. The 1973 statute required the defendant to personally commit the act which
caused death, whereas the 1977 Legislation required a defendant to be personally present and,
commit the act or acts causing death. If a defendant can personally commit an act without
being personally present when the act is committed, then the 1977 Legislation narrowed the
liability from that provided by the 1973 statute. I doubt this was intended to restrict the liabil-
ity of a defendant who personally commits the act causing death. Instead, it was probably
meant to limit the liability of the defendant who "aided" another to commit the act or acts
causing death.
83. See 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation, supra note 36, § 5 (codified as former
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1979).
84. The statute provides that except where death eligibility is predicated on either the
"contract killer" or the murder perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive spe-
cial circumstances, "the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person who was a princi-
pal in the commission of a capital offense unless he was personally present during the commis-
sion of the act or acts causing death, and intentionally physically aided or committed such act
or acts causing death." 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 13 (codified as former CAL. PENAL,
CODE § 190.5(b) (West 1979)). For the purposes of the foregoing provision, "the defendant
shall be deemed to have physically aided in the act or acts causing death only if it is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct constitutes an assault or a battery upon the victim
or if by word or conduct he orders, initiates, or coerces the actual killing of the victim." 1977
Legislation, supra note 63, § 13 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(c) (West
1979)). All parties classified at common law a an accessory before the fact, as a principal in
the first degree or a principal in the second degree are liable as principals in California. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1988).
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penalty as a matter of the substantive criminal law in the same man-
ner as the elements of the crime of first degree murder defined eligi-
bility for the death penalty under the pre-Anderson law of Califor-
nia.8" They effectively divide the crime of first degree murder into a
capital offense (first degree murder with a special circumstance) and
a non-capital offense.
Conformity with the United States Supreme Court's 1976 death
penalty decisions, and with Rockwell, was achieved by creating sen-
tencing standards to be employed by the sentencing authority at the
penalty phase of the capital trial. These standards are known as the
"factors" or "circumstances" in aggravation and mitigation.86 The
process by which the sentencing authority is to arrive at its decision
is also specified by the statute:
After having heard and received all of the evidence, the trier of
fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this sec-
tion, and shall determine whether the penalty shall be death or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.87
Finally, the special circumstance phase of the 1973 mandatory
death penalty statute was abolished,88 except in instances in which
the special circumstance was a prior conviction of murder in the first
or second degree.89 Since special circumstances are apparently distin-
guishable from the elements of first degree murder only by their re-
spective names, it made little sense to litigate the "truth" or "falsity"
of the special circumstance in a separate proceeding. The obvious
reason for making an exception for the prior-murder-conviction spe-
cial circumstance is to protect the defendant from the prejudice in-
herent in the trier of fact learning that the defendant has been previ-
ously convicted of murder while the question of the defendant's guilt
of first degree murder is still being decided. The Legislature's gen-
eral abolition of the special circumstance phase of the capital trial
further confirms that the special circumstances are simply capital of-
fenses under another name.
The 1977 Legislation thus embraced the basic structure of the
85. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
86. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 11 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.3 (West 1979)).
87. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 11 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.3 (West 1979)).
88. See supra text accompanying note 39.
89. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 7 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.1(a) (West 1979)).
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1973 mandatory death penalty statute with respect to the special cir-
cumstances, amended several of the special circumstances and added
two more. Furthermore, the Legislature excised the provisions for an
automatic sentence of death, restored the penalty phase and individu-
alized capital sentencing from pre-Furman law. However, the Leg-
islature guided the sentencing authority's decision by aggravating
and mitigating factors.
D. The 1978 Death Penalty Initiative
Almost immediately, the opponents of the 1977 Legislation
abandoned the legislative halls and took to the streets. Their purpose
was to repeal the 1977 statute, which was regarded as "weak" death
penalty legislation and replace it with a "stronger" statute enacted
by the People through the initiative process." State Senator John V.
90. A glimpse of the process of compromise that produced the 1977 Legislation is de-
scribed by Cynthia Roberts in the California Journal:
In this year's controversy over reinstitution of capital punishment, Republican
Senator George Deukmejian could have maneuvered almost any bill he wanted
through the Senate. The key question, as always, was whether he could get
anything from the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee-even though there
was a majority waiting on the Assembly floor to vote for a death-penalty
measure.
As it turned out, the committee passed a weak capital punishment measure out
of political necessity. The alternative would have been a strong bill written on
the floor. And the committee won an agreement from Deukmejian not to accept
any amendments that would stiffen the bill. This meant that even if Governor
Brown's anticipated veto were overridden, California would have a relatively
weak law ...
It is only under extraordinary circumstances, such as with the death penalty,
that the committee can't take the heat and must allow a bill to survive that it
would rather kill. The key vote for Deukmejian's bill was cast by Democrat
Frank Vicencia, who said he was doing so because of political realities and not
because he favors capital punishment. Negotiations on the substance of the mea-
sure were conducted by Majority Leader Howard Berman, another death-pen-
alty opponent and Speaker Leo McCarthy's main man on the committee. If the
issue had not been so political, with Democrats fearing the consequences of a
strong death-penalty measure on the ballot next year, the bill would have died.
The committee, from a liberal viewpoint, did the next best thing. It made sure
that the bill sent to the floor was the weakest bill obtainable.
Roberts, "Court Of Last Resort:" The Assembly's Graveyard for Law-Enforcement Legisla-
tion, 8 CALIF. J. 197 (1977).
It is unfortunate that much of the political debate about the restoration of capital punish-
ment in California centered around "tough" and "weak" legislation (see id.), and what would
pass constitutional muster under the eighth amendment. See supra note 61. What we needed
was a debate about the death penalty and public policy. But, for the most part, issues about
the wisdom of capital punishment, public policy, and appropriate death penalty provisions
were ignored in the race to restore capital punishment. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 198-200,
233-34.
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Briggs, the sponsor of the death penalty initiative, claimed "that the
California citizenry want[ed] a tough, effective death-penalty law to
protect the state's families from ruthless killers. But every attempt to
enact such a law ha[d] been thwarted by the powerful anti-capital
punishment members of the Legislature . . . .The current law was
drafted in such a way as to make it as weak and ineffective as possi-
ble . . ., but this initiative would give Californians the toughest
death-penalty law in the country.""'
The 1978 death penalty initiative qualified for the ballot on
June 27, 1978, as Proposition 7. It was approved by 72 per cent of
the voters at the general election held on Tuesday, November 7,
1978.92 Except for crimes committed before its effective date,93 the
1978 Initiative currently governs capital punishment in California.94
Senator Briggs' hyperbole promised a revolution. The initiative
produced quite ordinary changes in the law. The structure of capital
punishment law established in the 1977 Legislation is maintained
without change. Death eligibility remains dependent upon conviction
of first degree murder and a finding of the truth of at least one of the
enumerated special circumstances.9" The "truth" or "untruth" of the
special circumstances is still to be decided in the guilt phase of the
capital trial with the same single exception of the prior-murder-con-
viction special circumstance.9 The special circumstances still func-
tion as rules of substantive law effectively sub-dividing the offense of
first degree murder into a capital and a non-capital offense.97 Once
death eligibility is established in this manner, the sentence is deter-
91. California Journal Ballot Proposition Analysis, 9 CALIF. J. (Special Section, No-
vember 1978) 4-5 (1978).
92. Salzman, Election '78 Post-Mortem, 9 CALIF. J. 386, 390 (1978).
93. Since the 1977 Legislation contained an urgency provision, it became effective on
August 11, 1977 when the bill was passed over the Governor's veto (Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr.) and filed with the Secretary of State. 1977 Legislation, supra note 63, § 26, at
1266. As an initiative measure, the 1978 Initiative became effective when it was approved by
the voters on November 7, 1978. Since the 1978 Initiative cannot be applied to a crime com-
mitted before its effective date, a capital crime committed between August 11, 1977 and No-
vember 7, 1978 is governed by the 1977 Legislation. People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671
P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983); People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982). A capital crime committed before August 11, 1977 is not subject to the
death penalty inasmuch as both the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute, and its predecessor
statute, are unconstitutional, and the 1977 Legislation may not be applied retroactively. People
v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979).
94. The 1978 Initiative is codified as CAL. PENAL CODE sections 190, 190.1, 190.2,
190.3, 190.4, 190.5 (West 1988).
95. Id. §§ 190.1, 190.2.
96. Id. § 190.1(a), (b).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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mined in the familiar penalty phase of the trial98 by weighing the
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors."
Important changes were made, however, in the contents within
this structure. Ten new special circumstances were added:' (1)
murder to prevent arrest or to escape from lawful custody;' 0 ' (2)
murder of a federal law enforcement officer; 0 2 (3) murder of a fire-
man;103 (4) murder of a prosecutor; 104 (5) murder of a judge; 0 5 (6)
murder of other specified government officials;1' 6 (7) an "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" murder; 0 7 (8) murder by lying in
wait;0 8 (9) murder because of the victim's "race, color, religion, na-
tionality or country of origin";'0 9 and murder by poison." 0
The 1978 Initiative also substantially amended the actus reus of
five of the special circumstances shared with the 1977 Legislation.
Each of these changes enlarged the scope of the special circumstance
from what it had been under the 1977 Legislation. The "contract
killer" special circumstance"' was replaced by a murder for "finan-
cial gain" special circumstance." 2 The murder of a peace officer spe-
cial circumstance was changed by expanding the definition of "peace
officer"."' Witness-murder was expanded by including within its
98. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1(c), 190.3, 190.4 (West 1988).
99. Id. § 190.3.
100. Although the 1977 Legislation defined eight special circumstances (see supra text
accompanying notes 69-76) and the 1978 Initiative defines nineteen (see infra text accompany-
ing notes 101-34), one of the special circumstances enumerated in the 1977 Legislation was
divided and its actus reus narrowed in the 1978 Initiative. Former section 190.2(b) defined a
special circumstance in terms of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder "perpetrated
by means of a destructive device or explosive." Two special circumstances were defined in
terms of a murder by "means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive" in the 1978 Initia-
tive: when the device, bomb or explosive was concealed (§ 190.2(a)(4) (West 1988)); and when
the device, bomb or explosive was mailed or delivered (§ 190.2(a)(6) (West 1988)). Since the
actus reus of both of these special circumstances is included within the physical acts prohibited
by the corresponding single special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation, ten, not eleven, spe-
cial circumstances were added by the 1978 Initiative.
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (West 1988).
102. Id. § 190.2(a)(8).
103. Id. § 190.2(a)(9).
104. Id. § 190.2(a)(11).
105. Id. § 190.2(a)(12).
106. Id. § 190.2(a)(13).
107. Id. § 190.2(a)(14).
108. Id. § 190.2(a)(15).
109. Id. § 190.2(a)(16).
110. Id. § 190.2(a)(19).
111. See supra note 69.
112. CAL. PENAL COnE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988).
113. Compare former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(1) (West 1979) with CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(7) (West 1988).
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scope the intentional killing of a witness "in retaliation for his testi-
mony in any criminal proceeding." 1 4
The felony-murder special circumstance was apparently ex-
panded in three ways. First, the list of qualifying felonies was aug-
mented by adding four felonies (sodomy, oral copulation, arson, and
train wrecking):' Second, the limitations on the qualifying felonies
of kidnapping,1 rape, and burglary"i were removed. Third, in
addition to applying while the defendant is engaged in the commis-
sion or attempted commission of one of the enumerated felonies, the
felony-murder rule is expressly made applicale to murders commit-
ted in "the immediate flight" after committing or attempting one of
the qualifying felonies.11" On its face, the 1977 provision applies
only during the commission or attempted commission of one of the
listed felonies.120 Finally, the torture-murder special circumstance
was amended by the addition of the following sentence: "For the
purpose of this section torture requires proof of the infliction of ex-
treme physical pain no matter how long its duration." '1
Of equal importance, the mens rea requirements specified in the
special circumstances carried forward from the 1977 Legislation
were substantially altered. The general requirement that the defend-
ant act with the "intent to cause death"' 22 was repealed. 2 In addi-
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 1988).
115. Id. § 190.2(a)(17)(iv), (vi), (viii), (ix).
116. The kidnapping felony in the 1977 Legislation contained the following limitation:
"Brief movements of a victim which are merely incidental to the commission of another offense
and which do not substantially increase the victim's risk of harm over that necessarily inherent
in the other offense do not constitute a violation of Section 209 within the meaning of this
paragraph." Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(ii) (West 1978). This limitation was
omitted in the 1978 Initiative's felony-murder provision. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(ii)
(West 1988).
117. The felony of rape referred to in the 1977 Legislation's felony-murder rule con-
tained the following limitation: rape "by force or violence in violation of subdivision (2) of
Section 261; or by threat of great and immediate bodily harm in violation of subdivision (3) of
Section 261." Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(iii) (West 1978). The initiative's
equivalent provisions simply specifies, "Rape in violation of Section 261." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(17)(iii) (West 1988).
118. The felony-murder special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation specified the fel-
ony of burglary, but limited the qualifying offense to burglary "in violation of subdivision (1)
of Section 460 of an inhabited dwelling house with an intent to commit grand or petit larceny
or rape." Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(v) (West 1978). The equivalent provision
in the initiative reads, "Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(vii) (West 1988).
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988).
120. The text of this provision is quoted supra note 72. It is not clear whether the 1978
provision expanded liability from what it was under the 1977 provision.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988).
122. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b), (c) (West 1979).
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tion, four special circumstances in the 1977 Legislation (the "de-
structive device or explosive, '1 24 the witness-murder,' 25 the felony-
murder, 2 and the torture-murder2 7 special circumstances) required
that the murder be willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Each of
these requirements was eliminated by the 1978 legislation.
Presently, the "destructive device or explosive" special circum-
stance' 28 requires that "the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that his act or acts would create a great risk of death to
a human being or human beings." '29 The witness-murder special
circumstance requires that the witness be "intentionally killed for the
purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding."' 30
The provisions governing the felony-murder special circumstance in
the 1978 legislation are so ambiguously worded that its mens rea
requirement cannot be easily determined,'' although it is clear that
the murder need not be willful, deliberate, and premeditated. 2
Lastly, the torture-murder special circumstance is written to require
123. This general requirement expressly applied to all of the special circumstances ex-
cept for the "contract killer" and the "destructive device or explosive" special circumstances.
Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c) (West 1979). This general provision was. frequently
redundant. Of the eight special circumstances enumerated in the 1977 Legislation, four re-
quired that the murder be "willful, deliberate, and premeditated." See infra notes 124-27.
Since the term "willful" murder is an intent-to-kill murder, the general requirement added
nothing to these special circumstances. E.g. People v. Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162, 170, 554 P.2d
881, 884, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (1976); California Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 8.20
(1979 Revision) (West 1979) [hereinafter CALJIC]. The "destructive device or explosive"
special circumstances also specified that an "intent to cause death" was required. Former CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1979). The peace officer-murder special circumstance specifi-
cally required that the officer be "intentionally killed" so that the general provision added
nothing to that special circumstance (id. § 190.2(c)(1)); and the "contract killer" special cir-
cumstance contains an intentionality requirement as well. Id. § 190.2(a). Thus the only special
circumstances that could have been effected by the general provision that the defendant act
with the intent to cause death was the prior murder conviction and the multiple-murder spe-
cial circumstances. It was thus understandable that the general provision was eliminated in the
1978 Initiative.
124. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1979).
125. Id. § 190.2(c)(2).
126. Id. § 190.2(c)(3).
127. Id. § 190.2(c)(4).
128. See supra note 100.
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(4), (6) (West 1988).
130. Id. § 190.2(a)(10). The witness-murder special circumstance required the same
mens rea, but also added that the "murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated." Former
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(2) (West 1979). It should also be noted that this special circum-
stance requires proof of a specific intent-that the purpose of the intentional killing was either
to "prevent the testimony of the witness in a criminal proceeding or in retaliation for such
testimony." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 1988).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 388-422.
132. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988).
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only an intentional murder,' though it is not without some
ambiguity.""
Several other critical changes were made in the death eligibility
of both perpetrators and accomplices in the 1978 legislation. Under
the predecessor legislation, except for the "contract killer"'" 5 and the
"destructive device or explosive"' 8 special circumstances, both per-
petrators and accomplices had to meet the following criteria:
The defendant was personally present during the commission of
the act or acts causing death, and with intent to cause death
physically aided or committed such act or acts causing death
and any of the following additional circumstances exists... s3
The requirement of personal presence was completely elimi-
nated by the 1978 Initiative. Thus the rule with respect to the "con-
tract killer" and the "destructive device or explosive" special circum-
stances in the 1977 Legislation was extended to all defendants,
whether perpetrators or accomplices.
Accomplices were death eligible under the 1977 Legislation (ex-
cept for the "contract killer" special circumstance) only if, in addi-
tion to personal presence, they physically aided in the commission of
the act or acts causing death.' 8 The physical aid requirement was
given a restrictive statutory definition:
For the purposes of subdivision (c), the defendant shall be
deemed to have physically aided in the act or acts causing death
only if it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct
constitutes an assault or a battery upon the victim or if by word
or conduct he orders, initiates, or coerces the actual killing of
the victim." 9
This physical aide limitation, like the requirement of personal
presence, was abandoned as well. Accomplice liability, and perhaps
the liability of some perpetrators, " is governed by the following ex-
133. Id. § 190.2(a)(18).
134. See infra text at notes 351-59.
135. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1979).
136. Id. § 190.2(b).
137. Id. § 190.2(c). The same requirement of personal presence and intentional physi-
cally aid or actual commission is repeated at id. § 190.5(a).
138. Id. § 190.5(b).
139. Id. § 190.5(d). This definition of physical aid is repeated at id. § 190.5(c). Al-
though the "destructive device or explosive" special circumstance also provided for liability of
the accomplice only if the accomplice "physically aided or committed such act or acts causing
death," subsections (d) of section 190.2, and subsection (c) of section 190.5 were not applicable
to this provision. Id. §§ 190.2(d), 190.5(c).
140. The ambiguity in this section with respect to perpetrators is directed primarily at
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pansive provision:
Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of
intentionally aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, induc-
ing, soliciting, requesting, or assisting any actor in the commis-
sion of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or confine-
ment in the state prison for a term of life without the possibility
of parole, in any case in which one or more of the special cir-
cumstances enumerated . . . has been charged and specially
found under Section 190.4 to be true.14 1
Though important changes were also made in the aggravating
factors which guide the sentencing authority in the penalty phase of
the trial, and in the penalty phase procedures, those topics are re-
served for discussion on another day.142
Before turning to the court's understanding of the nature of the
special circumstances, a short summary of the changes in the special
circumstances wrought by the 1978 Initiative should prove helpful.
1. Summary Of Changes Wrought By The 1978 Initiative
The structure of the death penalty law established by the 1977
Legislation was retained, but many important changes were made in
the content of the law. All of the special circumstances defined in the
1977 Legislation were carried forward into the 1978 Initiative.
However, five of these eight special circumstances were expanded by
amending the reach of their actus reus. Ten new special circum-
stances were added.
The general requirement that the defendant act with intent to
cause death was removed, and all requirements that the murder be
willful, deliberate, and premeditated were eliminated. Nevertheless,
the 1978 Initiative usually defined each special circumstance to re-
quire some form of mens rea." 3
The requirement that both principals and accomplices be per-
sonally present during the commission of the act or acts causing
death- was eliminated. Furthermore, the 1977 Legislation's limitation
of accomplice liability to defendants who physically aided the act or
acts causing death was eliminated as well, as was the restrictive defi-
the felony-murder special circumstance. This is the Carlos-Anderson debate between the Bird
and Lucas courts. It is discussed below. See infra text at notes 389-422.
141. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1988).
142. See Poulos, The Lucas Court And The Penalty Phase Of Capital Trials: The
Original Understanding, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. - (1990).
143. See supra notes 123-34; infra note 216; infra text accompanying notes 349-61
(torture-murder), 423-63 (felony-murder), 635-49 (financial-gain-murder).
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nition of physical aid. The evolution of the law with respect to these
changes is discussed in Section IV.'" Before the specific law of the
special circumstances is discussed, however, the general theory of the
special circumstances will be explored. The following section of this
article, Part III, examines the purpose, structure, and function of the
special circumstances, and the fundamental principles governing
their interpretation.
III. THE NATURE OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
A. An Introductory Analysis
The death penalty statutes of California create or rely on three
types of legal rules which serve three distinct purposes. First to be
discussed are the rules of the substantive criminal law. These rules
.define the several crimes and the various forms of justification, ex-
cuse and mitigation. Under all three of the recent death penalty stat-
utes, one must first be found guilty of murder in the first degree
before a "special circumstance" can attach and render the culprit
eligible for the death penalty.' 45 Quite obviously, the rules defining
the crime of murder in the first degree are matters of substantive
criminal law governed by established constitutional, 4" statutory, 47
and common law principles. 4
These rules of substantive criminal law have two essential pur-
poses: They define what is prohibited by the criminal law, and they
define eligibility for the imposition of the criminal sanction for those
who violate the substantive offense. All three of these California
144. See infra text following note 338.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 68, 95.
146. For example, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the
prosecution to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g.,
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sanstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); People
v. Roder, 33 Cal. 3d 491, 658 P.2d 1302, 189 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1983).
147. California Penal Code 'section 20 codifies a fundamental principle of the criminal
law: "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and
intent, or criminal negligence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988). In Green, the California
Supreme Court said, "So basic is this requirement that it is an invariable element of every
crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication." People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1,
53, 609 P.2d 468, 519, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 53 (1980). In Martinez, the court said, "It is a basic
premise of our criminal law that 'with crimes which require both some act or omission and
mental fault, no crime is committed unless the mental fault concurs with the act or omission, in
the sense that the mental state actuates the act or omission.' " People v. Martinez, 150 Cal.
App. 3d 579, 602, 198 Cal. Rptr. 565, 580-81. (1984).
148. It is, for example, part of the common law tradition to analyze crime in terms of
the actus reus (the physical part of the crime) and the inens rea (mental part of the crime) of
the given offense. See, e.g., Martinez, 150 Cal. App. 3d 579, 198 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1984).
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death penalty statutes (the 1973 and 1977 statutes and the 1978 Ini-
tiative) use the crime of first degree murder and all of the substantive
rules governing criminal homicide as the foundation upon which eli-
gibility for the death penalty is based. " 9
The three death penalty statutes also create rules of criminal
procedure. These rules govern the process by which the substantive
law is invoked. For example, each statute creates separate phases in
the capital trial,"50 specifies the prosecution's burden of proof with
respect to the special circumstances,' 5 ' and designates other proce-
dural matters such as the identity of the trier-of-facts" 2 and the con-
sequences of a hung jury."81
Procedural rules are also governed by established constitu-
tional,' 54 statutory,"' and common law" 6 principles, but these con-
straints are frequently different from those governing the substantive
criminal law. Though the distinction between substantive and proce-
dural rules may not often arise, the distinction can be of critical im-
portance, as we shall see below."'
The third species of legal rules created by two of the three
death penalty statutes are rules governing the sentencing decision in
capital cases. Since the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute pro-
vided an inexorable sentence of death on conviction of first degree
murder coupled with a finding of truth of at least one of the enumer-
ated special circumstances, the 1973 statute did not create sentencing
rules. Instead, the death sentence automatically flowed from a con-
149. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 68, 95.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 66, 98.
151. See supra notes 39, 68, 95.
152. See supra notes 40, 68, 96.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 63, 95.
154. For example, the federal constitution applies to such procedural matters as the use
of "victim impact" statements at the penal phase of a capital trial (Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496, (1987)), the voir dire examination of prospective jurors (e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476
U.S. 28 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)), the prosecutor's argument during
the penalty phase (e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)), and jury instructions in
a capital case (e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 1020 (1987); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307 (1985)), among a multitude of procedural rules governed by the federal constitution.
155. For example, the California Penal Code provides that "No part of it is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." CAL. PENAL CODE § 3 (West 1988). And that "[wihenever in
this Code the punishment for a crime is left undetermined between certain limits, the punish-
ment to be inflicted in a particular case must be determined by the court authorized to pass
sentence, within such limits as may be prescribed by this Code." Id. § 13.
156. For example, the rules governing prosecutorial misconduct during the argument in
a death case are frequently viewed as being based upon common law notions of fairness, unless
the argument is so outrageous as to violate due process of law. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 411 (1986).
157. See infra text accompanying notes 168-72.
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viction under the substantive law. But both the 1977 Legislation and
the 1978 Initiative create sentencing rules which guide, if not govern,
the sentencing authority's selection of the penalty: death or life with-
out possibility of parole."5 8 These sentencing rules are the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors specified in both statutes.1"' In conjunction
with the procedural rules which regulate the sentencing process, it is
the purpose of these rules to give substantive guidance for assessing
the punishment. 6
Sentencing rules are a recent innovation in the law of capital
punishment. They were initially adopted in response to Furman's
holding that unfettered sentencing discretion violates the eighth
amendment. Their primary goal is to implement the constitutional
mandate for individualized capital sentencing 6" by guiding and lim-
iting that discretion "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action."' 62 Lacking roots in the common law, there
are few, if any, existing common law principles that directly govern
these sentencing rules. The same may be said of guiding statutory
principles. Although the federal constitution does place some limits
on the nature and content of these sentencing rules, 63 we are still in
the early stages of articulating those constitutional principles. There
are still many more constitutional questions than there are answers.
And because these sentencing rules are of such recent vintage, we
have only begun the process of creating new common law principles
to govern them. 64
How then should the "special circumstances" be classified? Are
they elements of a crime, procedural rules, sentencing rules, or some
type of sui generis category of rule unique to the law of capital pun-
ishment? Should the special circumstances be governed by the rules
pertaining to the substantive criminal law, to criminal procedure, to
sentencing rules, or an entirely new body of law yet to be created?
Or to put the question slightly differently, to what body of law
should lawyers and judges look to properly construe and apply the
special circumstances?
The choice of governing law should be determined by looking to
158. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 99.
159. See supra notes 66, 99.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 161-63, 170-72.
161. See supra note 162.
162. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 159 (1976) (joint opinion of Justices Stewart,
Powell & Stevens). See also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983); Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987). See generally Poulos, supra note 8, at 192-200.
163. E.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 170-72.
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the purpose and function of the special circumstances. They are rules
of law defining prohibited conduct and fixing liability for punish-
ment for those who breach them. Since that is the purpose of the
substantive criminal law, they should be governed by the rules of the
substantive criminal law, unless they function in such a way as to
make those rules inappropriate for their governance.
To establish guilt of a crime at trial the prosecution has the
burden of (1) pleading, and (2) proving (3) beyond a reasonable
doubt (4) to the trier of fact (5) by evidence produced in open court
(6) the existence of (7) specified historical facts (the actus reus and
the mens rea) (8) which must be unanimously found, (9) and trans-
lated into a verdict (10) which permits only one of two choices,
"guilty" or "not guilty." The verdict establishes the defendant's lia-
bility for punishment and implements the very purpose for the law's
existence, the goals of retribution, deterrence, and sometimes
rehabilitation.
The special circumstances function in precisely the same way.
The prosecution has the burden of (1) pleading (charging) one or
more of the special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2, and
(2) proving, (3) beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) to the trier of fact (5)
by evidence produced in open court (6) the existence (the "truth")
(7) of the charged special circumstances (which are historical
facts166), (8) which must be unanimously found (9) and translated
into a finding (a verdict), (10) which permits only two choices,
"true" or "not true."' 166 As noted above, the effect of the finding of
the truth of the special circumstance fixes liability for punishment
and implements the very purpose of the law's existence, deterrence
and retribution in the case of capital punishment. Thus, it functions
in the same way as a "guilty" verdict of murder in the first degree
did under the pre-Furman law of California.
1 67
Given their purpose and function in the process of the criminal
law, the special circumstances should be found to be governed by the
principles of the substantive criminal law. They should be labeled as
165. The California Supreme Court has recognized that the determination of the
"truth" or "non-truth" of the special circumstances requires a factual determination in pre-
cisely the same way that a jury's verdict on the guilt or innocence of a crime requires a factual
determination. People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 552, 684 P.2d 826, 833, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265,
272 (1984); People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal. 3d 797, 803, 647 P.2d 76, 79, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 803 (1982).
166. 1978 Initiative: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 190.2, 190.4 (West 1988). 1977 Leg-
islation: Former CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 190.2, 190.4 (West 1979). 1973 mandatory
death penalty statute: Former CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1 & 190.2 (West 1979).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
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elements of the capital crime of first degree murder with a special
circumstance. Using this same criteria, the law governing procedural
and sentencing rules should be rejected as having any unique rele-
vance to special circumstance issues. Special circumstances have
neither the purpose nor the function of procedural rules. They do
not concern the process of the capital trial, the way the capital trial
is conducted. Rather, their determination, along with that of the un-
derlying offense, is the goal of the guilt phase of the capital trial. 68
Moreover, the special circumstances do not function as do the
sentencing rules, the aggravating and mitigating factors, at the. sen-
tencing phase of the capital trial. The sentencing process is not the
same as the guilt determination process. In the guilt phase, and the
special circumstance phase if required,'69 the jury (or the judge as
the case may be) finds the facts and applies the law to the facts so
found to reach a verdict. The special circumstance is either true or
untrue under the facts as found and the law as applied.
At the sentencing phase, the jury's role changes from "trier of
fact" to "sentencing authority." The jury's role at the sentencing
phase is "inherently moral and normative, not factual."' 70 It ex-
presses "the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
life or death.'' 7 Given the different function of the sentencing jury,
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances serve a different pur-
pose than do either the special circumstances or other rules of sub-
stantive law. They guide the jury's sentencing discretion rather than
dictate the verdict once the facts are found.'7 2
168. Except for the case of a prior murder conviction special circumstance, the truth of
the charged special circumstances are determined in the guilt phase of the capital trial under
both the 1977 Legislation and the 1978 Initiative. See supra notes 89, 96. For a reason un-
known to me, the 1973 mandatory death penalty legislation provided for the determination of
the special circumstances in a separate phase of the capital trial. See supra note 65.
169. This would occur under either the 1977 Legislation or the 1978 Initiative only if
the charged special circumstance is a prior murder conviction. See supra text accompanying
notes 89, 96.
170. People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 779, 726 P.2d 113, 144, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667,
698 (1986). See People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985),
rev'd on another ground in California v. Brown, 484 U.S. 1014 (1987).
171. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501 (1987) (quoting from Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
172. Should the sentencing jury conclude that one or more aggravating factors existed
beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating factors, a verdict of death would
not be required. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985),
re,'d on another ground in California v. Brown, 484 U.S. 1014 (1987) (accord). On the other
hand, if the jury were to conclude that a special circumstance was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury would be required to return a verdict that the special circumstance were true
(unless the jury refused to apply the law).
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How then has the California Supreme Court treated the "spe-
cial circumstances"?
B. The Bird Court Precedent
This question was initially confronted by the Bird court. The
court rejected attempts to classify special circumstances as both pro-
cedural rules'17 and as sentencing factors or enhancements.'7 4 But
the court vacillated between characterizing the special circumstances
as "categories of first degree murder' '17 5 on the one hand, and as sui
generis rules on the other.'M But even under the sui generis theory,
the court appeared to be more concerned with the label than with
the applicable substantive law. The sui generis theory was first ar-
ticulated in Garcia:
Seeking to distinguish Sandstrom, the Attorney General argues
that a special circumstance is not a "crime," and an element of
a special circumstance thus is not an "element of a crime." His
argument is technically sound; special circumstances are sui
generis-neither a crime, an enhancement, nor a sentencing fac-
tor. In People v. Superior Court (Engert) (1982) 31 Cal. 3d
797, 803 [183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76], we said: "In the
California scheme the special circumstance is not just an aggra-
vating factor: it is a fact or set of facts, found beyond reasonable
doubt by a unanimous verdict (Pen. Code, § 190.4), which
changes the crime from one punishable by imprisonment of 25
years to life to one which must be punished either by death or
173. People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 117-18, 588 P.2d 773, 781, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633,
641 (1979).
174. People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d'539, 552, 684 P.2d 826, 832, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271
(1984). The court of appeal reached the same conclusion in Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal.
App. 3d 944, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1979). Ghent's holding was approved by the California
Supreme Court in Ramos v. Superior.Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 648 P.2d 589, 184 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1982).
175. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 429, 556 P.2d 1101, 1104, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 650, 653 (1976) (referring to the special circumstances enumerated in the 1973
mandatory death penalty legislation).
In a similar vein, in Teron the court generally characterized the 1977 Legislation as
containing "vitally substantive policy considerations" and that the legislation "cannot be char-
acterized as simply a 'procedural' measure." Teron, 23 Cal. 3d at 117-18, 588 P.2d at 781,
151 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
It should be noted that the elements of the crime of first degree murder have been referred
to as "aggravating elements of first degree murder." People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 545, 546
P.2d 665, 668, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (1976). A similar reference is made in Thomas, to
point out another among many cases. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 895, 156 P.2d 7, 15
(1945).
176. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d at 552, 684 P.2d at 832, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
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by life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The fact or
set of facts to be found in regard to the special circumstance is
not less crucial to the potential for deprivation of liberty on the
part of the accused than are the elements of the underlying
crime which, when found by a jury, define the crime rather
than a lesser included offense or component." . . . Engert
therefore held that the standards of specificity applicable to stat-
utes defining criminal offenses applied equally to special cir-
cumstances. ...
As we noted in Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.
3d 131, 134, "[a] finding of murder with special circumstances
requires the trier of fact to choose between only two alterna-
tives-death or life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
role-the most severe punishments permitted under our law." It
is, moreover, an essential prerequisite to the imposition of the
unique and extreme sanction of death. In view of the impor-
tance of a special circumstance finding, we do not believe the
courts can extend a defendant less protection with regard to the
elements of a special circumstance than for the elements of a
criminal charge. If failure to instruct on the element of a crime
is a denial of federal due process, the same consequence should
attend failure to instruct on the element of a special
circumstance."'
While the court thus refused to characterize special circum-
stances as crimes out of "technical" accuracy, recognizing that the
purpose and function of the special circumstances are precisely the
same as the purpose and function of crimes, the court held that the
elements of a special circumstance are governed by the same body of
law governing the elements of crimes. The virtue of initially labeling
a special circumstance as a crime is obvious. It immediately informs
counsel and the lower courts of the body of law to which they should
look in interpreting and applying the special circumstances. Quite
obviously, the cause of justice is best served when the law is correctly
fashioned and applied in the lower courts. 178
Nevertheless, the courts of California, at least before the emer-
177. Id.
178. Since the special circumstances were an innovation in California law, it was inevi-
table that the courts would be presented with a wide variety of situations in which the nature
of the special circumstances must be decided. Had the California Supreme Court adhered to
initial position in Rockwell and clearly labeled special circumstances as crimes in Teron, rever-
sals in a number of the later cases may have been avoided because both counsel and the lower
courts may have understood that they were governed by the familiar principles of the substan-
tive criminal law. See infra note 179.
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gence of the Lucas court, have universally applied the law governing
substantive crimes in interpreting and applying the special circum-
stances. 179 Indeed, research fails to disclose a single instance in
179. Listed here are the major decisions of the California Supreme Court and the courts
of appeal which treat special circumstances as though they were crimes. In each instance, the
court applied the rules governing crimes to the interpretation and application of the special
circumstances.
(1) The common law principle that the actus reus of a crime must be actuated by the
defendants' inens rea (the concurrence requirement), which is codified in CAL. PENAL CODE §
20 (West 1988), applies with equal force to special circumstances. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d
1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980) (felony-murder (robbery) special circumstance in the
1977 Legislation); People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1980) (accord). Furthermore, the Green holding applies to the felony-murder special circum-
stances in the 1978 Initiative. People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr.
57 (1985) (felony-murder (kidnapping) special circumstance); Ario v. Superior Court, 124
Cal. App. 3d 285, 177 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1981) (accord). The Green requirement is discussed
infra text at notes 423-63.
(2) The torture-murder special circumstance of the 1978 Initiative requires an intent to
inflict extreme pain despite the fact that the provision does not explicitly mention an intent
requirement with respect to the torture element of the special circumstance. People v. Daven-
port, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985); People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d
92, 710 P.2d 893, 221 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1985) (accord). In the parlance of California criminal
law, the torture-murder special circumstance is a "specific intent" special circumstance. People
v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 994-95, 750 P.2d 794, 805, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 916 (1988). See
Ortega v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 244, 185 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1982). The torture-
murder special circumstance is discussed infra at notes 349-76.
(3) The witness-murder special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative applies only to the
murder of a witness to a crime, as opposed to a juvenile proceeding; and the defendant's sub-
jective intent is crucial. The defendant must intentionally kill the victim for the purpose of
preventing the victim from testifying in an imminent criminal proceeding. People v. Weidert,
39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 389, 218 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985). This means that the defendant must
have two intents: first the defendant must intend to kill the victim; and second, the defendant
must do so for the purpose of preventing the victim from testifying in an imminent criminal
proceeding. The witness-murder special circumstance should be considered a "specific intent"
special circumstance for precisely the same reason that the torture-murder special circumstance
is considered to be a "specific intent" special circumstance.
(4) The special circumstance of murder-to-perfect-an-escape in the 1978 Initiative re-
quires that the killing be motivated by the goal of escaping custody, and must take place before
the defendant has reached a place of temporary safety outside the confines of the prison. Peo-
ple v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 944, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984). The requirement of
"purpose" to perfect an escape from lawful custody, like the equivalent requirement in the
witness-murder special circumstance, means that the defendant must both intend to kill and
that the intentional killing be done for the purpose of perfecting an escape from lawful cus-
tody. It is a "specific intent" special circumstance for the reasons noted above.
(5) Under the Bird court precedent, the murder-for-financial-gain special circumstance in
the 1978 Initiative applies only when the victim's death is the consideration for, or an essential
prerequisite to, the financial gain sought by the defendant. People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731,
691 P.2d 944, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984); People v. Montiel, 39 Cal. 3d 910, 705 P.2d 1248,
218 Cal. Rptr 572 (1985) (accord); Newberry v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d. 238, 213
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1985) (accord). But see infra text accompanying notes 653-64 for the Lucas
court's interpretation of this aspect of the financial-gain special circumstance.
(6) The murder-of-a-peace-officer special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative is constitu-
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which an appellate court has looked to any other body of law for
tionally valid even though it predicates liability, in part, on criminal negligence. People v.
Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986).
(7) A felony-murder special circumstance is barred by the statute of limitations governing
the underlying felony. People v. Superior Court (Jennings), 183 Cal. App. 3d 636, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 357 (1986).
(8) Under CAL. PENAL CODE § 3, a special circumstance enacted after the crime was
committed cannot be applied retroactively to the defendant's conduct in the absence of explicit
statutory language to the contrary. People v. Teron,'23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1979); People v. Payne, 75 Cal. App. 3d 601, 142 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1977) (also
suggesting that to do so would violate the ex post facto clause).
(9) The double jeopardy clause prevents the application of a subsequently enacted valid
death penalty statute to a person who has been tried, convicted and sentenced under a previ-
ously enacted unconstitutional death penalty statute. People v. Harvey, 76 Cal. App. 3d 441,
142 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1978); People v. Payne, 75 Cal. App. 3d 601, 142 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1977).
(10) The double jeopardy clause bars the retrial of a special circumstance which has been
set aside after trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding.
E.g., People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 389, 218 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985); People v.
Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980); People v. Green, 27
Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
(11) The rules for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence governing claims of
alleged deficiencies in proof of the elements of a crime are equally applicable to claims of
deficiencies in the proof of the elements of a special circumstance. People v. Thompson, 27
Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980).
(12) The due process clause requires the same specificity in defining special circumstances
that it requires in the definition of crimes. People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal. 3d 797,
647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982). See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
(holding that a similar Oklahoma provision was unconstitutionally vague under the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment as made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment).
(13) A special circumstance is an "action" within the meaning of CAL. PENAL CODE §
1385, so that a special circumstance may be dismissed by the trial court in furtherance of
justice under that section in the same manner as a crime. People v. Williams, 30 Cal. 3d 470,
637 P.2d 1029, 179 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1981).
(14) The adequacy of the preaccusatory evidence to support a charged special circum-
stance allegation is reviewable under CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 in the same manner as is the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a charged crime. E.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 160, 176 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981); Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 944, 153
Cal. Rptr. 720 (1979).
(15) A special circumstance is a "public offense" within the meaning of CAL. PENAL
CODE § 871 and thus a magistrate may dismiss or strike a special circumstance allegation if
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing does not provide sufficient cause to support
the allegation. Ramos v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 648 P.2d 589, 184 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1982).
(16) A special circumstance is an "offense" within the meaning of CAL. PENAL CODE §
1387 so that a second dismissal of a special circumstance by a magistrate pursuant to CAL.
PENAL CODE § 871 bars any further prosecution for that special circumstance. Ramos v. Supe-
rior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 648 P.2d 589, 184 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1982).
(17) A special circumstance allegation in an indictment may be dismissed pursuant to the
rule of Johnson v. Superior Court when the district attorney has withheld evidence tending to
negate guilt from the indicting grand jury. Page v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 959, 153
Cal. Rptr. 730 (1979).
(18) A special circumstance is a "public offense" which may be challenged by demurrer
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guidance in interpreting and applying the special circumstances.
1 80
C. The Lucas Court's Original Understanding
On the day the Lucas court took office the only distinction be-
tween a special circumstance and a crime may have been the fact
that special circumstances were not formally characterized as crimes.
Yet in view of the inconsistency in the terminology used by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in classifying special circumstances, even that
distinction was unclear.181
The Lucas court did little to clarify the law of special circum-
stances during its first year. The question of the proper characteriza-
tion of special circumstances, whether they are crimes or sui generis
rules, was never addressed. More importantly, the court treated the
special circumstances inconsistently in several of the automatic ap-
peals decided in its first year. In two cases, the court's resolutions of
special circumstance issues were consistent with Bird court precedent
and with the conception that the special circumstances are crimes
dividing the crime of first degree murder into capital and non-capital
offenses. But in a third decision, the Lucas court treated the special
circumstances inconsistently with prior law and its own precedent.
under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1004. People v. Superior Court (Reed), 98 Cal. 3d 39, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 310 (1979) (overruled on another ground in People v. Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814, 633 P.2d
186, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1981)); Owen v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 757, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1979). See also People v. Superior Court (Jennings), 183 Cal. App. 3d 636, 228
Cal. Rptr. 357 (1986).
180. A dissenting opinion by Justice Poche in People v. Superior Court (Engert), when
that case was decided by the Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4 on May 1, 1980,
suggested that special circumstances may not be governed by the same law applicable to the
definition of crimes. People v. Superior Court (Engert), 164 Cal. Rptr. 374, 214-15 (1980).
The majority held otherwise. Id. at 210-14. A hearing was granted by the California Supreme
Court and thus the decision by the court of appeal was vacated. The opinion does not appear
in the official reports. The opinion of the California Supreme Court treated the special circum-
stance there at issue, the "heinous-atrocious-or-cruel" special circumstance, as though it were
the definition of a crime and held that it was void for vagueness under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76,
183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982). See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (holding that a similar
Oklahoma provision was unconstitutionally vague under the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the eighth amendment as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment).
Although a portion of Justice Poche's dissent in Engert was quoted with apparent ap-
proval in Allen (Allen v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 3d 42, 55-56, 169 Cal. Rptr. 608, 617
(1981)) the Allen court did not rest its analysis on the proposition that the body of law gov-
erning the validity and interpretation of special circumstances was different than the law ap-
plicable to crimes. Id. at 50-58, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 613-19. Allen was disapproved by the
supreme court in Engert, supra.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78.
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That decision also suggests that the court has no theory, no concep-
tion, of how the special circumstances do or should fit into the law of
capital murder in California. The court's decisions in the remaining
eight cases resolving special circumstance issues this year do not af-
fect either the theory of the special circumstances or the method for
resolving special circumstance issues. The two cases which treat spe-
cial circumstances issues consistently with prior law are Wade and
Howard.
As already noted, under Bird court precedent the special cir-
cumstances were interpreted by applying the law governing the in-
terpretation of crimes. The torture-murder special circumstance at
issue in Wade"2 provides an excellent example. Torture was in-
cluded as an element of first degree murder when murder was di-
vided into degrees in 1856.' Using the familiar method of the sub-
stantive criminal law, the California courts have defined both the
actus reus and the mens rea of murder in the first degree on the
theory of murder by torture. With respect to the actus reus of first
degree murder by torture, the defendant must commit acts
designed"8 4 to cause cruel pain and suffering to the victim,' and
those acts must cause the victim's death."8 6 There are two mens rea
requirements. First, of course, is the mental element for murder. An
intent to kill is not required.' "Implied malice," to use the Califor-
nia term for what is more generally known as a "depraved-heart"
murder,' "extremely reckless" murder,8 9 or "wanton and willful
disregard" murder, 9 0 are sufficient.'' The aggravating mental ele-
ment elevating the murder to first degree is an intent to cause cruel
182. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1988).
183. See supra text accompanying note 9.
184. There is no requirement that the victim actually suffer pain. E.g., People v. Wiley,
18 Cal. 3d 162, 554 P.2d 881, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1976).
185. E.g., see People v. Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162, 554, P.2d 881, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135
(1976); People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 546 P.2d 665, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1976); People v.
Tuby, 34 Cal. 2d 72, 207 P.2d 52 (1949).
186. E.g., People v. Talamantez, 169 Cal. App. 3d 443, 215 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1985).
187. People v. Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162, 168, 554 P.2d 881, 884, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138
(1976); People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 546 P.2d 665, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1976).
188. E.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 617-21 (2d ed. West 1986)
(hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT).
189. E.g., J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 461-62 (Matthew Bender
1987).
190. E.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOyCE, CRIMINAL LAW 50-60 (3d ed. Foundation Press
1982).
191. E.g., Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162, 554 P.2d 881, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135; Steger, 16 Cal. 3d
539, 546 P.2d 665, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161; People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177, 481 P.2d 193, 93
Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971).
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pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion
or for any other sadistic purpose. 192 Without this aggravating mens
rea, a murder committed by torturous means is murder in the second
degree. The California Supreme Court has explained the critical im-
portance of the aggravating mens rea for first degree murder by
torture:
The element of calculated deliberation is required for a torture
murder conviction for the same reasons that it is required for
most other kinds of first degree murder. It is not the amount of
pain inflicted which distinguishes a torturer from another mur-
derer, as most killings involve significant pain . .. Rather, it is
the state of mind of the torturer-the cold-blooded intent to in-
flict pain for personal gain or satisfaction-which society con-
demns. Such a crime is more susceptible to the deterrence of
first degree murder sanctions and comparatively more
deplorable than lesser categories of murder. 9 '
When the Bird court was presented with the question of the
proper interpretation of the torture-murder special circumstance in
the 1978 Initiative, the court applied the method of the substantive
criminal law to determine its meaning. The language of the provi-
sion suggests that the defendant's mental state with respect to the
torture is irrelevant. The critical factor is the experience of pain by
the victim.
The section applies when "[tihe murder was intentional and in-
volved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this section tor-
ture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no mat-
ter how long its duration. '"19' When this language is compared with
the language of the 1977 special circumstance,' 9 5 one could easily
infer that the Initiative meant to abolish the requirement of an ag-
gravating mens rea for the torture-murder special circumstance and
192. Wile),, 18 Cal. 3d at 168-73, 554 P.2d at 883-87, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 137-41; Steger,
16 Cal. 3d at 544-47, 546 P.2d at 667-70, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 163-66.
Though it is unclear whether this intent must be "willful, deliberate and premeditated"
(compare Steger with Wiley), the standard jury instructions include that requirement, thus
resolving the ambiguity in favor of a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict
extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion,
persuasion or for any sadistic purpose." CALJIC No. 8.24 (1987 Revision) (West Supp.
1987).
193. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d at 546, 546 P.2d at 669, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 165. (citation omit-
ted). See also People v. Tubby, 34 Cal. 2d 72, 77, 207 P.2d 51, 54 (1949).
194. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
195. "The murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and involved the infliction
of torture. For purposes of this section, torture requires proof of an intent to inflict extreme
and prolonged pain." Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(4) (West 1979).
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replace it with proof that the victim suffered extreme physical pain
though not necessarily for a prolonged period of time."' Further-
more, if one also focuses on the phrase "infliction of extreme physi-
cal pain" in the definition of the special circumstance, then quite
obviously the statute is ambiguous.
Finding the provision ambiguous, the court applied substantive
criminal law analysis and held that,
Proof of a murder committed under the torture-murder special
circumstance therefore requires proof of first degree murder,
...proof the defendant intended to kill and to torture the vic-
tim . . ., and the infliction of an extremely painful act upon a
living victim. . . . The special circumstance is distinguished
from murder by torture under section 189 because under section
190.2, subdivision (a)(18) the defendant must have acted with
the intent to kill.19 7
196. In Davenport, the Bird court recognized that the 1978 provision abolished the re-
quirement in the 1977 torture-murder special circumstance that the pain be "prolonged." Peo-
ple v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 260, 710 P.2d 861, 868, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801 (1985).
197. Id. at 271, 710 P.2d at 875, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citations omitted). The Daven-
port court identified three reasons for reaching this conclusion: (1) that a different interpreta-
tion would "overthrow the long-established definition of torture"; (2) that a contrary construc-
tion of section 190.2(a)(18) would "lead to a possibly absurd result"; (3) and, finally, that such
a conclusion would raise grave questions as to the constitutional validity of the statute." Id. at
269, 710 P.2d at 874, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
Arguably, the first degree torture rule and the torture-murder special circumstance are
distinguishable by more than the fact that the murder must be intentional to qualify for the
special circumstance. For the first degree rule, the murder must be "perpetrated by means of
... torture," CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988), whereas the special circumstance re-
quires that the first degree murder "was intentional and involved the infliction of torture." Id.
at § 190.2(a)(18). Under the first degree provision the torturious acts must be the cause of
death. E.g., People v. Talamantez, 169 Cal. App. 3d 443, 215 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1985). In other
words, the torture must be the means by which the killing was accomplished. This is what is
meant by the word "perpetration" in section 189, whereas the change in language in the
special circumstance suggests that the torturious acts need not be the cause of death to satisfy
the special circumstance. In the one case to consider this issue, the court of appeal so held.
People v. Hoban, 176 Cal. App. 3d 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1985).
Hoban seems to be correct on principle. This means that there is a difference in both the
actus reus and the mens rea between the first degree rule and the torture-murder special
circumstance. Although both require the intent to torture, the first degree rule defines the
minimum mens rea for guilt as "implied malice," whereas the special circumstance requires
that the murder be intentional. From this perspective, the class of first degree torture murder-
ers is narrowed by the special circumstance to those who intentionally kill. On the other hand,
because of the difference in the wording of the actus reus of the special circumstance, the
defendant would not need to be guilty of first degree murder on a theory of'torture for there is
no requirement that the killing be caused by the torture. As long as the defendant is guilty of
an intentional first degree murder, if the defendant also commits torturious acts with the requi-
site torturious intent, the defendant is guilty of both first degree murder and the torture-mur-
der special circumstance.
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In Wade the defendant attacked the torture-murder special cir-
cumstance on the same ground urged in Davenport. It was con-
tended that it is "unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it
fails to 'meaningfully narrow the group of those subject to the death
penalty and serves only as a vehicle for arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion, to be used whenever jurors and prosecutors, in their sole and
unguided discretion, so desire.' "198 The court rejected these argu-
ments on the ground that the interpretation of the torture-murder
.special circumstance in Davenport fully answered his contentions. 99
Wade also reaffirmed the Bird court's holding that special cir-
cumstances are to be treated in precisely the same way as are crimes
with respect to the specificity with which they are defined. In En-
gert, the Bird court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires the same specificity in defining special circum-
stances that it requires in the definition of crimes.200 Wade followed
Engert and likewise held that the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" spe-
cial circumstance was unconstitutionally vague.2 'O
By reaffirming Davenport and Engert, the Lucas court reaf-
firmed that the interpretation and application of the special circum-
stances are governed by the rules of the substantive law pertaining to
the elements of crimes. 22 With a great deal more subtlety, the court
reached the same result in Howard'08
In Howard the trial court instructed the jury on the bare lan-
guage of the statute.204 In order to find the financial-gain special
circumstance true the jury was told that it must find that "the mur-
198. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 993, 750 P.2d 794, 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 915
(1988).
199. d.
200. People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr.
800 (1982).
201. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 993, 750 P.2d at 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
202. The court also rejected an argument that the torture-murder special circumstance
finding must be vacated because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the requirement of
intent to torture. The court held that in view of the proper instructions on the first degree
torture rule and the arguments of counsel, "we are confident that the jury understood the basic
elements of the torture-murder special circumstance, and that the special circumstance finding
was not based on a mere accidental or unintentional infliction of cruel pain." Id. at 995, 750
P.2d at 805, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 916 . A discussion of this aspect of Wade is beyond the scope of
this article. For a discussion of the Lucas court's use of the arguments of counsel to "cure"
defects in penalty phase jury instructions, see Poulos, supra note 142.
203. People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1988).
204. The financial-gain special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative simply provides:
"The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain." CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(1) (West 1988).
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der was intentional and carried out for financial gain." 05 The de-
fendant proposed three instructions defining "financial gain," 206 but
the trial court refused all three."' 7 The defendant's principal conten-
tion was that "financial gain" means that the murder "was carried
out pursuant to an agreement by the person committing the murder
to accept valuable consideration for the act of the murder from some
person other than the victim."' 8 In affirming the trial court's action
and rejecting the defendant's agreement theory, Chief Justice Lucas
wrote that,
the fundamental problem with defendant's claim . . . [is his fo-
cus] . . . on the terms of the agreement which was reached
before the murder occurred. The special circumstance focuses on
the defendant's intention at the time the murder was committed.
Even if the agreement would have been satisfied by less than the
victim's murder, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant
committed the murder in the expectation that he would thereby
obtain the desired financial gain.209
At another point in the opinion the court emphasized that
"[n]othing in the special circumstance's language requires a preexist-
ing 'agreement' before the circumstance is found true. What is rele-
vant is the particular defendant's purpose, whether or not achieva-
ble."2 10 It was further noted that "no such agreement was necessary.
The issue was defendant's intent at the time the murder was com-
mitted, not whether that intent arose pursuant to a contractual
agreement."'21
The court's reliance upon the defendant's mens rea to give
meaning to the financial-gain special circumstance falls squarely
within the tradition of the substantive criminal law of California,
and the precedent established by both the Bird court2" 2 and Chief
205. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 407, 749 P.2d at 296, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
206. Id. at 407 n.8, 749 P.2d at 296 n.8, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.8.
207. Although the opinion does not specify the trial court's reasoning in denying each of
the three requested instructions, the court does tell us that the prosecutor objected on the
grounds that the phrase "was a matter of common understanding and the Legislature (sic) did
not intend that its meaning be restricted, certainly not in the manner sought by defendant." Id.
at 407-08, 749 P.2d at 296-97, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. Presumably the court agreed with
the prosecutor's arguments.
208. Id. at 407 n.8, 749 P.2d at 290 n.8, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.8.
209. Id. at 409, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (emphasis in original).
210. Id. at 410 n.10, 749 P.2d at 298 n.10, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.10 (emphasis
added).
211. Id. at 410 n.12, 749 P.2d at 298-99 n.12, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.12 (original
italics).
212. See supra notes 179-80.
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Justice Lucas' later opinion in Wade.213 It is the defendant's mental
state, the defendant's intention to obtain financial gain from the in-
tentional killing, which justifies the harsher punishment and its de-
sired deterrent effect.2
14
Like the torture-murder special circumstance, the financial-gain
special circumstance has two mental elements: first, the defendant
must intentionally kill his victim; and second, the defendant must
intend to obtain financial gain by the killing. More specifically, in
regard to the second element, the murder must have been committed
for the purpose of obtaining financial gain. To use the precise lan-
guage of Chief Justice Lucas, the second intent requires that the
"defendant committed the murder in the expectation that he would
thereby obtain the desired financial gain." '215
Furthermore, Chief Justice Lucas' interpretation of the finan-
cial-gain special circumstance sensibly flows from the language used
to define that special circumstance. The words "carried out for fi-
nancial gain" mean nothing less than "done for the purpose of finan-
cial gain."2 6 Having construed the financial-gain special circum-
stance in this manner, the court correctly rejected each of the
defendant's three proffered instructions. Rejection was based on the
fact that each instruction focused on the definition of "financial gain"
rather than on the critical words "carried out for" financial gain,
and each offered an incorrect interpretation of that phrase.2"'
The court's interpretation of the financial-gain special circum-
stance in Howard is solidly in line with prior authority holding that
the interpretation and application of the special circumstances are
governed by the rules of the substantive law pertaining to the ele-
ments of crimes. 18 However, Howard neither mentions how the spe-
213. See supra text accompanying notes 182-202.
214. See supra notes 146,179,193; infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
215. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
216. The 1978 Initiative uses the specific intent pattern to describe various special cir-
cumstances. The pattern describes an intentional killing and then articulates a specified pur-
pose for that killing. It is used in the following special circumstances: torture-murder (see infra
text accompanying notes 361-62), the prevention-of-arrest or perfecting-an-escape special cir-
cumstance (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (West 1988)), the murder of a peace officer "in
retaliation for the performance of his official duties" (id. § 190.2(a)(7)), witness-murder (id. §
190.2(a)(10)), prosecutor-murder (id. § 190.2(a)(11)), judge-murder (id. § 190.2(a)(12)),
high-government-official-murder (id. § 190.2(a)(13)), and the race-color-religion-nationality-
or-country of origin-murder special circumstance (id. § 190.2(a)(16)), though the same words
are not used in each of these special circumstances.
217. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 407 n.8, 409, & n.9, 749 P.2d at 296-97 n.8, 298, & n.9,
243 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.7, 861, & n.9.
218. The law of the financial-gain special circumstance is discussed infra text beginning
with note 624.
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cial circumstances should be classified, nor cites to the fundamental
principles of the substantive criminal law in concluding that the cul-
pable mental element of this special circumstance includes an intent
to obtain financial gain by the killing.
The next topic to be discussed is that case which ireats the spe-
cial circumstances inconsistently with both the principles articulated
by the Bird court and with the Lucas court's own precedent. Indeed,
this decision suggests that the Lucas court has no conception of how
the special circumstances do or should fit into the law of capital
murder in California.
The problematic case is People v. Kimble.219 The defendant
broke into the home of Harry and Avone Marguilies, stole a set of
keys to the couple's stereo store from Mr. Marguilies, raped Mrs.
Marguilies, and after placing tape over the eyes and mouth of each
victim and securing their hands behind their backs, he killed each
with a single .45 caliber shot to the chest. Later, with the assistance
of two accomplices, the defendant used the stolen keys to enter the
stereo store and steal a number of boxes of stereo equipment.
Defendant was convicted of two murders, two burglaries, rob-
bery, and rape (along with several enhancements). With respect to
the murder of Harry Marguilies, two special circumstances were
found true: felony-murder (robbery), and multiple-murder. Three
special circumstances were found to be true in connection with the
murder of Avone Marguilies: felony-murder (robbery), felony-mur-
der (rape) and multiple-murder. The jury eventually returned a ver-
dict imposing the sentence of death. The prosecution was under the
1977 Legislation. 2 '
During the course of his summation, the prosecutor relied on
the theory that the murders were committed for revenge. 2 ' The trial
judge instructed the jury that in order to find the various felony-
murder special circumstances true, the jury would have to find
"[tihat the murder was committed during the commission of" the
felony upon which the special circumstance was based.222 Note that
this instruction simply repeats the language of the statute.223 On ap-
219. 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1988).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 502-03, 749 P.2d at 816-17, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
222. Id. at 502-03 n.15, 749 P.2d at 814 n.15, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 160 n.15.
223. The relevant portion of the felony-murder special circumstance in the 1977 Legis-
lation reads as follows: "The murder was ... ncommitted during the commission ...of any
of the following ...." Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3) (West 1979) (emphasis
added). The wording of the felony-murder special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative is simi-
lar: "The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in ... the following felo-
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
peal defendant challenged this instruction on the ground that it
failed to properly inform the jury of the law applicable to the felony-
murder special circumstances as articulated in People v. Green.224
In Green, the defendant took his wife to a remote area and
forced her to remove her clothes at gun point. He then shot her to
death and removed the rings from her finger. The victim's clothes
and her rings were taken from the scene. Defendant was charged
with the felony-murder (robbery) special circumstance in the 1977
Legislation. Although it was clear from the evidence that the defend-
ant took the clothes and rings to conceal the crime by making the
body difficult to identify, the prosecutor argued that the robbery of
the clothing supported the felony-murder special circumstance.
The trial court in Green instructed the jury in the same lan-
guage used in Kimble: that the jury need only find that the murder
was committed "during the commission" of the robbery for the fel-
ony-murder special circumstance to apply.225 The California Su-
preme Court in Green recognized that at the very least "the Legisla-
ture must have intended that each special circumstance provide a
rational basis for distinguishing between those murderers who de-
serve to be considered for the death penalty and those who do
not.''22" The court held that the "Legislature's goal is not achieved,
however, when the defendant's intent is not to steal but to kill and
the robbery is merely incidental to the murder .... , 2" The critical
factor is the defendant's intent, not "semantics or simple
chronology." '28
In People v. Thompson, the court again emphasized that the
question turns on the defendant's intent. "[T]his determination,"
nies. . . " CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988). In Ario v. Superior Court, 124
Cal. App. 3d 285, 177 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1981), the court held that the language of the two
statutes was so similar "that they should carry the same meaning." Accordingly, Green is
equally applicable to the felony-murder special circumstance defined in the 1978 Initiative. Id.
at 288-89, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 267; Richards v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 3d 306, 317 n.10,
194 Cal. Rptr. 120, 127 n.10 (1983) (following Ario). See Jones v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 160, 176 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981). Most of the cases simply assume, correctly I might
add, that the Green rule applies to the 1978 Initiative's felony-murder special circumstance.
E.g., People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1038 (1988); People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988); People v. Oliver, 168 Cal. App. 3d 920, 214
Cal. Rptr. 587 (1985); People v. Sanders, 145 Cal. App. 3d 218, 193 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1983).
See also Talamantez v..Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 629, 176 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1981).
224. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
225. Id. at 59-60, 609 P.2d at 504, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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said the court, "involves proof of the intent of the accused. A murder
is not committed during a robbery within the meaning of the statute
unless the accused has 'killed . . . in order to advance an indepen-
dent felonious purpose.229 Applying Green to the Thompson facts,
the court said,
The question presented under People v. Green is whether the
shootings were done to advance an independent felonious pur-
pose of stealing the car and keys or whether instead such in-
tended thefts were "merely incidental to the murder." Viewing
the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdicts, as this court must, it is impossible to conclude that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proof on this issue."'0
Thus the Thompson court concluded that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the jury finding that the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance was true.
The analysis used in Green and Thompson to ferret out the
meaning of the felony-murder special circumstance follows the gen-
eral theory employed in interpreting the other special circumstances.
Their interpretation is based upon the fundamental principles and
policies of the substantive criminal law. Under that body of law, it is
the defendant's mental state, the defendant's intention, which gener-
ally jus'tifies the use of harsher punishment and its desired deterrent
effect.2"' Since the purpose of the felony-murder special circumstance
is to create "a rational basis for distinguishing between those mur-
derers who deserve to be considered for the death penalty and those
229. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 322, 611 P.2d 883, 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289,
299 (1980). More specifically, the court wrote:
Since 'the Legislature must have intended that each special circumstance provide
a rational basis for distinguishing between those murderers who deserve to be
considered for the death penalty and those who do not,' the determination as to
whether or not a murder was committed during the commission of robbery or
other specified felony is not 'a matter of semantics or simple chronology.'
Rather, this determination involves proof of the intent of the accused. A murder
is not committed during a robbery within the meaning of the statute unless the
accused has 'killed in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious
purpose, e.g, [has] carried out an execution-style slaying of the victim of or
witness to a holdup, a kidnapping, or a rape.' A special circumstance allegation
of murder committed during a robbery has not been established where the ac-
cused's primary criminal goal 'is not to steal but to kill and the robbery is
merely incidental to the murder . . . because its sole object is to facilitate or
conceal the primary crime.'
Id. at 322, 611 P.2d at 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 299 (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 324, 611 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 300 (footnote omitted).
231. See supra notes 146, 179, 193 and accompanying text; infra notes 333-35 and
accompanying text.
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who do not," '82 the legislative distinction was based upon the de-
fendant's mental state at the time of the crime. To paraphrase Chief
Justice Lucas' opinion in Howard, the special circumstance focuses
on the defendant's intention at the time the murder was committed.
The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant committed the murder
to advance an independent felonious purpose."'3 Moreover, although
the statutory provision does not explicitly articulate the mens rea re-
quirement, both the language used by the legislative body and the
statute's goals imply an additional mens rea requirement.
In this respect, the felony-murder special circumstance is
treated in precisely the same way as both the torture-murder and the
financial-gain special circumstances treatment by the Bird court, and
by Chief Justice Lucas' opinions in Wade and Howard.2"" In both
the torture-murder and the financial-gain special circumstances, the
additional mental state was implied from the statute's language and
goals. The same is true of the felony-murder special circumstance.
Furthermore, the additional mens rea for the felony-murder
special circumstance makes the required culpable mental state for
that special circumstance even more nearly similar to the mens rea
requirements necessary for the torture-murder and the financial-gain
special circumstances. For torture-murder there must be the requi-
site mens rea for first degree murder coupled with the intent to cause
cruel pain and suffering to the victim.23 5 For financial-gain there
must be the requisite mens rea for first degree murder coupled with
the intent to acquire financial gain from the murder."' For felony-
murder there must be the requisite mens rea for first degree murder
coupled with the intent to advance an independent felonious pur-
pose. In other words, in addition to the culpable mental state neces-
sary for first degree murder, the defendant must intend to acquire
some felonious gain other than the "gain" acquired from the mur-
der. Simply put, the murder must be the means by which the cul-
prit's goal, which is some other felonious gain, is acquired.
Returning to the Kimble case,237 the trial judge instructed on
the felony-murder special circumstance contained in the bare lan-
232. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 500, 749 P.2d 803, 815, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161
(1988) (per Lucas, C.J., quoting with approval from Robertson (People v. Robertson, 33 Cal.
3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982))) (emphasis added). Robertson in turn quoted
from Green. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at 52, 655 P.2d at 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
233. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409, 749 P.2d at 297, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
234. See supra notes 179, 197, 202, 211.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 360-61.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 636-37.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 219-24.
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guage of the statute. To find the special circumstance true, the jury
must find that the murder was committed "during the commission"
of the felony. 2 8 The defendant's complaint was that the phrase
"during the commission" of the felony did not fairly inform the jury
that it must find that the defendant intended to advance an indepen-
dent felonious purpose from the murder Although the defendant's
precise claim does not appear in the report of the case, Green and
Thompson require an instruction telling the jury that in order to find
the felony-murder special circumstance. true, the jury must find that
the murder was committed with the intent "to carry out or advance
the commission of the crime of [ ], or to facilitate the escape there-
from or to avoid detection. '"239
It is fundamental that a trial judge has a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury on all of the elements of the offense charged.240 Ap-
parently, this was one of the principles invoked by Kimble to sup-
port his claim that the trial judge should have instructed on the
Green intent requirement.24'
Given the Chief Justice's opinions in Wade and Howard, it is
surprising that the defendant's argument was rejected. "Prelimina-
rily," wrote Chief Justice Lucas, "we reject the dissent's novel sug-
gestion that Green's clarification of the scope of felony-murder spe-
cial circumstances has somehow become an 'element' of such special
circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases re-
gardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction. '"242
238. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 499, 749 P.2d 803, 814, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 160
(1988).
239. This is a paraphrase of the relevant provisions of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (West
pamph. 1987). I have substituted the words "with the intent to" for the phrase "in order to"
which appears in the instruction. The phrase "the murder was committed in order to carry out
or advance the commission of the crime" does not clearly inform the jury that it must deter-
mine this question on the basis of the defendant's intent at the time of the killing. This instruc-
tion is discussed at infra text accompanying notes 423-63.
240. E.g., People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 388 P.2d 892, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1974);
People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 9 (1950); People v. Hamilton, 80 Cal. App. 3d
124, 145 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1978); People v. Peabody, 46 Cal. App. 3d 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780
(1975).
Advising his fellow judges on their duty to give sua sponte instructions in criminal cases,
Judge Richards wrote in Appendix A (1979) of CALJIC, "Obviously the requirement of sua
sponte instructions to cover the 'general principles of law governing the case' includes instruc-
tions to be given by the court in the absence of a request which delineate the elements of the
offense charged." RICHARDS, CRIMINAL LAW-SUA SPONTE INSTRUCTIONS, Appendix A,
CALJIC (West 1979).
241. I have not read the briefs in Kimnble, but I assume that defendant's lawyer would
argue the "element rule" as one of the foundations for her argument that the trial judge had a
sua sponte duty to instruct on Green's intent requirement.
242. Kinble, 44 Cal. 3d at 501, 749 P.2d at 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
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The fundamental question then is whether Green's intent require-
ment is an element of the special circumstance. Two reasons are
given by the Chief Justice for the conclusion that it is not: (1) Green,
Thompson, and Robertson,243 the three leading cases, "have not
treated Green in this fashion;244 and (2) the court has not treated
other "clarifying" holdings in analogous settings as elements of the
crime they "clarify. 24
5
But before turning to an analysis of the Chief Justice's argu-
ment, the argument supporting the proposition that Green's intent
requirement is, indeed, an element of the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance should be clearly in mind. When discussing the elements
of a crime, the actus reus and the mens rea, or the definition of the
offense itself, is that which is customarily referred to.1
41
As noted above, the purpose of the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance is to separate first degree murderers into two catego-
ries:247 first degree murderers "who," in the words of Chief Justice
Lucas, "deserve to be considered for the death penalty and those who
do not."'248 According to Green and its progeny, the dividing line
selected by the Legislature is between "those defendants who killed
in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious purpose"
and all other first degree felony murderers. 4 In other words,
Green's intent rule is the Legislature's definition of death eligible
and non-death eligible first degree felony murderers.
Accordingly, the "truth" or "untruth" of the felony-murder spe-
cial circumstance is solely dependent upon the existence of the Green
intent at the time the murder is committed. Thus, Green articulates
the Legislative definition of the felony-murder special circumstance
and provides the only dividing line between those who are death eli-
243. People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
244. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 501, 749 P.2d at 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
245. Id.
246. E.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 188, at 48. The Model Penal Code includes
within its concept of a "material element of an offense" not only the actus reus and the mens
rea (though those terms, of course, are not used) but also conduct, attendant circumstances and
the results of conduct that negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct. MODEL PENAL
CODE AND COMMENTARIES (OFFICIAL DRAFT AND REVISED COMMENT PART II) § 1.13
(1980) [herinafter MODEL PENAL CODE]. The Model Penal Code is thus somewhat broader
than customary usage.
247. See supra text accompanying note 177.
248. Kinble, 44 Cal. 3d at 500, 749 P.2d at 815, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (quoting from
Robertson).
249. Id. The reasoning is obvious enough. A defendant who commits a first degree mur-
der to achieve some other felonious goal has not only the moral culpability of a first degree
murderer, but the additional moral depravity which flows from treating fellow human beings
as objects to be removed because they stand in the way of his achieving another felonious goal.
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gible and those who are not. Defendant's who kill with the intent "to
advance an independent felonious purpose" are "guilty" and those
without this intent are not. Thus the Green intent must exist in the
mind of each defendant when the killing occurs.
In the traditional terms of actus reus and mens rea, all first
degree felony-murder shares the same actus reus. The distinction be-
tween those who are guilty of the felony-murder special circum-
stance and those who are not is Green's mens rea requirement.
Again, this requirement is the defendant's intent to carry out or ad-
vance the commission of the enumerated felony or to facilitate the
escape therefrom or to avoid detection for its commission. If the ele-
ment concept means anything, it must mean that the mens rea dis-
tinction between the guilt or "innocence" of a crime is an element of
that crime. It also must mean that the mens rea distinction between
the "truth" or "untruth" of a special circumstance is an element of
the special circumstance. " "
Chief Justice Lucas takes issue with none of the above. His first
argument is that Green, Thompson and Robertson do not treat
"Green in this fashion." '' He is clearly wrong with respect to
Green and Thompson, and Robertson is sufficiently ambiguous that
it does not provide an adequate basis for concluding that the Green
intent is not a element of the felony-murder special circumstance.
In Green the Attorney General conceded "that . . . murder was
the prime crime and that the robbery was incidental to that murder,
since the underlying motive for the robbery was to leave Karen's
corpse bereft of anything whatsoever by which she could be identi-
fied."2 2 Given these facts, the court held the "evidence insufficient as
a matter of law to support the jury's finding of the truth of the rob-
bery special circumstance alleged in count I. ''253 Though Green did
not involve an instructional issue, surely it is beyond argument that
an element of an offense or a special circumstance must be proved by
250. It might prove helpful here to note again that the Green intent requirement per-
forms exactly the same purpose and function as the inens rea requirements for (1) first degree
murder on the theory that the murder was "willful, deliberate, and premeditate (see supra text
accompanying notes 9, 16, 37), (2) the financial-gain special circumstance (see infra text ac-
companying notes 635-39), (3) the arrest-escape special circumstance (see supra note 216), (4)
the torture-murder special circumstance (see infra text accompanying notes 354-61), (5) race-
color-religion-nationality-or-country-of-origin special circumstance (see supra note 216), and
(6) in six of the different "victim" special circumstances (see supra note 216). From the previ-
ous discussion of these crimes and special circumstances it seems clear that each of these mens
rea requirements is an element of the crime or the special circumstance.
251. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 501, 749 P.2d at 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
252. Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 62, 609 P.2d at 506, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
253. Id.
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the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt."" '
Consequently, if the evidence fails to establish that element in
accordance with the appropriate standards, then the reviewing court
should reverse or vacate the verdict or finding on the basis of the
insufficiency of the evidence. Little would be gained by repetition of
the above analysis of Green and why it establishes the defendant's
independent felonious intent at the time of the killing as an element
of the special circumstance. Suffice it to say that Green simply held
that the prosecutor had not born the People's burden of proof on the
issue of the defendant's intent at the time of the murder. The Su-
preme Court accordingly set aside the special circumstance finding
on the traditional ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict. Indeed, nothing in Green remotely suggests that the rule
it created operates in any other way. Certainly the simple assertion
that Green did not treat the intent requirement as an element of the
special circumstance may be dismissed on the ground that a conclu-
sion is entitled to no more weight than the rationale upon which it is
based. Having offered neither a rationale for his conclusion nor an
analysis of Green, little more can be said of Chief Justice Lucas"
opinion on this point.
Chief Justice Lucas also claimed that Thompson'" "never
treated" Green as creating an element of the felony-murder special
circumstance. 0  In Thompson precisely the same claim was
presented as in Green. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the
felony-murder special circumstance finding under Green was chal-
lenged. The court's reasons for sustaining the defendant's claim are
more than mildly interesting:
The question presented under People v. Green is whether the
shootings were done to advance an independent felonious pur-
pose of stealing the car and keys or whether instead such in-
tended thefts were "merely incidental to the murder." Viewing
the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdicts, as this court must, it is impossible to conclude that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proof on this issue. ...
When the whole record is viewed . .. it establishes at
254. For example, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the
prosecution to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g.,
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sanstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); People
v. Roder, 33 Cal. 3d 491, 658 P.2d 1302, 189 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1983).
255. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980).
256. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749 P.2d 803, 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161
(1988).
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most a suspicion that appellant had an intent to steal indepen-
dent of his intent to kill. . . . The evidence against appellant on
the question of the truth of the special circumstances is "so
fraught with uncertainty as to preclude a confident determina-
tion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." . . . It is insufficient
to establish that the crime appellant committed was "in fact a
murder in the commission of a robbery [rather than] the exact
opposite, a robbery in the commission of a murder." 5 '
The following factors were critical to the Thompson analysis of
the sufficiency of evidence claim: (1) the prosecution had the burden
of proof on the issue of the Green intent requirement; (2) the stan-
dard of proof was the traditional requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt;"' 6 (3) the evidence had to affirmatively establish that
the defendant killed the victims to further an independent felonious
purpose; and (4) the verdict must be set aside unless the evidence
was sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant in fact killed to further that independent felonious purpose.
This is, of course, the precise analysis that a court would use to
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence of a conceded element of a
crime or special circumstance. Let us suppose, for example, that the
special circumstance required an intent-to-kill as in the case of the
financial-gain special circumstance.2"9 The prosecution would be
obliged to prove the defendant's intent-to-kill beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the evidence was insufficient to sustain that factual finding,
then the special circumstance would have to be set aside. In short,
the prosecution's failure to prove intent-to-kill would be analyzed in
exactly the same way that Thompson analyzed the failure of the
prosecution to prove that the defendant killed to further an indepen-
dent felonious goal. Thus, like Green, Thompson supports the classi-
fication of the Green intent rule as an element of the special
circumstance.1
60
However, the Chief Justice correctly asserts that Robertson2 6 1
257. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 324-25, 611 P.2d at 894-95, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 300-01.
258. In this respect the court later indicated that the burden of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt was constitutionally mandated for the Green intent requirement. Id.
259. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988). Until the court overruled the Car-
los intent-to-kill requirement, the felony-murder special circumstance under discussion did
have such a requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 389-421.
260. In Williams, the court was willing to assume that the Green intent instruction is
routinely required in a felony-murder special circumstance case. The court then went on to
hold that the assumed error was not prejudicial and therefore a reversal was not required.
People v. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d 883, 927-29, 751 P.2d 395, 424-25, 245 Cal. Rptr.
336, 365-67 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 454-59.
261. People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
does not treat Green as an element of the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance. Robertson also fails to speak to the question of whether
Green's intent rule is an element of the special circumstance or
"something else."
The defendant made two claims in Robertson. The first was the
same issue presented in Green and Thompson: the insufficiency of
the evidence to support the finding that the defendant committed the
murder for an independent felonious purpose. The court rejected this
contention on the ground that the evidence was indeed sufficient to
support the necessary findings under Green.262 The holding on this
first issue in Robertson, like Green and Thompson, supports the ele-
ment theory.
The defendant's second contention was that the special circum-
stance finding had to be "reversed because the trial court failed to
instruct the jury sua sponte on the 'incidental robbery'" theory
enunciated in Green." 8 The court rejected this claim in a single
paragraph:
In light of the significant differences between the facts of this
case and the facts of Green, however, we do not believe that
case's "incidental robbery" doctrine can properly be character-
ized as a general principle of law "closely and openly connected
with the facts before the court." (See People v. St. Martin
(1970) 1 Cal. 3d 525, 531 [83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390];
People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 703, 715 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1,
518 P.2d 913]) as to which a sua sponte'duty to instruct could
arise."O6
It is clear that the Robertson court is not treating Green's intent
rule as an element of the special circumstance. 66 It is equally clear
that Robertson does not even consider that question. The duty of a
trial court to instruct the jury on every element of an offense (or a
special circumstance) was not involved in either St. Martin266 or
Sedeno,2 67 the two cases on which the Robertson court relies.
In addition to the sua sponte instruction obligation for the ele-
ments of an offense, a trial court must give instructions sua sponte
262. Id. at 51-52, 655 P.2d at 296-97, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
263. Id. at 52, 655 P.2d at 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
264. Id.
265. Based on the cases cited by the court for rejecting the defendant's argument, it
appears that defendant did not argue that Green's intent rule is an element of the felony-
murder special circumstance. Had this argument been made, undoubtedly the "element" the-
ory would have been mentioned.
266. People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 463 P.2d 390, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970).
267. People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
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on "general principles of law relevant to the issues raised 'by the
evidence .... The general principles of law governing the case are
those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before
the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of
the case."26
The Robertson court found no sua sponte duty to instruct on
what the court called Green's " 'incidental robbery' theory" because
the facts before the trial court did not indicate that the instruction
was called for as it was in Green. Accordingly, the court's answer in
Robertson is irrelevant to the question presented in Kimble of
whether Green's intent rule is an element of the felony-murder spe-
cial circumstance. The rationale of Green and Thompson indicate
that it is, Robertson simply does not address the issue.
The second reason given by the court for refusing to recognize
Green's intent rule as an element of the special circumstance is that
the court has not "so treated other 'clarifying' holdings in analogous
settings." '69 He offers the example of the Daniels-aggravated-kid-
napping rule.270
In Daniels, the court held that movements of a victim constitute
kidnapping for robbery. 1 only if the movements are not merely inci-
dental to the commission of the robbery and if they substantially in-
crease the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the robbery. 72 Both
prongs of the rule must be met before there is an asportation suffi-
cient for aggravated kidnapping. 78 The courts recognize that at least
the second prong of the Daniels rule is essentially a factual determi-
nation,"" but they have disagreed over whether the judge 17 or
jury 1 6 is the proper entity to make this determination.
Although the California Supreme Court has never resolved this
268. Id. at 715, 518 P.2d at 921, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 9 (quoting from St. Martin).
269. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749 P.2d 803, 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161
(1988).
270. Id.
271. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 1988).
272. People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969).
273. E.g., In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d 122, 534 P.2d 721, 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1975).
274. E.g., People v. Beaumaster, 17 Cal. App. 3d 996, 95 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1971); People
v. Moreland, 5 Cal. App. 3d 588, 85 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1970); People v. Chavez, 4 Cal. App. 3d
832, 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1970). See People v. Rocco, 21 Cal. App. 3d 96, 98 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1971).
275. E.g., Beauimaster, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 1006-08, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 366-68; see Rocco,
21 Cal. App. 3d at 104-05, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70.
276. E.g., see People v. Anthony, 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1970); Rocco,
21 Cal. App. 3d at 104-05, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70.
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issue, 2 "7 practice in California has. The Daniels rule is now rou-
tinely submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions. Practi-
cally speaking then, the current practice in California treats the
Daniels rule as though it is an element of the crime of aggravated
kidnapping. Thus, the Daniels instruction is given to the jury re-
gardless of the evidence in the case.279 As a general rule, this is simi-
lar to the nature of an element of the crime.280 The instruction is
given regardless of the evidence because the prosecution bears the
burden of proof. The lack of evidence does not mean that the in-
struction should be withheld, rather it means that the defendant
should be acquitted.
Assuming that the lower California courts,28' Justice Stanley
Mosk 82 and the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions are cor-
rect, 88 then the Daniels analogy does not support Chief Justice Lu-
cas' argument that Daniels and its progeny "disclose that the mere
act of 'clarifying' the scope of an element of a crime or a special
277. Compare People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 768-69 n.20, 523 P.2d 267, 287-88
n.20, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 487-88 n.20 (1974) (discussing the "instruction approach" without
either accepting or rejecting it) with Earley, 14 Cal. 3d at 128, 534 P.2d at 725, 120 Cal. Rptr.
at 885 ("Nothing in People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal. 3d 588, is inconsistent with the
requirement that to convict a defendant of violating section 209 the jury must find both of the
foregoing matters.").
278. See, e.g., CALJIC No. 9.23 (1979 Revision) (West pamph. 1987); People v. John,
149 Cal. App. 3d 798, 197 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1983).
279. See John, 149 Cal. App. 3d 798, 197 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1983) In John, the court
said: "The parties agree that CALJIC No. 9.23, which was given at the trial in this case,
accurately states the elements which must be proved in order to establish a violation of section
209." Id. at 804, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (emphasis added). John went on to reverse the convic-
tion of aggravated kidnapping on the ground that the jury's verdict finding the existence of the
Daniels factors was not supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 804-07, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 343-
46.
280. See infra text accompanying notes 309-20.
281. See supra note 279.
282. Justice Mosk wrote for the majority in Daniels. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459
P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969). The court was nearly unanimous; only Justice McComb
failed to join the Mosk opinion. His objection was a single sentence: "I would affirm the
judgments in their entirety. Id. at 1143, 459 P.2d at 241, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 913. In Thornton,
Justice Mosk dissented, in part, on the ground that "Itihe jury was not required to consider
the length or duration of the movement, nor to find any increase whatever in the risk of harm
caused by that movement, less still a substantial increase in the risk. Yet these are essential
eletnents, under Daniels, of the offense of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery." People v.
Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 771, 523 P.2d 267, 289, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 489 (1974). It was
this aspect of the Mosk dissent that provoked the majority into discussing the "instruction
approach" (see supra note 277), but the instructional issue was not resolved by the majority
because the error was either harmless or the instruction was unsupported by the evidence. Id.
at 768-69 n.20, 523 P.2d 267, 487-88 n.20, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 287-88 n.20.
283. CALJIC No. 9.23 (1979 Re-revision) (West Supp. 1987) treats the Daniels rule
as an element of the offense.
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circumstance does not create a new and separate element of that
crime or special circumstance." 8 '
However, since a majority of the California Supreme Court has
treated Daniels with "elemental" ambiguity,"8 5 it may be assumed
that the "clarifying" ruling in Daniels does not create "a new . . .
element of that crime . . . ." Even with this concession, Daniels and
its progeny lend no support to the Chief Justice's argument that the
Green intent rule is not an element of the felony-murder special
circumstance.
There is no magic in a "clarifying" ruling of a court. Some
clarifying rulings recognize new elements of an offense and some do
not. Indeed, the history of the common law of crimes is little more
than the history of clarifying rulings which recognize the elements of
substantive crimes. It is far too late in our experience with the judi-
cial process to deny that much of the work of defining the elements
of the various offenses is allocated in one way or another to the
courts. Furthermore, a moment's reflection reveals that Justice Lu-
cas' opinion in Kimble confirms, rather than refutes, this fundamen-
tal power in the courts and the force of "clarifying" rulings. A "clar-
ifying" ruling which holds that a particular rule is not an element of
an offense or a special circumstance bespeaks the authority to reach
the opposite conclusion: that it is an element of the felony-murder
special circumstance. Neither pronouncement is more legitimate than
the other from the viewpoint of judicial power and authority.
It is thus not a question of the authority of courts to recognize a
new element of an offense by a "clarifying" ruling. Clarifying rul-
ings undeniably recognize new elements of an offense or special cir-
cumstance even at the hands of the Lucas court. For example, in
Davenport the court interpreted the statutory language of the tor-
ture-murder special circumstance to require a specific intent to tor-
ture.286 Chief Justice Lucas' opinion in Wade embraced Davenport's
"clarifying" interpretation of the felony-murder special circumstance
in the following excerpt:
284. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749 P.2d 803, 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161
(1988).
285. See supra note 277. It is true that in Thornton the majority failed to recognize that
the Daniels rule was an element of the offense; and in Earley the court's statement that "the
jury must find both of the foregoing matters" (see supra note 277) is dictum. Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court has never resolved the question of whether the Daniels rule creates
an element of the offense.
286. People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 267-71, 710 P.2d 861, 875, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794, 808 (1985). See infra notes 352-61 and accompanying text.
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In sum, we find that the words used in section 190.2, subdivi-
sion (a)(18) must be understood in light of the established
meaning of torture. Proof of a murder committed under the tor-
ture-murder special circumstance therefore requires proof of
first degree murder, . . . proof the defendant intended to kill
and to torture the victim, . . . and the infliction of an extremely
painful act upon a living victim. . . ." (Davenport, supra, 41
Cal. 3d at p. 217, citations omitted.)
Defendant contends that, given the Davenport holding, the tor-
ture-murder special-circumstance finding in this case must be
reversed because the special circumstance instruction failed to
inform the jury that the specific intent to torture was an ele-
ment of the special circumstance ...
. . . Under these circumstances, we are confident that the jury
understood the basic elements of the torture-murder special cir-
cumstance, and that the special circumstance finding was not
based on a mere accidental or unintentional infliction of cruel
pain.2 8
7
Wade thus relies on the court's legitimate authority to articulate
new elements of a special circumstance to effect the legislative body's
intent or to further some overriding public policy.28 8 The same is
true of Chief Justice Lucas' opinion in Howard.2 89 Yet Chief Justice
Lucas professes to be mystified by the argument that a "clarifying"
interpretation can recognize a new element of a special circumstance:
Preliminarily, we reject the dissent's novel suggestion that
Green's clarification of the scope of felony-murder special cir-
cumstances has somehow become an "element" of such special
circumstances .... 290
The Chief Justice's opinion in Wade demonstrates how a clari-
fication of the scope of a special circumstance produces an element of
that special circumstance and that the result is not "novel" but a
typical ruling on the substantive criminal law. Accordingly, it can
only be assumed that the court wished to avoid the task of deciding
when a clarifying interpretation produces an element of the crime or
special circumstance and when it does not.
This distinction is a matter of continuing importance. Subse-
287. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 994-95, 750 P.2d 794, 805, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905,
916 (1988) (emphasis added).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 182-202.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 203-18.
290. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749 P.2d 803, 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161
(1988).
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quently, the balance of this section will discuss a method for deciding
whether a particular ruling creates an element of a crime or special
circumstance. That method will then be applied to Chief Justice Lu-
cas' analysis in Kimble to test the validity of his assertion that the
Green intent rule is not an element of the felony-murder special
circumstance.
1. Method for Deciding Whether an Element of an Offense or
Special Circumstance is Created
Whether a clarifying ruling on the scope of a crime or special
circumstance creates or recognizes a new element depends entirely
upon the substance of the clarification. Initially the ruling must af-
fect either the physical part of the special circumstance (the actus
reus) or its mental part (the mens rea). These are the foundation
blocks upon which our fundamental conception of the crime or the
special circumstance is based. This is a necessary, but not the sole
condition, for not all rulings which affect the actus reus or the mens
rea qualify as articulating an element.29' Not only must the ruling
relate to the actus reus or the mens rea of the crime or special cir-
cumstance, but also an element of the crime must define what is to
be deterred by the law. Additionally it must announce the circum-
stances under which punishment will be exacted, or (in the case of
non-capital crimes) rehabilitation undertaken, when nothing more is
shown.29 In other words, standing alone, the elements of a crime or
special circumstance translate the purposes of the criminal law into
prohibited physical acts and culpable mental states.29
291. For example, evidence of voluntary intoxication relates to the mens rea of the
homicide offenses by negating the existence of a required specific intent, but the absence of
intoxication is not an element of the offense-the positive mens rea is. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 22 (West 1988); 1 B. WITKIN, CAL. CRIMES §§ 144, 300, 321, 485 (1963). The
various forms of justification (e.g., self-defense) and excuse (e.g., "insanity") also relate to the
actus reus and the mens rea, but they qualify our basic concept of the crime and thus they are
not elements of the crime.
292. Id.
293. Within certain ill defined federal constitutional constraints a legislative body, or a
court (under certain circumstances), has the power to redefine a crime or special circumstance
to allocate what was previously an element to the status of a "defense." The existence of this
power does not affect my analysis for we are here concerned with the fundamental meaning of
an element of a crime or special circumstance, not with the question of how that element could
or should be transformed into some other aspect of criminal liability. See Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). The physical part of the
crime can, and frequently does, include other elements such as the description of the subject
matter of the crime, a human being in the case of the homicide offenses (see infra note 297),
and the attendant circumstances which must exist for the particular crime in question. In order
to avoid obviously awkward wording, I have have generally focused on the acts or acts prohib-
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An element of a crime generally presents both legal and factual
questions. When the issue is the definition of one of the terms used
in the actus reus or the mens rea, the issue is primarily a legal ques-
tion for resolution by the court. When the legal definition is applied
to the facts of the case, the question is primarily factual for determi-
nation by the jury. But on rare occasions there are elements of a
crime which do not require a factual determination. This is men-
tioned only to emphasize that the mere fact that a jury issue is not
tendered does not mean that an element of the crime is not involved.
A few examples should now be helpful.
The actus reus of all of the homicide offenses and the murder
special circumstances includes a homicide: the killing of a human
being. To be more specific, the word "killing" means "an act or
omission causing the death" of a human being. Each of the compo-
nent concepts of a homicide is an element of the actus reus, and the
definition of each of these terms presents a question of law for the
court. For example, the meaning of the terms "human being" and
"death" presents a legal issue for resolution by the judge. When the
California Supreme Court decided that the phrase "human being"
means a person who is either born alive or in the birth process, the
court was actually defining an element of the crime of murder de-
spite the fact that this was also a "clarifying" interpretation of the
scope of the offense. 94
In response to that "clarifying" ruling, the Legislature amended
the actus reus of murder by including a fetus within its terms:
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought. ' '25 But the legislation did not include a defini-
tion of what was meant by the word "fetus." That question was also
a legal issue to be resolved by the courts. In Smith, the court held
that a "fetus" for the purpose of the actus reus of murder means a
viable fetus-a fetus capable of independent human life.296 This, too,
is a "clarifying" ruling concerning the scope of a crime, but this defi-
nition is undeniably an element of both first degree murder and all
of the special circumstances. This clarifying ruling in Smith produces
a new component of the subject matter element of the actus reus of
ited by the actus reus of the given crime. The reader should understand, however, that the
other components of the actus reus work in tandem with the act to fulfill the purposes of the
criminal law for the crime in question as well.
294. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
295. An act to amend Section 187 of the Penal Code, relating to homicide, 1970 Cal.
Stat., ch. 1311, at 2440 (codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988)).
296. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
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murder and of the special circumstance. After Smith, the subject
matter of both murder and the special circumstances is a human be-
ing (as defined in Keeler) 9 7 or a viable fetus (as defined in Smith).
Furthermore, since Smith concerns the definition of what the law of
murder seeks to deter and punish, its "clarifying" ruling, its defini-
tion of "fetus," is undeniably an element of the actus reus of murder
and the special circumstances.
Finally, there is nothing mystical about this process. It does not
unexplainably happen. It is not a "novel" occurrence. There should
be nothing mystifying about it. It is the typical product of the appli-
cation of the legal process to the actus reus of the crime or special
circumstance by "clarifying" the terms used in the legislation. It is
the ordinary course of the law. Although further examples abound,
such as the "clarification" of the term "death" for the purpose of all
of the homicide offense and the special circumstance, 98 little would
be gained by prolonging this discussion with further examples of this
type.
Once the particular element is "clarified," the question of
whether the victim of an alleged murder or special circumstance was
a "viable fetus" is a factual question for resolution by the jury under
appropriate instructions.299 Although an element of an offense or
special circumstance nearly always produces a factual issue which
must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt,300
that is not necessarily an inherent quality of an element.
Infrequently, and despite the fact that there are constitutional
constraints on the use of this technique, an element of an offense
tenders only a question of law for resolution by the court." 1 This is
297. See supra note 294.
298. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1966); People v. Saldana, 47 Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975).
299. E.g., People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1978).
300. E.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1970); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); Allen, The Restoration of In Re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1977).
301. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1986) (and cases cited therein) (instruction that promissory notes involved in the transactions
were "securities" under the Corporate Securities Law was tantamount to a directed verdict on
the "security" element of the offense and usurped the defendant's right to a jury trial).
Although a discussion of the constitutional constraints on the defining of an element of an
offense in purely legal terms is beyond the scope of this article, a distinction should be drawn
between the partial directed verdict in Figueroa and the rule presently under consideration. In
Figueroa the court quite properly held that though the definition of a "security" is a question
of law, for the court, the application of the definition to the facts in the case was a factual issue
for the jury. Id. A different, and perhaps unique, situation is presented by the inherently-
dangerous-felony rule. Undoubtedly we would all agree that the definition of an "inherently
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true with respect to the second degree felony-murder rule in Califor-
nia. A homicide committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpe-
trate a felony which is "inherently dangerous to human life," but not
enumerated in the first degree felony-murder rule,"'2 is murder in
the second degree under the second degree felony-murder rule. 308 Al-
though the commission of an inherently dangerous felony is part of
the actus reus and the mens rea of felony-murder, '0 the definition of
an "inherently dangerous felony" raises only a legal issue because of
the way it is defined.
A felony is "dangerous" only if it is life-threatening, and it is
"inherently" dangerous only if the elements of the offense, as they
are written in the statutes, necessarily create a life-threatening
risk." 5 In other words, the determination is made by examining "the
elements of the felony in the abstract, not by the 'facts' of the
case."' 6 Since this determination is made from the abstract elements
of the underlying felony, both the definition of an inherently danger-
ous felony and the application of the definition to the elements of the
underlying felony are questions of law for the court. 0 " It raises no
factual issue to be resolved by the jury. It is also clear that this "clar-
ification" of an inherently dangerous felony is an element of second
degree felony-murder for it implements one of the basic purposes of
dangerous felony" presents a question of law for the court. But the application of the rule also
presents only a question of law for the rule is applied by analyzing the contents of a statute on
its face. It has nothing to do with the evidence produced in the case; and everything to do with
the law as it is written in the books. The inherently-dangerous-felony rule is thus quite distin-
guishable from a partial directed verdict of guilt at issue in Figueroa for there are no "facts"
upon which to direct the partial verdict only "law." And though I realize that the "fact-law"
distinction is, in many respects illusory, I do believe that it has reality in this context. Given
the expertise of judges on interpreting statutes, the question of the whether the elements of the
underlying felony pose the necessary risk to human life should be made by the judge. I there-
fore believe that the rule withstands analysis under Figueroa. It is in this sense that I use the
phrase "not factually based."
302. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
303. E.g., People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1984); People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977); People
v. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971); People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d
28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971); People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353,
51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
304. Both the actus reus and mens rea of the underlying felony, or of the attempt to
commit the felony, quite obviously become part of the actus reus and the inens rea of the
felony-murder for one must be guilty of either an attempt to commit the underlying felony, or
the commission of the underlying felony for guilt under the felony-murder rule.
305. See supra note 303.
306. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 829-30, 678 P.2d at 897, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (quoting
from Phillips, Henderson, Satchell, and Lopez).
307. See supra note 301.
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the crime itself: the deterrence of killings during the commission or
attempt to commit a qualifying felony. 8'
2. Role of Jury Instructions on Elements of a Crime of
Special Circumstance
In view of Chief Justice Lucas' concern expressed in Kimble
over the giving of a jury instruction "regardless of whether the evi-
dence supports such an instruction,"' 8 9 a brief discussion of the role
of jury instructions on the elements of a crime or special circum-
stance is in order. Since most of the elements of a crime or special
circumstance raise factual issues which must be proved by the prose-
cution beyond a reasonable doubt, an instruction must be given to
the jury on these elements regardless of the evidence in the case. If
there is no evidentiary support for the instruction, then the defendant
should be acquitted. Conversely, even if the prosecution's evidence
establishes the elements of the crime under every standard of proof,
the issue must still be submitted to the jury under proper instruc-
tions.810 In other words, an instruction on all of the factually based
elements of the crime or special circumstance is required by the
charge made against the defendant regardless of whether the evi-
dence actually supports such an instruction."'
308. The supreme court "formulated this standard because '[i]f the felony is not inher-
ently dangerous, it is highly improbable that the potential felon will be deterred; he will not
anticipate that any injury or death might arise solely from the fact that he will commit the
felony.' " Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 829, 678 P.2d at 897, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (quoting from
People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458 n.4, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.4, 47 Cal. Rltr. 7, 10 n.4
(1965)).
309. See Chief Justice Lucas' statement in People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749
P.2d 803, 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161 (1988).
310. In Figueroa, the California Supreme Court expressed the rule as follows:
In many criminal cases, the prosecution's evidence will establish an element of
the charged offense 'as a matter of law.' Similarly, in many instances, the ac-
cused will not seriously dispute a particular element of the offense. . . . How-
ever, neither of these sometime realities of trial practice justifies the giving of an
instruction which takes an element from the jury and decides it adversely to the
accused. Such an instruction confuses the roles of judge and jury.
People v. Figueroa, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 733, 715 P.2d 680, 693, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719, 732
(1986) (citations omitted).
311. As a practical matter, if the prosecution does not produce sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case, the trial court would probably grant a motion for judgment of
acquittal either sua sponte or on motion of the defendant. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1118-
1118.1 (West 1988). In that case the unsupported charge would never be submitted to the jury.
Nevertheless, there is a sufficient number of cases in which reviewing courts find that a verdict
is unsupported by sufficient evidence for one to conclude that the jury was properly instructed
on an element of a crime or special circumstance and yet there was insufficient evidentiary
support for the instruction. In that situation, we cannot say that it was error to give the
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There is one apparent exception to this rule. If there are alter-
nate elements either of which will suffice for a finding of guilt of the
crime or the "truth" of the special circumstance, the trial court need
only instruct on the alternate element which is supported by the evi-
dence. For example, in California the mens rea of murder is either
malice aforethought or the mens rea of the underlying felony for a
felony-murder conviction.812 On a charge of murder, the trial court
should only instruct on the alternate mens rea requirement which is
supported by the evidence. 18 But this is not truly an exception to the
rule for the court must instruct on all of the elements of the crime or
special circumstance even though the judge need not instruct on all
variants of the crime; rather only those variants which are raised by
the charge or supported by the evidence.
In a murder prosecution, if there is no felony-murder theory
urged by the prosecution (and supported by the evidence) then no
felony-murder instruction should be given.81 4 However, an instruc-
tion on malice aforethought would then be required regardless of the
evidence in the case if the murder charge is submitted to the jury.318
The "alternate element" instruction rule is, of course, equally appli-
cable to all alternate elements. It is not limited to alternate mens rea
elements. There are alternate subject matter requirements in the ac-
tus reus of the crime of murder. The subject matter must either be a
human being or a viable fetus.81 " Here, too, the trial court should
only instruct the jury on the alternate subject matter supported by
the evidence, and for precisely the same reason delineated above. 17
Furthermore, exactly the same analysis applies to alternate the-
instruction.
312. E.g., People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983);
CALJIC No. 8.10 (1983 Revision) (West Supp. 1987).
313. E.g., CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 Revision), Use Note (West Supp. 1987); CALJIC
No. 8.21 (West 1979) & Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.21 (West Supp. 1987).
314. E.g., CALJIC No. 8.11 (1983 Revision), Use Note (West Supp. 1987); CALJIC
No. 8.21 (West 1979) & Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.21 (West Supp. 1987).
315. But, of course, the case should not be submitted to the jury if the ,ens rea of
malice aforethought is not supported by sufficient evidence to support the verdict. See supra
note 311.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 294-97.
317. When the victim has been "born alive" so that it qualifies as a "human being"
under Keeler, with respect to the subject matter of the crime of murder, the typical instruction
will simply tell the jury that "[tlhe crime of murder is the unlawful killing of a human be-
ing. . . . In order to prove the commission of the crime of murder, each of the following
elements must be proved: 1. That a human being was killed .... " See CALJIC No. 8.10
(1983 Revision) (West pamph. 1988). No further definition of a "human being" need be given
for the term has no technical meaning in this context. It is thus within the common knowledge
of the jurors. See infra note 640 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30
1990] THE LUCAS COURT & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 395
ories of an element of a crime or special circumstance. For example,
there are two theories of malice aforethought in California: an in-
tent-to-kill without justification, excuse or mitigation (express mal-
ice), and implied malice on the theory of a "wanton disregard" for
human life without justification, excuse or mitigation. 18 Although
the trial court must instruct the jury on the mens rea requirement of
malice aforethought if the case is submitted to the jury (and assum-
ing that the felony-murder rule is not involved), the court should
only instruct on the theory supported by sufficient evidence. 19
Of course, in the rare circumstance when an element is not fac-
tually based, when it is purely a question of law, then no instruction
is called for regardless of the charge and regardless of the evidence in
the case. The "inherently dangerous felony" element of the second-
degree felony-murder rule again provides a ready example.320
Before this analysis is applied to the Daniels-aggravated-kid-
napping rule, a brief summary should be helpful. A "clarifying" rul-
ing recognizes or creates a new element of an offense or special cir-
cumstance if (1) it affects either the physical part (the actus reus) or
the mental part (the mens rea), 2 1 and (2) it defines what is to be
deterred by the law, and announces the circumstances under which
punishment will be exacted, or rehabilitation undertaken (in the case
of non-capital crimes), when nothing more is shown. 22 Finally,
since virtually all of the elements of a crime or special circumstance
are, and perhaps must be, 23 factually based, a jury instruction is
318. E.g., People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 296-97, 637 P.2d 279, 283, 167 Cal. Rptr.
22, 25-26 (1981). This latter theory is frequently referred to as "extreme recklessness" (as in
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.2(b)) or as "depraved-heart" murder (see
LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 188, at 617-21).
319. See, e.g., CALJIC No. 8.11 (1979 Revision), Use Note (West 1979).
320. Thus, quite correctly, the standard jury instruction on second degree murder in-
forms the jury that "[tihe unlawful killing of a human being ...which occurs as a direct
causal result of the commission of or attempt to commit a felony inherently dangerous to
human life, namely, the crime of , . . . is murder of the second degree." CALJIC No.
8.32 (West 1979). See People v. Lilliock, 265 Cal. App. 2d 419, 71 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1968). If
this element required a factual determination by the jury, then this instruction would be con-
stitutionally impermissible as a partial directed verdict of guilt. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa,
41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986) (instruction that promissory notes
involved in the transactions were "securities" under the Corporate Securities Law was tanta-
mount to a directed verdict on the "security" element of the offense). The federal and state
constitutions undoubtedly restrain the power of a court or a legislative body to define an ele-
ment of a crime or special circumstance in purely legal terms so that it does not call for a
factual determination by the jury. See Figueroa, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr.
719. A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
321. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
323. Perhaps the right to a jury trial requires virtually all of the elements of a crime or
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required on each element of the crime or special circumstance re-
gardless of the evidence in the case, if the question is submitted to
the jury.82'
As we have already seen, Daniels held that movements of a vic-
tim constitute kidnapping for robbery only if the movements are
more than merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and if
they substantially increase the risk of harm beyond that inherent in
the robbery.32 This rule modifies the "asportation" element of the
actus reus of kidnapping, and thus it would pass the first prong of
our "element" test. 26 But it falters on the second prong. The pur-
pose of the Daniels rule is to avoid overlap between the two crimes
of robbery and kidnapping, and the resulting serious injustice when
a ordinary robbery is prosecuted as an aggravated kidnapping.s2 7
The rule was conceived to prevent most, if not all, robberies
from also being aggravated kidnappings unless the purpose of the
aggravated kidnapping law is also met. Hence, the twin require-
ments of more asportation than necessary for robbery and a substan-
tial increase in the risk of significant physical injury to the victim.
These two requirements prevent the application of the more severe
penalties for aggravated kidnapping than is provided for robbery
when the crime is essentially a robbery. 28 But the Daniels rule does
not address the purpose for the crime of aggravated kidnapping. It
does not define the offense in terms of the law's goal of deterring the
defendant's conduct or fixing the conditions warranting punishment,
or the nearly forgotten goal of rehabilitation. In short, the rule has
nothing to do with the defendant's culpability or the deterrence of
the defendant's conduct.
Because the Daniels rule does not further the purpose of defin-
ing the crime of aggravated kidnapping, it is not an element of that
crime. Chief Justice Lucas is correct in his conclusion that the Dan-
iels rule has never been treated by the California Supreme Court as
an element of the offense, and under the analysis presented it should
special circumstance to be factually based and submitted for their determination to the jury
under appropriate instructions. See supra note 301.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41, 309-20.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 270-73.
326. People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1134, 459 P.2d 225, 234, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897,
906 (1969).
327. Id. at 1134-39, 459 P.2d at 234-38, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 906-10 (1969). See People v.
Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d 588, 598-601, 522 P.2d 1058, 1065-68, 114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 257-60
(1974);
328. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d at 1134-39, 459 P.2d at 234-38, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 906-10
(1969).
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not be characterized as an element of aggravated kidnapping. Never-
theless, in agreement with the lower California courts, the Commit-
tee on Standard [Criminal] Jury Instructions, and the prevailing
California practice, the Daniels rule should be decided by the jury
under appropriate instructions in every case"' in which the defend-
ant is charged with aggravated kidnapping whether the theory is
kidnapping for robbery, or for ransom, reward, or extortion."' 0
Daniels creates a rule which, though external to the elements of
the crime of aggravated kidnapping, is factually based.3"' The right
to trial by jury clearly extends to factual determinations which are
not elements of a crime or special circumstance but nevertheless
speak to the guilt-innocence determination by the jury. Further dis-
cussion of the Daniels rule is beyond the scope of this article.
Since Daniels did not create or recognize an element of the
crime of aggravated kidnapping, does that case support Chief Justice
Lucas' argument that Green did not create an element of the felony-
murder special circumstance? The answer is obvious by now: it is
"(no."
Unlike Daniels, the Green intent rule satisfies both prongs of
the element test. The rule relates to the mens rea of the felony-mur-
der special circumstance, and it interprets the felony-murder special
circumstance so as to fulfill its fundamental purpose by creating or
recognizing a new mens rea requirement. As Chief Justice Lucas
observed in Kimble, the goal of the felony-murder special circum-
stance is to "provide a rational basis for distinguishing between those
murderers who deserve to be considered for the death penalty and
those who do not . ".. -332
Since one's just desert principally depends upon the moral cul-
pability or the mens rea with which a prohibited act is committed, 33
329. Quite clearly, the instruction should be given in any case in which both aggravated
kidnapping and the aggravating crime (see infra note 331) are submitted to the jury. The
instruction should also be given when the charge is only aggravated kidnapping (and the ag-
gravating crime is not charged) for it is only by giving the Daniels instruction that the danger
of "abusive prosecution[s] for kidnapping" (Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d at 1138, 459 P.2d at 237, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 909) can be eliminated. See People v. Martinez, 150 Cal. App. 3d 579, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 565 (1984).
330. And this is so whether the charge is kidnapping for robbery (CAL. PENAL CODE §
209(b) (West 1988)) or kidnapping for ransom, reward or extortion (Id. § 209(a)). See People
v. Martinez, 150 Cal. App. 3d 579, 198 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1984).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 271-84, 301.
332. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749 P.2d 803, 815, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 160
(1988) (emphasis added).
333. In Ennund, a felony-murder death penalty case, Justice White wrote for the
majority:
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Green implements this goal by distinguishing between death eligible
and non-death eligible first degree murderers on the basis of the in-
tent of the defendant (his mens rea) in committing the murder. 84 If
the defendant commits the first degree murder for independent felo-
nious gain, then he deserves to be considered for the death penalty
for that is the required degree of moral culpability provided by the
statute. The Green intent rule thus provides the vital link between
the purpose for the provision and definition of the felony-murder
special circumstance.88 That is precisely the function performed by
the elements of any crime or special circumstance.
Upon analysis, the Green intent rule is an element of the fel-
ony-murder special circumstance.886 Daniels is clearly distinguisha-
ble. And the court's conclusion in Kimble that Green did not recog-
nize an element of the felony-murder special circumstance is simply
We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty will
be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no
intention or purpose that life will be taken. Instead, it seems likely that 'capital
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premedi-
tation and deliberation . . . for if a person does not intend that life be taken or
contemplate that lethal force will be employed by others, the possibility that the
death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not 'enter into
the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.'
As for retribution as a justification for executing Enmund, we think this very much de-
pends on the degree of Enmund's culpability-what Enmund's intentions, expectations, and
actions were. American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and there-
fore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree of [his criminal culpability,'. . . and the
Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of inten-
tional wrongdoing." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-800 (1982) (citations omitted).
And in Tison, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court:
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in
capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime.
Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is
the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more
severely it ought to be punished.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987). In a similar vein, see, e.g., People v. Steger, 16
Cal. 3d 539, 544-46, 546 P.2d 665, 668-69, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164-65 (1976) (recognizing
the specific intent to inflict cruel pain and suffering for first degree murder by means of tor-
ture); F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 66 (1981); P. BEAN, PUN-
ISHMENT 19 (1981); A. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 37-38 (1970); A. VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 51-52, 79-81 (1976); H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
60-61 (1968).
334. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 500-501, 749 P.2d at 815-16, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61
(quoting from Green and Thompson).
335. The Green intent rule is based upon an interpretation of the statutory phrase
"[t]he murder ... was committed during the commission or attempted commission Of any of
the following crimes: ...... See infra notes 423-26 and accompanying text.
336. See Ario v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 3d 285, 177 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1981).
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unfounded.3 7 The trial court was thus required to instruct on
Green's intent requirement. The failure to do so was error. But the
error would not require a reversal of the death judgment on the nar-
row ground of special circumstance error because the court found
another special circumstance (multiple-murder) valid."'
We now turn from the theory of the special circumstances and
the general principles that govern them to the court's decisions artic-
337. Chief Justice Lucas' opinion in Kimble did not purport to analyze the nature of the
elements of a crime or special circumstance and apply that analysis to the Green intent rule in
reaching the court's conclusion. Instead, without analysis, the opinion belittles the idea (the
court called it a "novel suggestion") that a "clarifying" instruction can "somehow become an
'element' of such special circumstances" and relies upon authority that either supports a find-
ing that Green recognizes an element of the felony-murder special circumstance (see supra text
accompanying notes 251-69) or is clearly distinguishable (see supra text accompanying notes
270-337). Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 501, 749 P.2d at 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161. Chief Justice
Lucas could have cited People v. Sanders, 145 Cal. App. 3d 218, 193 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1983),
which similarly rejected an argument that an instruction on the Green intent rule should have
been given sua sponte. The court noted that there had been no request for the instruction and
that even if it had been requested, it would have been properly refused because there was no
evidentiary support for the instruction. Id. at 223, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 333. Although the court's
conclusion in Sanders lends some support to the Chief Justice's argument, there is no indica-
tion in Sanders that the appellant was arguing that the Green intent rule recognizes an ele-
ment of the felony-murder special circumstance. Accordingly, Sanders neither analyzes the
Green rule to determine whether it creates an element of the special circumstance nor cites any
authority for its conclusion. The issue is decided by a simple ipse dixit. Since a court's holding
is no better than the reasoning and the authority on which it is based, Sanders needs no
further discussion. Sanders is wrong for the same reasons that Kimble is wrong.
Indeed, there appears to be a subtle conflict between the opinion of the Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division Two in Sanders and the opinion of the Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, Division Three in Ario v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 3d 285, 177 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1981). Like Sanders, Ario was not cited in Kimble. In Ario, a prosecution under the felony-
murder special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative, the petitioner challenged the trial court's
denial of his motion to dismiss the felony-murder (kidnapping) special circumstance allegation
on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary examination did not support the
allegation. Holding that "the kidnaping special circumstance allegations here may be sustained
only if the evidence will support a reasonable inference that the kidnaping was for some pur-
pose other than merely to facilitate the primary crime of murder," and after traversing the
evidence produced at the preliminary examination and finding that the only reasonable infer-
ence that could be drawn was that the kidnaping was incidental to the murders, the court
restrained the trial court from proceeding on those allegations. Ario, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 289-
90, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68. Ario thus appears to treat the Green intent rule as any other
element of the felony-murder special circumstance, though the opinion does not analyze the
question in terms of an "element" analysis.
338. Since a single valid special circumstance supports death eligibility, the fact that
other special circumstances are reversed does not compel a reversal of the death judgment. E.g.
People v. Montiel, 39 Cal. 3d 910, 705 P.2d 1248, 218 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1985); People v.
Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 883, 973-74, 751 P.2d 395, 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 397-98 (1988)
(Mosk, J., concurring in the judgment). However, a reversal of the death judgment might be
required on the ground that the jury's consideration of the invalid special circumstance may
have so infected the death determination process that the death verdict must be vacated. Wil-
liams, 44 Cal. 3d at 973-74, 751 P.2d at 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
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ulating the specific law of the special circumstances.
IV. THE LAW OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
In eleven of the automatic appeals decided this year the Lucas
court resolved special circumstance issues raised under both the 1977
Legislation and the 1978 Initiative. 3 9 None of these decisions were
written on an entirely clean slate. Nearly a decade of death penalty
litigation under both of these statutes produced a number of auto-
matic appeals which were decided by the Bird court. These cases
provided a decisional environment and precedent for the court's work
on the law of the special circumstances this year.
The issues resolved this year arose in connection with six spe-
cial circumstances: (1) heinous-atrocious-or-cruel murder, (2) tor-
ture-murder, (3) felony-murder, (4) multiple-murder, (5) prior-mur-
der-conviction, and (6) financial-gain. The law of each of these
special circumstances will be discussed in the order in which they are
listed. A brief historical sketch of each special circumstance will be
presented, along with an elaboration and analysis of the law ex-
pressed by both the Bird and Lucas courts. A comparison of the law
articulated by each of the two courts will be presented where it is
appropriate.
The goal of this section is to state the law of these special cir-
cumstances as it stood on March 25, 1988, the last day of the Lucas
court's first year of deciding automatic appeals; to critically evaluate
that law; and, when it appears to aid understanding of the Bird and
Lucas courts, to compare the way in which each has handled special
circumstance issues.
A. The Heinous-Atrocious-Or-Cruel Special Circumstance
The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, mani-
festing exceptional depravity, as utilized in this section, the
phrase especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manifesting excep-
tional depravity means a conscienceless, or pitiless crime which
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. 4
This special circumstance first appeared in the 1978 Initia-
tive."" The first phrase is worded identically with the heinous-atro-
339. These cases are listed supra note 6.
340. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 1988) (the 1978 Initiative).
341. No similar provision was contained in either the 1973 mandatory legislation or the
1977 death penalty statute. It is interesting to note that none of the twenty-two states that
adopted mandatory death penalty legislation in response to Furman contained this or a similar
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cious-or-cruel "aggravating circumstance" contained in the Model
Penal Code's capital sentencing procedure.842 The Commentaries to
the Code indicate that it was included as an aggravating circum-
stance, though "virtually every murder is heinous," because it "ad-
dresses the special case of a style of killing so indicative of utter de-
pravity that imposition of the ultimate sanction should be
considered." 4
In People v. Superior Court (Engert)3" the Bird court held that
this special circumstance was so vague that it violated both the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, sections 7, subdivision (a) and 15 of the
California Constitution. Engert was followed by the Lucas court in
Wade. 34
Later in the same year, in Maynard v. Cartwright,"" the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that a similar provision in the
Oklahoma death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague under
the Eighth Amendment. Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating
circumstances defined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment and characteristically assert that the
challenged provision fails to adequately inform juries of what they
must find to impose the death penalty. As a result it leaves both
juries and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion
which was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). 847
After distinguishing a void-for-vagueness attack under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the High Court
agreed with the court of appeals that the Oklahoma provision vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. 8
provision. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 254-56, Table 5. Undoubtedly, this "aggravating cir-
cumstance" was not considered to be an appropriate definition of a capital offense.
342. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6(3)(h): "The murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."
343. MODEL PENAL CODE, sitpra note 246, § 210.6, Comment 6, at 137. Since the
Official Draft of the Model Penal Code was adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the
American Law Institute, it was obviously not drafted with the strictures of the eighth amend-
ment in mind.
344. 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982).
345. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 993, 750 P.2d 794, 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 915
(1988).
346. 56 U.S.L.W. 4501 (U.S. June 6, 1988).
347. Id. at 4502 (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
348. The state argued that in some cases there are factual circumstances that so plainly
characterize the killing as "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" that affirmance of the death
penalty is proper. Construing this argument to mean "that if there are circumstances that any
reasonable person would recognize as covered by the statute, it is not unconstitutionally vague
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In view of Cartwright, Wade, and Engert, this special circum-
stance may no longer be validly used. It thus has no continuing sig-
nificance in the jurisprudence of death in California.
B. The Torture-Murder Special Circumstance
This special circumstance involves a murder which was inten-
tional and involved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this
section torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical
pain no matter how long its duration. 49
This provision replaced the torture-murder special circumstance
in the 1977 Legislation. The 1977 provision reads as follows: "The
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and involved the
infliction of torture. For purposes of this section, torture requires
proof of an intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain." 350 Two
important changes were made by the Initiative in this special cir-
cumstance. First, the mens rea requirement was changed from a
"willful, deliberate and premeditated" murder to an intentional
murder. Second, the Legislation's requirement of an "intent to inflict
extreme and prolonged pain" was also eliminated. Under the word-
ing of the Initiative, the only criterion is "extreme physical pain, no
matter how long its duration.3 ..1 The Initiative's provision thus ap-
pears to abolish the 1977 Legislation's mens rea requirement that
the defendant must also intend to torture the victim with prolonged
pain.
Despite these omissions, and the implication that the legislative
even if the language would fail to give adequate notice that it covered other circumstances as
well," the Court rejected the claim:
The difficulty with the State's argument is that it presents a Due Process Clause
approach to vagueness and fails to recognize the rational of our cases construing
and applying the Eighth Amendment. Objections to vagueness under the Due
Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be overcome in any
specific case where reasonable person would know that their conduct is at risk.
Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are
examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-
applied basis.
Id.
The Court then articulated the Eighth Amendment standard and found that the provision
violated the anti-vagueness principle of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4502-03.
In effect, the high court held that the Eighth Amendment principle differed from Four-
teenth Amendment anti-vagueness principle in that the Eighth Amendment permitted a facial
attack whereas the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the provision be unconstitutional as
applied (since this was not a First Amendment case).
349. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988) (1978 Initiative).
350. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(4) (West 1979).
351. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988).
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body intended to abolish the requirement that the defendant intend
to inflict pain which was "prolonged" in duration," 2 the Bird court
held that the 1978 Initiative should be interpreted with a mens rea
requirement with respect to the torture.
The very use of the term torture, to describe the class of
murders to which the subdivision applies necessarily imports
into the statute a requirement that the perpetrator have the sa-
distic intent to cause the victim to suffer pain in addition to the
pain of death . 858
As interpreted by the Bird court, the torture-murder special cir-
cumstance thus requires an intent to cause the victim extreme (or
cruel) pain.3 54 The Lucas court followed this interpretation in
Wade.355
At the close of the first year of the Lucas court, the actus reus of
the torture-murder special circumstance requires both a homicide (as
does first degree murder), and the infliction of torture."" Torture is
defined as acts designed to inflict extreme physical pain on the living
victim, no matter how long its duration. 57 Despite the contrary im-
352. It is common for courts to compare the repealing legislation with the legislation
repealed and infer the legislative intent was to repeal a particular provision. See, e.g., Whitley
v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 75, 113 P.2d 449 (1942). Nevertheless, in People v. Leach, 41
Cal. 3d 92, 109-10, 710 P.2d 893, 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 836 (1985), the Attorney General
conceded:
[Tihe elimination of the requirement in former section 190.2, subdivision (c)(4)
of proof of an intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain from the present
section cannot be construed to mean that the electorate intended that such proof
is no longer needed: 'The only reasonable interpretation of Penal Code section
190.2, subdivision (a)(18), is that the electorate, in enacting this section, in-
tended to incorporate into. it the settled, reasonable, workable, and meaningful
definition of the term torture contained in Steger and Wiley.'
(emphasis in original).
353. People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 271, 710 P.2d 861, 875, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794,
808 (1985); Leach, 41 Cal. 3d at 109-10, 710 P.2d at 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
354. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d at 109-10, 710 P.2d at 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
355. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1988), inodi-
fied, 45 Cal. 3d 648a, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 248 (1988).
356. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988); Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 993-94, 750
P.2d at 804-05, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 915-16; Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d at 271, 710 P.2d at 875, 221
Cal. Rptr. at 808; Leach, 41 Cal. 3d at 110, 710 P.2d at 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 836; Daven-
port, 41 Cal. 3d at 271, 710 P.2d at 875, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 808. In Davenport, the leading
case on the torture-murder special circumstance, the court said, "Proof of a murder committed
under the torture-murder special circumstance therefore requires proof of first degree murder
. .. proof the defendant intended to kill and to torture the victim ... , and the infliction of
an extremely painful act upon a living victim.' " Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d at 271, 710 P.2d at
875, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citations omitted).
357. In defining the concept of "Torture" used in the special circumstance, the court
said, "Whatever the scientific merit to appellant's argument that the extent of pain can only be
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
plication in the statutory language, 5 proof that the victim actually
suffered extreme physical pain is not required.
35
There are two mens rea elements, two culpable mental states,
for the torture-murder special circumstance. The first degree murder
must be (1) intentional, and the defendant must (2) intend to cause
the victim extreme physical pain by the infliction of torture.3$ ° The
torture-murder special circumstance is thus a "specific intent" spe-
cial circumstance. 861
How then does the torture-murder special circumstance differ
from first degree torture-murder rule? It differs in two important
respects. First, the actus reus of the first degree rule requires that
homicide by torture-the torture must cause the victim's death. 62
This causation requirement flows from the statutory language that
the murder must be "perpetrated by means of torture." 63 But the
single case that has considered whether there is a similar causal re-
quirement for the special circumstance has held that the torture need
not cause the victim's death for the torture-murder special circum-
stance.6" The different interpretation appears to be required by the
different wording of the special circumstance. For the special cir-
cumstance, the murder need not be perpetrated by means of torture.
It is sufficient if the murder "involved the infliction of torture."3 63
The case seems correct on principle.
In sum, the actus reus of the first degree torture-murder rule
requires a homicide be caused by torture inflicted by the defendant.
The actus reus of the torture-murder special circumstance requires
that the defendant torture and kill the victim, but there is no re-
measured by reference to something that occurs in the mind, the statutory requirement of the
infliction of extreme physical pain emphasizes the concern with the physical rather than the
mental experience of the victim. The evident purpose of the statute is to encompass killings in
which the perpetrator intentionally performed acts which were calculated to cause extreme
physical pain to the victim and which were inflicted prior to death." Id. at 271, 710 P.2d at
875, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (emphasis in original).
358. The statute may be reasonably be read as implying that there must be proof that
the victim suffered pain for it provides that "If]or the purpose of this section torture requires
proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter how long its duration." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
359. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d at 268, 710 P.2d at 873, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
360. See supra notes 353-55 and accompanying text.
361. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 994, 750 P.2d 794, 805, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 916
(1988), modified, 45 Cal. 3d 648a, cert. denied, - U.S. -., 109 S. Ct. 248 (1988).
362. E.g., People v. Talamantez, 169 Cal. App. 3d 443, 215 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1985).
363. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
364. People v. Hoban, 176 Cal. App. 3d 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1985).
365. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (West 1988).
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quirement that the torture cause the death."' If, however, the tor-
ture does cause the death of the victim, then the defendant has com-
mitted the actus reus of both the first degree torture-murder rule and
the torture-murder special circumstance.
The second difference between the first degree rule and the spe-
cial circumstance is with respect to the mens rea requirements. For
first degree murder by means of torture the killing need not be inten-
tional. Implied malice will suffice."67 But there must be an intent to
torture, an intent to cause cruel suffering, for the first degree rule to
be satisfied. 68 On the'other hand, the two mens rea requirements for
the special circumstance are (a) an intentional murder, and (b) the
intent to torture.3 "9 Though the intent to torture required for both
the first degree torture-murder rule and the torture-murder special
circumstance is precisely the same,87 ° the special circumstance's re-
quirement that the murder be intentional thus narrows the class of
first degree torture-murderers who qualify for the special circum-
stance.87 Hence, not all first degree torture-murderers are guilty of
the torture-murder special circumstance.
However, because the special circumstance does not require that
the torture cause the homicide," the torture-murder special circum-
stance may attach to any first degree murder, provided, of course, the
elements of the torture-murder special circumstance have been met.
The first degree murder must have been intentionally committed,8 7
the murderer must intend to inflict extreme or cruel pain on the
victim, and the defendant must actually torture the victim with that
366. See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
369. People v. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d 975, 993-94, 750 P.2d 794, 804-05, 244 Cal. Rptr.
905, 915-16 (1988), mnodified, 45 Cal. 3d 648a, cert. denied, - U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 248
(1988); People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92, 110, 710 P.2d 893, 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 836
(1985); People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 271, 710 P.2d 861, 875, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 808
(1985).
370. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 994, 750 P.2d at 805, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 916. In Wade, Chief
Justice Lucas wrote, "the torture-murder special circumstance embodies the same intent-to-
cause-cruel-pain element as in torture-murder .... Id.
371. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d at 271, 710 P.2d at 875, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 808. See People
v. Ross, 92 Cal. App. 3d 391, 154 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1979) (construing the torture-murder spe-
cial circumstance in the 1977 Legislation).
372. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
373. Since the word "willful" in the definition of first degree murder, on the theory that
it was a "willful, deliberate and premeditated" murder, means "intentional," this element of
the torture-murder special circumstance is met by any first degree murder on this theory. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
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specific intent."" '
Before turning to the felony-murder special circumstances, it
should be noted that there is no torture-murder provision in the
Model Penal Code; 75 and the 1973 mandatory death penalty legis-
lation did not mention torture-murder. 
76
C. The Felony-Murder Special Circumstance
The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in
or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commis-
sion of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting
to commit the following felonies...171
1. Introduction
The felony-murder rule has figured prominently in California
death penalty law since 1856 when murder was divided into degrees
according to the Pennsylvania formula.37 Any person who commits
a felony-murder while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate one
of the felonies enumerated in the first degree statute is guilty of first
degree murder. 79 Until 1874, a conviction of first degree murder
carried a mandatory sentence of death. That year the sentencing au-
thority was given untethered discretion to select between death and
the lesser punishment of life imprisonment.38
The Model Penal Code's capital sentencing procedure, which
was approved in 1962, ten years before Anderson and Furman were
decided, contains a felony-murder "aggravating" circumstance: "The
murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kid-
374. See supra notes 356-61 and accompanying text.
375. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6.
376. See 1973 Cal. Stats. § 5, at'1299-1300 (codified as former CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2 (West 1979)).
377. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988). Because of the length of this pro-
vision, the nine felonies enumerated in the subsections to this provision are not quoted either in
the body of the article or in this note. The nine felonies are (1) robbery, (2) kidnapping (3)
rape, (4) sodomy, (5) a violation of § 288a (the performance of a "lewd or lascivious" act upon
the person of a child under the age of 14), (6) oral copulation, (7) burglary in the first or
second degree, (8) arson, and (9) train wrecking. Id.
378. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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napping." '81 The commentary on this provision simply notes that a
murder committed "in connection with designated felonies, each of
which involves the prospect of violence to the person" is a circum-
stance in which the death penalty should be considered. 82
After Anderson and Furman invalidated the use of wholly dis-
cretionary capital sentencing, a felony-murder provision was in-
cluded in the special circumstances enumerated in the 1973
mandatory death penalty legislation. This special circumstance was
defined as murder which "was willful, deliberate and premeditated
and was committed during the commission or attempted commission"
of robbery, kidnapping, rape, the performance of lewd or lascivious
acts upon a child under the age of 14, and burglary. 8 ' The 1977
Legislation contained exactly the same provision found in the 1973
statute.3
84
The current provision replaced the 1977 felony-murder special
circumstance. It changes the 1977 provision in four ways. First, the
list of qualifying felonies was augmented by adding four felonies:
sodomy, oral copulation, arson and train wrecking.385 Second, the
limitations on the qualifying felonies of kidnapping, rape, and bur-
glary were removed.88 Third, in addition to applying while the de-
fendant is engaged in the commission or attempted commission of
one of the enumerated felonies, the felony-murder rule is expressly
made applicable to murders committed in "the immediate flight" af-
ter committing or attempting one of the qualifying felonies. 8 ' On its
face, the 1977 provision applies only during the commission or at-
tempted commission of one of the listed felonies. 88 Finally, the re-
quirement that the murder be "willful, deliberate and premeditated"
to qualify as a felony-murder special circumstance under the 1977
felony-murder provision was eliminated.
Whether the elimination of the mens rea requirement made the
felony-murder special circumstance ambiguous when read in con-
junction with the Initiative's other provision, and how that ambigu-
381. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6(3)(e).
382. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, Comment 6(a), at 137.
383. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b)(3) (West 1979). The complete text of this
provision is quoted supra note 72.
384. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3) (West 1979). The complete text of this
provision is quoted supra note 72.
385. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
388. The text of this provision is quoted supra note 72. It is not clear whether the 1978
provision expanded liability from what it was under the 1977 provision.
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ity is to be resolved was first addressed by the Bird court in the now.
notorious Carlos case.
2. The Carlos Intent-to-kill Rule
a. The Bird Court
The most well-known problem with the 1978 Initiative was in
its felony-murder special circumstance provisions. After finding these
provisions ambiguous and thus in need of interpretation, the Bird
court construed the word "intentionally" in subdivision (b) of section
190.2 to apply to all defendants, actual killers and accomplices alike.
Accordingly, the court found that proof of an intent-to-kill must be
established before a defendant is subject to a felony-murder special
circumstance finding. That ruling came in Carlos v. Superior
Court.889 Carlos was decided by a nearly unanimous court. The
opinion was written by Justice Broussard and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Bird, and Justices Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso and Karesh 90 Justice
Richardson dissented alone. 91 Despite the fact that Justice Richard-
son was the lone dissenter, the Carlos rule immediately became
controversial.392
Although the Carlos intent-to-kill rule was reaffirmed and ap-
plied in nineteen subsequent cases by the Bird court, the court's ad-
herence to Carlos and the rule of stare decisis supporting its applica-
tion did not resolve the controversy surrounding this issue.893 Indeed,
389. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
390. Id. Justice Karesh is a retired judge of the superior court sitting under assignment
by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Id. As Chief Justice of California, Rose Bird was
Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
391. Id. at 154-60, 672 P.2d at 877-81, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 95-99 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
392. The controversy surrounding the Carlos intent-to-kill rule is discussed in Poulos,
supra note 1, at 263-77.
393. People v. Ratliff, 41 Cal. 3d 675, 715 P.2d 665, 224 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1986); People
v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986); People v. Silbertson,
41 Cal. 3d 296, 709 P.2d 1321, 221 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1985); People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d
144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985); People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92, 710 P.2d 893,
221 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629, 710 P.2d 240, 221 Cal. Rptr.
440 (1985); People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377, 708 P.2d 1252, 220 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1985);
People v. Montiel, 39 Cal. 3d 910, 705 P.2d 1248, 218 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1985); People v.
Chavez, 39 Cal. 3d 823, 705 P.2d 372, 218 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1985); People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d
762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985); People v. Hayes (John), 38 Cal. 3d 780, 699 P.2d
1259, 214 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1985); People v. Anderson (Stephen), 38 Cal. 3d 58, 694 P.2d
1149, 210 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1985); People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal. 3d 573, 693 P.2d 243, 209
Cal. Rptr. 664 (1984); People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810
(1984); People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984), cert.
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the repeated application of Carlos had precisely the opposite effect.
Carlos and the reversal of fifteen death cases under the Carlos
rule"94 formed part of the mounting criticism of the Bird court to the
point that it became an issue in the November 1986 judicial reten-
tion election.8"
Under the Carlos rule, an intent-to-kill was one of the mens
rea elements of the felony-murder special circumstance in the 1978
Initiative. 9 The prosecution was required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill his victim when the
homicide was committed during the qualifying felony. 97 Addition-
ally, as with all elements of a crime,"' since the jury was required to
make a factual finding on the existence of that intent element, the
jury needed to receive an appropriate instruction.399 Thus, regardless
of the evidence and regardless of the defendant's omission in request-
ing an intent-to-kill instruction, the failure to so instruct the jury
was error.'00 Furthermore, in People v. Garcia,"°1 the Bird court
held that unless one of four exceptions were applicable, the failure to
instruct the jury on the intent-to-kill element invoked the per se rule
of reversible error.
Although by its repeated application the Carlos rule was firmly
denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985); Ramos v. Superior Court (Ramos 11), 32 Cal. 3d 26, 648 P.2d
589, 184 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1982).
The Carlos rule was applied in three additional cases, but the opinion was pending on
remand from the Supreme Court of the United States in one of these cases and petitions for
hearing were granted in the remaining two: People v. Hamilton (Bernard), 41 Cal. 3d 408,
710 P.2d 981, 221 Cal. Rptr. 902 (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)) (opinion on remand pending at the close of the first year
of the Lucas court), cert. granted, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986); People v. Hamilton (Billy), 41 Cal.
3d 211, 710 P.2d 937, 221 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1985) (petition for rehearing granted, opinion on
rehearing pending at the close of the first year of the Lucas court); and People v. Walker, 41
Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1985) (petition for rehearing granted, opinion
on rehearing pending at the close of the first year of the Lucas court).
394. These fifteen cases were Ratliff, Balderas, Hamilton (Bernard), Hamilton (Billy),
Silbertson, Fuentes, Guerra, Chavez, Boyd, Hayes (John), Anderson (Stephen), Armendariz,
Ramos, Whitt, and Garcia.
395. See Poulos, supra note 1 at 263-65.
396. See supra notes 177, 389-93 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 177, 389-93 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 312-20.
400. See supra notes 312-20.
401. 36 Cal. 3d 539, 684 P.2d 826, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1229 (1985). The Bird court cases invoking this per se reversibility rule are listed supra note
393. This per se test of reversibility should also govern the failure to instruct the jury on the
Green intent rule. See People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 517-26, 749 P.2d 803, 826-33, 244
Cal. Rptr. 148, 172-79 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting); People v. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d
883, 973, 751 P.2d 395, 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 397-98 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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entrenched in the law of California, not all of the justices were will-
ing to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis and continue to reverse
the large number of cases in which Garcia mandated a reversal for
Carlos error. In People v. Hamilton (Bernard Hamilton), the Bird
court reversed three felony-murder special circumstances, based on
the felonies of burglary, robbery and kidnapping, for Carlos error.
402
Justice Lucas, now Chief Justice Lucas, filed a dissent from the
court's use of the Carlos rule:
The majority relies upon People v. Garcia . . . and Carlos v.
Superior Court . . . . in concluding that the failure to instruct
the jury regarding intent to kill was prejudicial error requiring
us to set aside the special circumstances finding and the penalty
judgment. For reasons I have previously explained, I strongly
disagree with the holdings in those cases (see People v. VVhitt
* . .), and I can no longer concur in judgments which reverse
special circumstances findings under their compulsion (see Peo-
ple v. Guerra . . ).
• . . My principal quarrel is with Carlos itself, wherein my
colleagues rewrote Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(17), and introduced an "intent to kill" requirement which
was mandated by neither state nor federal law. As we proceed
to reverse one death penalty judgment after another on Carlos
grounds, let us not assign the blame to some other court-the
fault is ours. I continue to urge reconsideration and disapproval
of that unfortunate decision .... 'o
Justice Mosk also filed a separate dissent in Hamilton:
I cannot join in Justice Lucas' criticism of Carlos v. Superior
Court. . . . Even if one be disillusioned by the number of pen-
alty reversals required by that decision and by People v. Garcia
402. People v. Hamilton (Bernard), 41 Cal. 3d 408, 710 P.2d 981, 221 Cal. Rptr. 902
(vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570
(1986)) (opinion on remand pending at the close of the first year of the Lucas court), cert.
granted, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986).
403. Id. at 437-38, 710 P.2d at 999-1000, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21 (citations omitted).
Justice Lucas began dissenting from the reversal of felony-murder special circumstance find-
ings under the Carlos rule in People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377, 708 P.2d 1252, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 374 (1985). During his dissent in that case, he wrote,
Although I have in the past concurred in reversals of some capital cases under
the compulsion of Carlos]Garcia . .. , I can no longer characterize myself as
'concurring' in these reversals. The Carlos and Garcia rulings are responsible
for an increasing number of unnecessary reversals and retrials. I would join
three of my colleagues in reexamining, and ultimately overruling, those deci-
sions. Accordingly, I cannot join in the judgment of reversal.
Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d at 390, 708 P.2d at 1259, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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... stare decisis and respect for the judicial process require ad-
herence to decisions rendered so recently by a substantial major-
ity of this court. A petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court was sought by the Attorney General in Garcia,
and review in the high court was denied. . . . Thus Carlos-
Garcia remains the law in California.
I agree with Justice Lucas, however, that even under Carlos,
we need not set aside the special circumstance finding in this
case. Intent to kill was manifest from the facts and no evidence
was introduced by defendant that might raise a reasonable
doubt on that issue.4°4
These opinions were filed on December 31st, the last day of
1985. Before the following year was over three vacancies had been
created on the court. Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso and
Grodin had been denied a further term in office in the November,
1986 judicial retention election.4"' The Bird court's handling of au-
tomatic appeals had become the major issue in the retention election
campaign.4 °6 The criticism focused on the number of death judg-
ments reversed during the Bird court's tenure.4 °7 When the votes
were counted, it was relatively clear that a majority of the voters
wanted a change in the way the California Supreme Court was han-
dling death penalty appeals. 40 8 Arguably, they wanted affirmances,
not reversals. 409 The continued vitality of the Carlos rule thus de-
pended upon the views of the new appointees.
b. The Lucas Court
When the new California Supreme Court was finally organized
in March of 1987, a large backlog of death penalty cases greeted the
new justices. The lack of an intent-to-kill instruction for the felony-
murder special circumstance infected a large number of felony-mur-
der special circumstance findings. According to one critic, the Carlos
intent-to-kill rule may have been applicable to as many as fifty cases
already tried under the pre-Carlos instructions.410
404. Hanilton (Bernard), 41 Cal. 3d at 439, 710 P.2d at 1000, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 921
(citations omitted).
405. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 208-20 for a discussion of the retention election cam-
paign, the retention election, and its aftermath.
406. Poulos, supra note 1, at 208-09.
407. Poulos, supra note 1, at 209.
408. Poulos, supra note 1, at 217-18.
409. Poulos, supra note 1, at 218.
410. Soberanis, A California Journal Survey: How biased is the Court?, 17 CAL. J.
435, 437 (1986). It was estimated by Ed Jagels, Kern County District Attorney and a spokes-
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Furthermore, the Carlos rule was applicable to at least one of
the special circumstance findings in nearly one-half of the sixteen
automatic appeals decided this year.411 Given the prevalence of Car-
los error and the anticipated reversal of a large number of death
judgments under its compulsion, the Carlos rule presented a major
impediment to changing the way automatic appeals had been han-
dled under the Bird court. 12
California Governor Deukmejian's support for capital punish-
ment and his practice of appointing pro-capital punishment judges to
the bench41 is well-known. As indicated above, Chief Justice Lucas
made clear his opposition to Carlos while still Justice. Additionally,
he urged the court to reconsider and disapprove of "that unfortunate
decision"4 4 and professed his willingness to "join three of [his] col-
man for Crime Victims for Court Reform (one of the major organizations opposing the confir-
mation of Chief Justice Bird, and Justice Reynoso and Grodin), that Carlos and its progeny
"may affect as many as 50 other judgments." Id.
411. Sixteen death cases were decided during the first year of the Lucas court's tenure.
See supra note 5. There was a felony-murder special circumstance finding in each of the
following cases decided under the 1978 Initiative: Hendricks I, Gates, Anderson (James), Mi-
randa, Hale, Hendricks II, and Melton. Ultimately the Lucas court reversed Hendricks I and
Snow on non-death penalty law grounds. See supra note 5. Since there was another valid
special circumstance finding in Anderson (James) (multiple-murder) and since the death judg-
ment was reversed in that case for Ramos error, a reversal would not have been compelled in
Anderson. In Hendricks II, there was also a multiple-murder special circumstance which was
upheld. Invalidating the felony-murder special circumstance finding under Carlos would not
have affected the defendant's death eligibility, though it may have necessitated a new penalty
trial (though the Lucas court rejected a similar argument in Wade). In Miranda the jury
made a special finding that the defendant was guilty of first degree murder and that the killing
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Arguably this holding would have brought the case
under one of the exceptions to the Carlos rule. A reversal of the special circumstance findings
and the death judgment would have apparently been required in Gates; though, because the
court relied upon Anderson's overruling of Carlos, one cannot tell from the face of the opinion
whether one of the exceptions to the Carlos rule might have been applicable.
Six of the sixteen cases decided this year were prosecutions under the 1977 Legislation.
These were Ghent, Bell, Kimnble, Hovey, Ruiz, and Williams. See supra note 5. The felony-
murder special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation was involved in five of these cases: Ghent
(felony-murder (rape)), Bell (felony-murder (robbery)), Kimble (felony-murder (burglary, rob-
bery, and rape) and multiple-murder), Hovey (felony-murder (kidnapping)), and Williams
(felony-murder (robbery, and kidnapping), and multiple-murder).
Since the felony-murder special circumstance defined in the 1977 Legislation required a
finding that the killing that was committed during the felony was done willfully and with
deliberation and premeditation (see supra note 72), it did not suffer from the same defect
found in the 1978 Initiative's felony-murder provision.
412. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 267-76 for a discussion of these issues.
413. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 209.
414. People v. Hamilton (Bernard), 41 Cal. 3d 408, 437-38, 710 P.2d 981, 999-1000,
221 Cal. Rptr. 902, 920-21 (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Rose
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)) (opinion on remand pending at the close of the first year of the
Lucas court), cert. granted, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986).
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leagues in reexamining, and ultimately overruling" Carlos.'1" Subse-
quently, it was widely anticipated that the Carlos rule would be
abandoned shortly after the new Deukmejian appointees took the
bench.4 This prediction proved to be accurate.
On October 13, 1987, in People v. Anderson (James) the Lucas
court overruled Carlos.41 7 Anderson was the third automatic appeal
decided by the Lucas court, and the first case to review a felony-
murder special circumstance finding in a prosecution under the 1978
Initiative. In view of Justice Mosk's recent statement in Bernard
Hamilton that "stare decisis and respect for the judicial process re-
quire adherence" to Carlos,4 8 it was surprising that the Anderson
opinion was written by Justice Mosk.4" 9 All of the Deukmejian ap-
pointees, new and bygone alike, signed the Mosk opinion.420 Only
Justice Broussard, the author of Carlos, dissented to the reversal.4 "
With the demise of the Carlos intent-to-kill rule, the felony-
murder special circumstance no longer has a culpable mental state
beyond that necessary for the conviction of murder in the first de-
gree. The analysis of Anderson and a critique of the Lucas court's
overruling of the Carlos intent-to-kill rule is far too long and com-
plex to be included here. That task is reserved for another day.42
3. The Green Intent Rule
a. The Bird Court
In People v. Green the Bird court interpreted the felony-mur-
der special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation as requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to advance an
415. People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377, 390, 708 P.2d 1252, 1259, 220 Cal. Rptr. 374,
381 (1985).
416. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 268-69, 275-76.
417. People v. Anderson (James), 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1987).
418. Hamilton (Bernard), 41 Cal. 3d at 439, 710 P.2d at 1000, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
419. Anderson (]ames), 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
420. Justice Mosk's opinion was thus signed by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices
Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson and Kaufman. The new justice appointed by Governor
Deukmejian to fill the seats vacated by the November, 1986 judicial retention election, were
Justices Arguelles, Eagleson and Kaufman. Chief Justice Lucas, then Justice Lucas, and Jus-
tice Panelli had been previously appointed by Governor Deukmejian. See Poulos, supra note
1, at 220. Thus five of the current seven member of the California Supreme Court are
Deukmejian appointees.
421. Anderson (amnes), 43 Cal. 3d at 1151, 742 P.2d at 1333-34, 240 Cal. Rptr. at
613.
422. See generally Poulos, supra note 1, at 263-65, 272-77.
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independent felonious purpose by killing his victim.4 " In an opinion
decided several weeks after Green, the court explained the rule as
follows:
Since 'the Legislature must have intended that each special cir-
cumstance provide a rational basis for distinguishing between
those murderers who deserve to be considered for the death pen-
alty and those who do not,' the determination as to whether or
not a murder was committed during the commission of robbery
or other specified felony is not 'a matter of semantics or simple
chronology.' . . .Rather, this determination involves proof of
the intent of the accused. A murder is not committed during a
robbery within the meaning of the statute unless the accused has
'killed . . .in order to advance an independent felonious pur-
pose.' . . . A special circumstance allegation of murder commit-
ted during a robbery has not been established where the ac-
cused's primary criminal goal 'is not to steal but to kill and the
robbery is merely incidental to the murder . . . because its sole
object is to facilitate or conceal the primary crime.' 42'
This rule thus requires proof of the intent with which the de-
fendant killed his victim, and it defines the intent with which the
killing must be done: The killing must have been committed to ad-
vance the "commission or attempted commission"42" of the felony on
which the felony-murder charge is based."26
The Green intent rule was subsequently applied to the felony-
murder special circumstance provision in the 1978 Initiative.' 2 7
423. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 59-62, 609 P.2d 468, 504-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 37-
39 (1980).
424. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 322, 611 P.2d 883, 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289,
299 (1980). Justice Richardson, joined by Justices Clark and Manuel dissented to the reversal
of the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance on the ground that there was sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could have found that the defendant killed his victim with the intent
to further an independent felonious purpose. In other words, the dissenting Justices in Thomp-
son accepted the law as articulated in the majority opinion, but they disagreed with the major-
ity's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to permit the jury to find
that the requisite intent existed in the mind of the defendant when he killed the victim. Id. at
334, 611 P.2d at 901, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
Green was decided on April 24, 1980, and Thompson on June 9, 1980. See Green, 27
Cal. 3d 1,609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1; Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 289.
425. The felony-murder special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation applies when the
felony is committed or attempted. See supra note 72.
426. The meaning of the word "independent" in the formulation of the rule means that
the defendant must intend to advance the commission or attempted commission of the felony
which supports the felony-murder special circumstance charge. See supra notes 424-25 and
accompanying text.
427. People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 842, 705 P.2d 380, 383, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57, 60
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Though the rule most frequently appears in prosecutions under the
felony-murder-robbery special circumstance,42 8 it applies with equal
force to all of those felonies enumerated in the felony-murder special
circumstance provisions of the 1977 Legislation or the 1978
Initiative.4 '
On principle, the Green intent rule is an element of the felony-
murder special circumstance."38 Accordingly, the prosecution has the
burden of proving that the defendant killed his victim with the intent
of advancing the commission or attempted commission of the felony
upon which the felony-murder special circumstance is based beyond
a reasonable doubt. In addition, since the rule is an element of the
culpable mental state required by the felony-murder special-circum-
stance,""1 the trial court must include an instruction on the intent
rule in the court's charge to the jury. This instruction must be given
without regard to. whether it is requested by the defendant, and re-
gardless of whether it is supported by the evidence.432
Finally, despite Chief Justice Lucas' assertion in Kimble to the
contrary,' and the fact that the court never had occasion to so label
the rule, the Bird court treated the Green intent rule as an element
(1985).
428. See supra note 393.
429. In the course of explaining the Green intent rule in Thompson, the court wrote:
Under the special circumstances statute, this court reasoned in Green, 'it was
not enough for the jury to find the defendant guilty of a murder and one of the
listed crimes [there, robbery]; the statute also required that the jury find the
defendant committed the murder 'during the commission or attempted commis-
sion of' that crime. . . . In other words, a valid conviction of a listed crime was
a necessary condition to finding a corresponding special circumstance, but it was
not a sufficient condition; the murder must also have been committed 'during the
commission' of the underlying crime.'
People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 322, 611 P.2d 883, 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 299 (1980)
(emphasis added). The Green rule has accordingly been applied to the following felonies listed
in the felony-murder provisions: robbery, burglary, and kidnapping. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836,
705 P.2d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1985) (felony-murder-kidnapping special circumstance in
the 1978 Initiative); Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980)
(felony-murder-robbery and felony-murder-burglary special circumstances in the 1977 Legis-
lation); People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 59-62, 609 P.2d 468, 504-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 37-39
(felony-murder-robbery special circumstance in 1977 Legislation).
The Lucas court has also applied the Green intent rule to the felony-murder provision of
the 1978 Initiative. People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988); People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127,
241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1038, reh'g denied 487 U.S. 1246 (1988).
430. See supra notes 224-37, 322-38 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 224-37, 322-38 and accompanying text. But cf. supra text accom-
panying notes 219, 237-45 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 240-41, 309-20 and accompanying text.
433. See infra notes 447-53 and accompanying text.
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of the felony-murder special circumstance in every case in which the
rule was invoked, except for Robertson."4" But Robertson does not
contradict the classification of this rule as an element, " 5 for that case
was argued and decided on an entirely different theory.4 6
b. The Lucas Court
An instruction on the Green intent rule was incorporated into
the special circumstances instructions in the book of approved jury
instructions. ""7 The Green instruction is apparently routinely given
in every felony-murder special circumstance case. Indeed, the first
two cases in which the Green intent rule was considered by the Lu-
cas court involved the use of the approved form of the Green
instruction.
In Gates, the trial court erroneously stated the felony-murder
special circumstance's requirements in the disjunctive. Literally read,
the jury was told that to find the felony-murder-robbery special cir-
cumstance "true" it must find that the murder was committed while
the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commis-
sion of a robbery or that the murder was committed in order to carry
our or advance the commission of the robbery.4"8 The instruction
should have been given in the conjunctive. "And" should have been
used instead of "or." Although the Gates court acknowledges that an
instruction worded in this fashion is erroneous, it nevertheless found
that the error had been cured by a further instruction and illustra-
tions given by the trial judge on this issue.4 9 Since the standard jury
434. See supra notes 423-29 and accompanying text.
435. The Green instructions fashioned by the Committee On Approved Jury Instruc-
tions and included in the book of approved jury instructions [CALJIC] treats the Green intent
rule as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. See infra notes 437-38 and
accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
437. See People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 1193, 743 P.2d 301, 317, 240 Cal. Rptr.
666, 682 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027, 108 S. Ct. 2005 (1988); People v. Kimble, 44
Cal. 3d 480, 517, 749 P.2d 803, 827, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 172 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
438. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1193, 743 P.2d at 317, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The instruction
read as follows:
Now, to find that the special circumstance, which is murder in the commission
of a robbery, is true, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the
murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or
attempted commission of a robbery, or that the murder was committed during
the immediate flight after the commission of a robbery, or that the murder was
committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of rob-
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instructions are properly worded in the conjunctive, the trial court
apparently misspoke in Gates."0
In Miranda, the instruction on the Green intent rule read, in
pertinent part, as follows: "That the murder was committed in order
to carry out or advance the commission of the crim6 of robbery, or to
facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection." 44'
Although the Miranda opinion never identified the defendant's
specific objections to this instruction, the court found no error in the
giving of this instruction because the defendant "did not request any
additional instruction on this point" and the instruction "effectively
informed the jury that in order to find the special circumstance to be
true it had to find the murder was committed in furtherance of the
robbery." '2
The instructions in Gates"43 and Miranda444 tell the jury that
the killing must have been committed "in order to carry out or ad-
vance" the felony. However, the fact that this determination* must be
made by inquiring into the defendant's subjective mental state at the
time of the killing, and by finding that the defendant killed the vic-
tim with the intent (or for the purpose) of advancing the felony is
left for the jury to infer from the italicized phrase.445 While, it would
be preferable for the jury to be instructed that it must find ". . . that
the murder was committed for the purpose (or with the intent) of
carrying out or advancing the commission of the crime of robbery
.," the more general phrase was found to suffice in both cases.
Since instructions were given on the Green intent rule in both cases
which treat the rule in the same manner as an element of the felony-
murder special circumstances would be treated, both of these cases
support the element theory of the rule. It should also be noted that
Gates and Miranda were prosecutions under the 1978 Initiative.44
440. Id.
441. People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 90, 744 P.2d 1127, 1147, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594,
614 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1038, reh'g denied 487 U.S. 1246 (1988). Though the
opinion does not identify this as the standard jury instruction from the book of approved jury
instructions, it is apparently CALJIC No. 8.81.17. See Kiinble, 44 Cal. 3d at 517, 749 P.2d at
827, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
442. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 90, 744 P.2d at 1147, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
443. See supra note 437.
444. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
445. This instruction is apparently based on the following sentence from the Thompson
opinion: "A murder is not committed during a robbery within the meaning of the statute
unless the accused has 'killed in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious
purpose .... " People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 322, 611 P.2d 883, 893, 165 Cal. Rptr.
289, 299 (1980) (emphasis in original).
446. People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1987), cert.
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The Green intent rule was also a major issue in Kimble. But in
that case a majority of the Lucas court concluded that the intent rule
is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance, and
thus the trial court need not always include the Green intent instruc-
tion in its charge to the jury on that ground.44 The court then held
that the Green instruction need not be given unless it is either re-
quested by the defendant or the evidence raises a factual issue as to
whether the killing was committed for a purpose other than to ad-
vance the felony which forms the basis of the felony-murder special
circumstance.448
Kimble's holding that the Green intent rule is not an element of
the felony-murder special circumstance drew a dissent from Justice
Mosk. 4" 9 Relying on Green and the standard jury instruction on the
Green intent rule, Justice Mosk concluded that the rule "is plainly
an element of the felony-murder special circumstance and, as such,
should have been instructed on in connection with each of the felony-
murder special circumstances alleged in this case." 45 The major
portion of his dissent is devoted to the question of the reversibility of
the error which is committed when the instruction is not included in
the jury charge. 41
Chief Justice Lucas' opinion in Kimble has already been dis-
cussed in connection with the current court's conception of the spe-
cial circumstances.' 52 For the reasons appearing in that discussion,
Kimble is wrong on principle and should be disapproved by the
court. 58
The final case to consider the Green intent rule during the first
year of the Lucas court is People v. Williams.45' Since the Williams
trial took place before the court decided Green, the Green instruction
was not read to the jury. 5 Defendant's argument that this omission
was error and that the error invoked a per se standard of reversibil-
ity was rejected. But the court did not address the question of
denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988); Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1038, reh'g denied 487 U.S. 1246 (1988).
447. People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 501, 749 P.2d 803, 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 161
(1988).
448. Id. at 502-03, 749 P.2d at 816-17, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
449. Id. at 517, 749 P.2d at 826, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 517-26, 749 P.2d at 826-33, 244 Cal. Rptr. 172-79.
452. See supra notes 237-338 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 237-338 and accompanying text.
454. 44 Cal. 3d 883, 751 P.2d 395, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1988), modified, 45 Cal. 3d
517a, cert. denied - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 249 (1988).
455. Id. at 928, 751 P.2d at 424, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
[Vol. 30
19901 THE LUCAS COURT & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 419
whether the failure to instruct on the intent rule was error. "Assum-
ing that such an instruction would have been required in this case,"
wrote Justice Eagleson for the majority, "the omission could not
have prejudiced defendant."" 6 Without ever identifying the standard
governing the reversibility issue for this type of error, the court used
an undisclosed form of harmless error analysis to conclude that the
error did not compel a reversal of the felony-murder special circum-
stance finding.457
Again, Justice Mosk dissented.
I cannot, however, join in the opinion of the court: I disagree
with the majority's conclusion that the felony-murder special-
circumstance findings are valid.
To begin with, I believe that advancement of an independent
felonious purpose is an element of the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance and as such should have been instructed on in con-
nection with each of the felony-murder special circumstances al-
leged in this case. We held as much in People v. Green ....
The majority choose not to dispute this point and, in my view,
simply cannot do so.
Further, contrary to the majority's conclusion, I believe that
failure to instruct on the independent-felonious-purpose element
is not subject to general harmless-error analysis, and that on
this record the error cannot be held nonprejudicial.
Regardless of the validity of the felony-murder special circum-
stance, Williams remained death eligible. A valid multiple-murder
special circumstance finding had also been made in the case. For that
reason Justice Mosk ultimately concurred in the affirmance of the
death judgment.48 9
At the close of the first. year of the Lucas court the status of the
Green intent rule as an element of the offense remains clouded by
Chief Justice Lucas' opinion in Kimble.460 There is nothing in Gates
or Miranda supporting the rejection of the rule as an element of the
special circumstance. The fact that the issue was completely avoided
in Williams suggests that Kimble will not be followed. It would have
been far too easy for the Williams court to rely on Kimble for the
proposition that the rule is not an element of the offense. Thus the
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 973, 751 P.2d at 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Mosk, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting).
459. Id. at 973-74, 751 P.2d at 457, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
460. See supra notes 237-338 and accompanying text.
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question of the error turned on whether the trial court had a sua
sponte duty to instruct on the rule because of the evidence in the
case. Whether the Lucas court will ultimately conclude that the
Green intent rule is an element of the felony-murder special circum-
stance is far from clear at this point.
So far, the Green intent rule has survived the emergence of the
Lucas court." 1 The Carlos intent-to-kill rule has not. Justice Mosk
wrote the opinion in Anderson overruling Carlos. 2 and he is the
principal champion of the Green intent rule on the current court.483
Accordingly, perhaps he will be able to convince his brethren to disa-
vow Kimble and clearly affirm that the Green rule is an element of
the felony-murder special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative.
4. The Harris Overlapping-felony Rule
The principal problem associated with multiple special circum-
stance findings is that they inflate the number of aggravating circum-
stances that may be taken into account during the penalty assessment
process at the penalty phase of the capital trial.464 This occurs be-
cause the sentencing authority may consider each special circum-
stance found true during the preceding phase of the trial as a sepa-
rate aggravating factor (or circumstance) in the penalty assessment
process at the penalty phase under both the 1977 Legislation 465 and
the 1978 Initiative.466 Because the two Harris anti-inflation rules
identified below seek to prevent the inflation of the aggravating fac-
tors at the penalty phase, one would expect to find the following
discussion in an article focusing on the penalty phase of the capital
trial, rather than in an article on the law of the special circum-
stance.467 For purposes of clarity, the Harris single-charge rule is
identified below, but the discussion of that rule is reserved for an-
other day.468 The second Harris rule, the overlapping-felony rule,
tenders an issue of the substantive law of the felony-murder special
circumstance. For that reason, a discussion of that rule is included
below.
461. See supra notes 437-46 and accompanying text.
462. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 449-51, 458-59 and accompanying text.
464. See infra notes 469-71 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
467. People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 62-67, 679 P.2d 433, 448-52, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782,
797-801 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
468. See Poulos, supra note 142.
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The first of the two Harris anti-inflation rules, the single-
charge rule, prevents the use of the same conduct more than once for
the same purpose. A violation of this rule typically occurs when the
defendant has committed two or more murders. Since the multiple-
murder special circumstance requires that the defendant commit
more than one murder, the second murder qualifies the defendant for
the multiple-murder special circumstance. But in this situation, this
is only one multiple-murder special circumstance, not two.469
The same analysis is equally applicable, of course, to the situa-
tion in which the defendant has committed more than two murders.
There is still only one multiple-murder special circumstance regard-
less of the number of murders committed.47 If more than one multi-
ple-murder special circumstance is found to be true, the improper
inflation occurs when these multiple findings are considered as more
than one aggravating factor by the sentencing jury.'71 Since the Har*-
ris single-charge rule tenders only a penalty phase issue, that rule is
discussed in a separate article on the penalty phase of the capital
trial. 72
The second Harris anti-inflation rule embargoes the use of
multiple separate special circumstances findings as aggravating fac-
tors at the penalty phase of the trial when those findings are based
upon the segmentation of a single indivisible course of conduct."73
This type of inflation typically occurs when the defendant breaks
into the victim's home for the purpose of robbing the victim, and a
homicide is then committed during the course of the felonies. Since
the defendant has committed two felonies which are enumerated in
the felony-murder special circumstance statute (robbery and bur-
glary), the defendant may be prosecuted for two separate felony-
murder special circumstances.. 7' But since these two felonies were
committed as a result of a single indivisible course of conduct, the
Harris plurality held that the multiple felony-murder special cir-
cumstance findings could be considered as only one aggravating fac-
469. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d at 67, 679 P.2d at 452, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 801 (plurality
opinion).
470. People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1273, 729 P.2d 115, 146, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849,
880 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987) (plurality opinion) (though defendant was con-
victed of three murders, there was but a single multiple-murder special circumstance, not six).
471. In addition to Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984),
and Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986), see People v. Rodri-
guez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 787, 726 P.2d 113, 150, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 704 (1986).
472. See Poulos, supra note 142.
473. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d at 62-67, 679 P.2d at 448-52, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 797-801.
474. Id. at 66-67, 679 P.2d at 451-52, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
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tor at the penalty phase.478
This branch of the Harris anti-inflation rule, is known as the
overlapping-felony-murder rule. This rule, like its sibling the Harris
single-charge rule, has been assumed to tender only a penalty phase
issue. According to the analysis presented here, it is in fact an issue
which should be resolved as a question of the interpretation of the
special circumstances themselves. For that reason, the Harris over-
lapping-felony-murder rule is considered in this article.
a. The Bird Court
This issue was first encountered by the Bird court in People v.
Harris (Lee).' 7 ' Harris was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder. Three special circumstances were alleged and found to be
true in connection with each murder: felony-murder (robbery), fel-
ony-murder (burglary), and multiple-murder. These multiple special
circumstance findings, six in total, presented the court with the two
different types of inflation of the aggravating factors identified
above:' 77 (1) the single-charge rule because of the two multiple-mur-
der special circumstance findings; and (2) the overlapping-felony-
murder rule because of two felony-murder special circumstance find-
ings with respect to each murder. 47 8 It is only the two felony-murder
special circumstances, for robbery and burglary, for each murder
that concern us here.
The multiple felony-murder special circumstance findings were
based upon the following facts. Lee Harris and his companions trav-
elled to Long Beach, California, for the purpose of robbing a couple
who managed an apartment house in which one of the culprits had
475. Id.
476. 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984).
477. There are other ways of inflating the aggravating factors at the penalty phase of
the trial. One of the most obvious of these additional ways of achieving inflation is to allow the
jury to consider the first degree murder which qualified the defendant for special circumstance
consideration under both factor (a) (the circumstances of the crime of which defendant was
convicted in the present proceeding) and factor (b) (the presence or absence of criminal activity
by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence). This too is
improper. People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 764, 750 P.2d 741, 771-72, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867,
898 (1988). See People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 787, 726 P.2d 113, 150, 230 Cal. Rptr.
667, 704 (1986). On the other hand, the Melton court rejected a contention that it was an
improper inflation for the jury to consider prior felony convictions for violent felonies under
both factor (b) and factor (c) (the presence or absence of any prior felony conviction) on the
ground that the fact that tfie single conviction establishes two concerns: the commission of a
felony, and violent behavior. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 764, 750 P.2d at 771-72, 244 Cal. Rptr. at
898. See Poulos, supra note 142.
478. See supra notel 490-501 and accompanying text.
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lived. In the course of carrying out their plan they broke into the
managers' apartment, robbing and killing both victims.479 Relevant
to the analysis here is the fact that the instructions charged two fel-
ony-murder special circumstances for each murder: felony-murder
(robbery) and felony-murder (burglary). Both allegations were found
to be true with respect to both murders.48
Harris claimed that the robbery and burglary formed part of a
single course of action, and that the separate charging of the bur-
glary and robbery special circumstances wrongfully inflated the
number of aggravating factors before the jury at the penalty phrase
of the trial. Finding that "the federal Constitution and California
statutory laws prohibit the cumulative use of special circumstance
allegations" as aggravating factors at the penalty phase, the Harris
plurality agreed.48
The robbery and burglary special circumstances
are necessarily overlapping because they both describe virtually
the same conduct. The use in the penalty phase of both these
special circumstance allegations thus artificially inflates the par-
ticular circumstances of the crime and strays from the high
court's mandate that the state 'tailor and apply its law in a
manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty.''
In addition, the "principles underlying California's prohibition
of double punishment" also support limiting the use of overlapping
special circumstances as aggravating factors at the penalty phase.483
The plurality then fashioned a remedy for handling overlapping spe-
cial circumstances. 4 But the Harris plurality's overlapping-felony-
479. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d at 43-44, 679 P.2d at 435-36, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
480. Id. at 62, 679 P.2d at 449, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 63, 679 P.2d at 449, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 428 (1980)).
483. Id. at 64-65, 679 P.2d at 450, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
484. The procedure outlined by the Harris plurality was as follows:
We conclude that the appropriate procedure would be to allow the prosecution
to charge those special circumstances supported by the evidence, and for the jury
to determine in the guilt phase which special circumstances may have been
committed.
Assuming that overlapping special circumstances charged are found to be true,
the doctrine, of "merger" and the prohibition against multiple punishment
should then operate in the penalty phase to prevent the improper cumulation of
special circumstances to avoid the risk that a jury may give undue weight to the
mere number of special circumstances found to be true. To avoid that risk, in
those cases involving a single act or an indivisible course of conduct with one
principal criminal objective, the jury should be instructed that although it found
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murder rule was never again confronted during the Bird court's ten-
ure. This meant that the rule never acted with the binding force of
precedent, nor was it entitled to respect under the doctrine of stare
decisis for a majority of the Bird court never employed that rule in a
subsequent case.
Nevertheless, in Allen a plurality of the Bird court addressed a
related form of inflation-the use of alternate theories of a special
circumstance to support two special circumstance findings.485 The
witness-killing special circumstance can be committed in two ways:
by the intentional killing of a victim (1) to prevent his testimony in
any criminal proceeding; and, (2) in retaliation for the victim's testi-
mony as a witness in any criminal proceeding.' 86 The Allen court
held that even though the evidence supports both theories of the wit-
ness-killing special circumstance, only one special circumstance may
be found true. The holding was grounded in the "probable intent" of
the legislative body in enacting this special circumstance.487
Although Allen was a case of first impression, the multiple-the-
ory analysis appears to be correct on principle. It follows the analogy
of a finding of first degree murder on one of several alternative theo-
ries. The prosecution is entitled, for example, to pursue separate the-
ories of first degree murder, and to argue those separate theories to
the jury."88 But only one verdict of guilt of first degree murder is
permissible for each victim, even though the jury may find that all of
theories of first degree murder have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt."89
several special circumstances to be true, for purposes of determining the penalty
to be imposed, the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one.
In addition, the prosecution should be barred from referring to those multiple
special circumstance findings which have been merged in the penalty phase.
Such a procedure is necessary because of the dual nature of special circumstance
allegations provided by California's death penalty law coupled with the unique
role of juries in determining the appropriate sentence in capital cases.
Id. at 66-67, 679 P.2d at 451-52, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
485. People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
486. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 1988).
487. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1273-74, 729 P.2d at 146-47, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
488. For example, the prosecution could produce evidence that a particular murder was
(1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated, (2) committed by means of an explosive, and (3)
committed during the perpetration of both robbery (4) and burglary. If the trier of fact were to
find that each of these theories were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, only one verdict of first
degree murder would be proper. See, e.g., People v. Decaillet, 41 Cal. 2d 708, 263 P.2d 441
(1953); People v. Sutic, 41 Cal. 2d 483, 261 P.2d 241 (1953); People v. Gilliam, 39 Cal. 2d
235, 246 P.2d 32 (1952).
489. See, e.g., Decaillet, 41 Cal. 2d 708, 263 P.2d 441 (1953); Sutic, 41 Cal. 2d 483,
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b. The Lucas Court
The Harris overlapping felony-murder rule appeared for the
first time before the Lucas court in Melton."9" James Melton, like
Lee Harris, was convicted of murder in the first degree, burglary
and robbery. With respect to the murder, the jury found "true" both
a felony-murder (robbery) and a felony-murder (burglary) special
circumstance. The instructions permitted the sentencing jury to con-
sider each of these special circumstances as a separate aggravating
factor.491 Invoking the overlapping branch of the Harris rule, the
defendant claimed that the multiple Use of his intent to steal, which
formed a critical element in both robbery and burglary, impermissi-
bly inflated the aggravating factors in the penalty assessment pro-
cess.49 Furthermore, the People conceded that defendant's claim fell
squarely within the rule announced by the Harris plurality because
"the robbery and burglary special circumstances are necessarily
overlapping because they describe virtually the same conduct."' 93
Despite the Attorney General's concession, the Lucas court re-
jected the Harris plurality's overlapping-felony-murder rule. Writ-
ing for the majority in Melton, Justice Eagleson took an entirely
different view. Instead of focusing on the common element of the
burglary and robbery, the defendant's intent-to-steal, Justice Eagle-
son focused on the difference between the defendant's conduct in the
felonies of robbery and burglary. He wrote,
Insofar as the Harris plurality was suggesting that the penalty
jury may not consider, in any form, the existence of more than
one felony leading to the capital murder, we find its reasoning
unpersuasive. Section 190.3, subdivision (a), directs the jury to
consider generally "the circumstances" of the capital crime.
Even if the additional phrase "and the existence of any special
circumstances [previously] found to be true" was missing, the
sentencing jury would be statutorily entitled to evaluate all the
conduct which led to the capital conviction. ...
In our view, it is constitutionally legitimate for the state to de-
termine that a death-eligible murderer is more culpable, and
thus more deserving of death, if he not only robbed the victim
but committed an additional and separate felonious act, bur-
261 P.2d 241 (1953); Gilliamn, 39 Cal. 2d 235, 246 P.2d 32 (1952).
490. People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 765, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, modi-
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glary, in order to facilitate the robbery and murder. Robbery
involves an assaultive invasion of personal integrity; burglary a
separate invasion of the sanctity of the home. Society may deem
the violation of each of these distinct interests separately rele-
vant to the seriousness of a capital crime."94
Having rejected the constitutional concerns raised by the Harris
plurality, Justice Eagleson then turned to the argument that statu-
tory law supported the Harris overlapping special circumstance rule.
He concluded that section 190.3 cannot be read in harmony with
section 654, and that in the context of a death penalty case, section
190.3 prevailed."0 5 In a critical passage in the opinion, Justice Ea-
gleson explained the Melton court's view of the role of special cir-
cumstances at the penalty phase:
On the other hand, the death penalty statutes provide an inte-
grated scheme of 'special circumstances' in which the single ap-
propriate punishment for the most serious offense-a first de-
gree murder-is expressly influenced by just such 'indivisible'
acts and offenses. These 'special circumstances' render a first
degree murderer eligible for death or life without parole, and
their 'existence,' as well as all the 'circumstances' of the capital
crime, must be taken into account under section 190.3, subdi-
vision (a), when the actual penalty is chosen."
With this passage the focus of the opinion subtly changed. The
court began with the importance of allowing the jury to consider all
of the defendant's conduct, including conduct that involves the actus
reus of the crimes of robbery and burglary under the "circum-
stances" provision of 190.3(a). The court then shifted to the charac-
terization of that conduct as a special circumstance, and the propri-
ety of allowing the jury to take those characterizations into account.
With this analysis, the Harris plurality's overlapping-felony-murder
rule was completely cast aside. It no longer searches for a fourth
vote.4 "
However, the interests the Harris rule sought to vindicate
(eliminating unfair inflation of the aggravating factors at the penalty
494. Id. at 766-67, 750 P.2d at 773-74, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900 (emphasis in
original).
495. Id. at 768, 750 P.2d at 774, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
496. Id. (emphasis added).
497. Since no other member of the court joined Justice Broussard's opinion concurring
in the judgment in Melton, perhaps it would be more accurate to state that this aspect of the
Harris rule was looking for three more votes. The plurality opinion in Harris was authored
by. Justice Broussard and joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justice Reynoso.
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trial) survived, and they continued to plague the Melton court even
after the Harris overlapping felony rule has been put to rest. A few
sentences further on in the opinion, Justice Eagleson wrote,
Of course the robbery and the burglary may not each be
weighed in the penalty determination more than once for ex-
actly the same purpose. The literal language of subdivision (a)
presents a theoretical problem in this respect, since it tells the
penalty jury to consider the "circumstances" of the capital crime
and any attendant statutory "special circumstances." Since the
latter are a subset of the former, a jury given no clarifying in-
structions might conceivably double-count any "circumstances"
which were also "special circumstances." On defendant's re-
quest, the trial court should admonish the jury not to do so."98
In other words, no error was committed when the jury was al-
lowed to consider both the felony-murder (robbery) and the felony-
murder (burglary) special circumstances, but it was error for the
jury to also consider those two "specials" again as, using Justice Ea-
gleson's phraseology, "circumstances of the capital crime." Thus,
under the Melton rule, the concern for inflation is not with the
double counting of the two felony-murder special circumstances as
aggravating factors, but with the multiplication of the two "specials"
by considering them once as "special circumstances" and again as
"circumstances of the crime."
The Harris overlapping-felony-murder rule and the Melton
anti-inflation rule produce different results. Under Harris, the jury
is permitted to consider only one special circumstance-a single fel-
ony-murder special circumstance under the facts of that case-but
the conduct committed by the defendant which is classified as a bur-
glary and as a robbery can be considered by the jury under the "cir-
cumstances" provision of 190.3(a).' 99 An instruction was required
telling the jury that only one special circumstance could be consid-
ered as an aggravating factor, and the prosecutor was barred from
referring to the multiple special circumstance findings that were
merged into a single aggravating factor.5 "
Under Melton, the two overlapping special circumstances may
be considered as separate aggravating factors, but, upon the request
of the defendant, the jury should be instructed that it cannot double
count the special circumstances found true as both a special circum-
498. Meltott, 44 Cal. 3d at 768, 750 P.2d at 774, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
499. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d at 61, 679 P.2d at 448, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
500. See supra note 484 and accompanying text.
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stance aggravating factor and as a "circumstance of the capital
crime" aggravating factor."0 1
5. The Burden Of Requesting The Melton Anti-inflation
Instruction
The first quarrel with Melton concerns the allocation of the
burden of instructing the jury not to double count the special circum-
stances found true under the two clauses of 190.3(a). Justice Eagle-
son simple states that "[o]n defendant's request, the trial court
should admonish the jury not to do so. '' 5°2 He gives no rationale for
allocating the burden to the defendant to request this instruction, and
none is easily formulated. There are, of course, valid reasons for
placing the burden on the defendant to request an instruction. This
will generally occur when the instruction is dependent upon a partic-
ular set of facts and, under the adversary system, there are tactical
judgments which should be left to the defense. But this instruction is
not fact specific. The risk of double counting exists at every penalty
trial for it is a condition precedent of every penalty trial that at least
one special circumstance be found true. Nor could there possibly be
a tactical consideration for not requesting the instruction.
Furthermore, allocating the burden of requesting the instruction
to the defense is inconsistent with the instructional requirements for
reducing the risk of inflating the aggravating factors in other compa-
rable situations. Elsewhere in Melton, Justice Eagleson recognized
that the language of section 190.3, subsections (a) and (b)50' "liter-
ally construed . . . allows the jury to count the violent circumstances
of the current crime as aggravating factors under both subdivisions
(a) and (b). . . Instructions in future cases should explain that the
violent crimes described in subdivision (b) do not include the circum-
stances of the capital offense itself."" 4 Since the bare language of the
501. See supra notes 498 and accompanying text.
502. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 768, 750 P.2d at 774, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
503. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to
be true pursuant to Section 190.1:
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied
threat to use force or violence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a),(b) (West 1988).
504. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 763, 750 P.2d at 771, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
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two clauses of section 190.3 (a) allows the jury to double count the
special circumstances in precisely the same way, the court should
have likewise held that the jury instructions in future cases should
explain that double counting is also prohibited under subsection (a).
There is no reason to treat the prohibited double counting under
subsection (a) and (b) any differently from the prohibited double
counting under the two clauses of subsection (a) with respect to the
duty of the trial judge to accurately inform the jury of the law guid-
ing their decision in the penalty phase of the capital trial.
Justice Eagleson's statement indicating that the burden is on the
defense to request the instruction on the prohibited double counting
under subsection (a) is also inconsistent with his opinion for the
court in Williams. Williams presented the question of the multiple
use of the multiple-murder special circumstance. 505 After condemn-
ing the use of more than one multiple-murder special circumstance,
Justice Eagleson continued for the majority, "[tiherefore, failure to
instruct the jury at the penalty phase to consider only one multiple-
murder special circumstance was also error." 506
Since the purpose served by avoiding the multiple use of the
multiple-murder special circumstance is the same in both cases-the
avoidance of inflating the aggravating circumstances at the penalty
phase-the judge should consistently be required to include the in-
struction against double counting under subsection (a) in every
case.
507
Unless some convincing rationale is offered for Melton's rule
that the trial judge need read the anti-inflation instruction to the jury
only on the defendant's request, it should be disapproved.508 Absent
the anti-inflation instruction, the charge permits the jury to count the
felony which qualifies the defendant for the felony-murder special
circumstances and to take that same felony into account again as one
of the circumstances of the crime. This double counting, of course,
505. People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 883, 751 P.2d 395, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1988).
506. Id. at 950, 751 P.2d at 440, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
507. Indeed, there is more reason for requiring that the "no double counting under
subsection (a) instruction" be included as part of the standard jury instructions in every case
than there is for the multiple-murder special circumstance discussed in Williams. The Wil-
liams instruction is required only when more than one multiple-murder special circumstance is
erroneously submitted to the jury whereas the Mellon instruction is relevant in every case (for
in every case at least one special circumstance will be found true and thus there is the risk that
the special circumstance will be double counted in every case).
508. One benefit of the Melton approach is that it would eliminate one potential source
of error that undoubtedly appears in a number of the automatic appeals now pending in the
court. That this would be an illegitimate reason for shifting the burden to the defense should
need no discussion.
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violates the Melton anti-inflation rule.6" 9 Without this instruction,
the trial court's charge to the jury errs by omission. It is beyond
dispute that the court's instructions must accurately state all of the
law necessary for a correct resolution of the issues submitted to the
jury.
6. The Unitary Theory Of The Felony-murder Special
Circumstance
The second quarrel presented here is with the assumption upon
which both Melton and Harris are founded. It is commonly assumed
that the felony-murder special circumstance provisions in both the
1977 Legislation and the 1978 Initiative define a group of separate
special circumstances. For example, it is assumed that there is a bur-
glary special circumstance, a robbery special circumstance, and a
rape special circumstance. These are only a few of the felonies which
will support a felony-murder special circumstance finding under
these statutes. There is nothing in either the language of the felony-
murder provisions or the structure of the statutes which warrants
this assumption. Furthermore, since it is an assumption, no case has
addressed the question of whether this conception of the felony-mur-
der special circumstance accurately reflects the legislative intent with
respect to the felony-murder special circumstance provisions.
Putting the felony-murder provisions aside for a moment, and
focusing on the 1978 Initiative, all of the other special circumstance
provisions in the Initiative apparently define a single special circum-
stance. This issue came before the court for the first time in Allen.5 0
The prosecution alleged two witness-murder special circumstances.
One was grounded on the theory that the witness was murdered to
prevent his testimony, and the other alleged that the witness was
murdered in retaliation for his prior testimony.5" The prosecution
produced evidence supporting both witness-murder special circum-
stances and the jury found both true. On automatic appeal the court
held that witness-murder is a single special circumstance, though it
may be committed in two different ways. Speaking for a plurality,
Justice Grodin wrote:
Nothing suggests that evidence supporting findings on both the-
ories permits the People to charge and the jury to find two sepa-
509. See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text.
510. People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
511. Id. at 1244, 729 P.2d at 125, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
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rate special circumstances. Indeed, the opposite seems to better
reflect the drafters' probable intent: a defendant who is shown
to have violated a particular special circumstance in more than
one way is "guilty" of no more than one special circumstance
violation. Of course, evidence supporting the alternative theories
of violation would be properly before the jury in any event; we
therefore reject the People's suggestion that our construction of
the statute forces the People to promote one societal interest
over the other simply because both are established by a single
course of conduct. The presence of evidence supporting both
theories of violation can properly be emphasized by the prosecu-
tor in order to stress to the jury the extent to which societal
interests that underlie the witness-killing special circumstance
have been violated.512
There is additional evidence supporting Justice Grodin's opin-
ion that the legislative body most likely intended for each subsection
of section 190.2(a) to be a single, unitary special circumstance with
alternative theories for its commission. The- 1977 Legislation listed
both the multiple-murder and the prior-murder-conviction special
circumstances in a single provision.518 The 1978 Initiative separated
these two special circumstances into separate subsections of section
190.2.514 This action supports the inference that the legislative body
intended that each subsection define only a single special circum-
stance for there is no other apparent reason for this change.
As with the other special circumstahces in both the 1977 Legis-
lation 1' and the 1978 Initiative, 16 the felony-murder special cir-
cumstances are set forth in a single subsection of the statute. As
demonstrated in Allen, the inference is compelling that the drafters
of both statutes intended each of the subsections to define a single
special circumstance. The further subdivisions within the subsection
simply indicate alternate methods or theories by which the special
circumstance can be committed. In essence, this was the plurality's
holding with respect to the witness-murder special circumstance in
Allen. The Allen interpretation of the witness-murder special cir-
512. Id. at 1273-74, 729 P.2d at 146-47, 232 Cal. Rptr. 880-81. The witness-killing
special circumstance can be committed in two ways: by the intentional killing of a victim (1) to
prevent his testimony in any criminal proceeding; and, (2) in retaliation for the victim's testi-
mony as a witness in any criminal proceeding. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 1988)
(footnote added by the author).
513. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(5) (West 1979).
514. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2) & (3) (West 1988).
515. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 100-34 and accompanying text.
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cumstance is equally applicable to the felony-murder special circum-
stance. Allen should be followed and the court should hold that there
is only one felony-murder special circumstance which can be com-
mitted by the commission of the requisite first degree murder during
one of the felonies enumerated in the various subdivisions of the fel-
ony-murder special circumstance.
Furthermore, this interpretation of the felony-murder special
circumstance follows the same pattern that has been used in Califor-
nia for over a century to divide the crime of murder into a capital
and a non-capital offense.51
There is only one crime of murder in the first degree in Califor-
nia although the statute defines a number of ways in which that
crime can be committed. 18 One of those ways is, of course, the first
degree felony-murder rule. 519 Despite the fact that the statute enu-
merates a series of different felonies that qualify a killing during its
commission as murder in the first degree, these are not different first
degree felony-murder rules but rather different ways (among others)
to commit the crime of first degree murder. In other words, there is
no first degree felony-murder-robbery rule, no first degree felony-
murder-burglary rule, and no first degree felony-murder-rape rule,
to name only a few of the felonies enumerated in the first degree
felony-murder provision. There is a single first degree felony-murder
rule with alternate theories for its commission.
In addition to the first degree felony-murder rule, first degree
murder can be committed in California by such other means as, for
example, murder by torture520 and a willful, deliberate, and premed-
itated murder. 2 ' But, again, these are not separate first degree mur-
der offenses. They are alternate theories for the single crime of first
degree murder. Furthermore, in a given case the different theories of
first degree murder may overlap without prejudice to the defendant.
For example, the evidence may support a finding that the defendant
intentionally (willfully), and with deliberation and premeditation,
tortured her victim to death. In that case there would be two theories
of first degree murder, but only one crime of first degree murder.
There is virtue in this interpretation of the various special cir-
cumstance provisions. The law is simplified, which is a worthy goal
in itself. Additionally, the problem of overlapping felony-murder
517. See supra text accompanying notes 8-16.
518. See supra notes 9-10, 312-19 and accompanying text.
519. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
520. See supra notes 362-71 and accompanying text.
521. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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special circumstances, which troubled the court in both Harris and
Melton, and which will trouble the court in the future, simply
disappears.
I see no problems in this interpretation. Multiple special cir-
cumstance allegations are still permitted, as is obviously contem-
plated by the statute,52 provided they allege special circumstance de-
fined in the separate subsections of the statute and not the various
subdivisions within the separate special circumstances.52 3 For exam-
ple, in Melton, there should have been a single felony-murder special
circumstance allegation, and in Harris there should have been a sin-
gle multiple-murder allegation and two felony-murder special cir-
cumstances allegations, one for each victim. Under a given special
circumstance allegation, the prosecution is entitled to pursue the sep-
arate theories of the special circumstance enumerated in each subsec-
tion, and to argue those separate theories to the jury. 24 But the jury
should return a single finding with respect to each alleged special
circumstance.5 25
The felony-murder special circumstance presents no unique
problems for this interpretation of the statute. The statute already
requires that the felony supporting the special circumstance "be
charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial
and conviction of the crime."52  There is, thus, the same ability to
meaningfully review the finding of truth of the felony-murder special
circumstance that exists with the first degree felony-murder rule. At
the penalty phase of the trial, the jury would then be permitted to
consider each special circumstance as a separate aggravating fac-
tor.52 ' Furthermore, the conduct supporting the various theories of
the single felony-murder special circumstance would still be properly
522. People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 60-61, 679 P.2d 433, 447-48, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782,
796-97 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) (plurality opinion).
523. For example, if the defendant intentionally killed an undercover narcotics officer to
prevent that officer from testifying against him in a separate pending drug prosecution, and if
the defendant new that the victim was a peace officer at the time of the murder, then the
defendant would have committed two special circumstances: peace-officer-murder and witness-
murder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7), (10). There is no problem with overlapping special
circumstances.
524. See People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1273-74, 729 P.2d 115, 146-47, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 880-81 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 312-19, 498-501.
525. See supra text accompanying notes 312-19, 498-50.
526. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (West 1988).
527. The jury should still be instructed, pursuant to the Melton anti-inflation rule, that
the sentencing jury cannot consider the underlying felonious conduct as both an aggravating
factor under the special circumstance provision and again under the circumstances-of-the-crime
provision.
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considered as a "circumstance of the capital crime" under Melton."
In short, this interpretation would simplify the law, eliminate the
problem of overlapping felony-murder special circumstances, fulfill
the interest in having the various theories of the special circum-
stances fully litigated, and further the inferred intent of the legisla-
tive body.
7. The Underlying Felony
a. Litigating The Underlying Felony
1) The Bird Court
Both the 1977 Legislation and the 1978 Initiative provide that
whenever a special circumstance "requires proof of the commission
or attempted commission of a crime, such crime shall be charged and
proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and convic-
tion of the crime." ' Since the felony-murder special circumstance is
always dependent upon the commission of one of the felonies enu-
merated in the special-circumstance provision (the underlying fel-
ony), this section always applies to the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance. Accordingly, the underlying felony must be charged and
proved as in any other prosecution for that crime. This would nor-
mally mean that the accusatory pleading must charge the underlying
felony, the felony must be proved by the prosecution beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the jury must be instructed on all of the elements of
the crime, the reasonable doubt requirement, and any applicable de-
fenses, and the jury must find the defendant guilty of the crime in its
verdict. "3
In several of the cases the first and last requirements have been
omitted. The underlying felony has not been charged in the accusa-
tory pleading, and the jury has not returned a verdict on the under-
lying felony. With reference to the failure to charge the underlying
felony in the accusatory pleading, the Bird court consistently held
that though this was error under the statute, the error was harm-
less.58 The notice function of the charging requirement was fulfilled
528. See supra text accompanying notes 498-501.
529. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1988); former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a).
The pertinent provisions are identical.
530. See People v. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d 883, 926, 751 P.2d 395, 423, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 336, 364-65 (1988)
531. People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 47-48, 655 P.2d 279, 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77,
91 (1982); People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 606 P.2d 341, 346, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306,
311 (1980) (original opinion), vacated 448 U.S. 903 (1980), reiteration of original opinion on
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by the special circumstance allegation. " 2 The additional claim that
the jury also did not return a verdict on the underlying felony was
not presented to the court, though it was evident that the jury did not
do so in each case. " 8
2) The Lucas Court
Both claims, that the underlying felony was not charged in the
accusatory pleading and the jury did not return a verdict on the un-
derlying felony, were presented to the Lucas court this term. 3 " The
absence of the charge of the underlying felony, which presents a no-
tice issue, was resolved by applying the Bird court "notice" prece-
dent. " ' But the failure of the jury to return a verdict raises a differ-
ent issue: Did the jury understand that the defendant must be found
"guilty" of the underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt, and did
the jury do so?
The jury must be properly instructed on the prosecution's bur-
den of proof, the elements of the underlying felony and any applica-
ble defenses. In addition, the jury need also be told that it must find
that the defendant committed the underlying felony beyond a reason-
able doubt. If both of the above are done, then the instructions sat-
isfy the requirement that the jury understand that the defendant
must be found guilty of the underlying felony, and the finding of the
truth of the felony-murder suffices to establish that the jury did so."3 '
"In those circumstances," wrote Justice Eagleson, "the jury's
attention is focused directly on the crime and it is proven according
to the general law. The return of only a special circumstances verdict
confirming the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of the
crime is a defect in form not substance. The instructions on these
matters given the jury in this case were adequate in all respects." 8
remand from the Supreme Court of the United States: 28 Cal. 3d 461, 622 P.2d 952, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 507 (1980).
532. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at 47-48, 655 P.2d at 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 91; Velasquez,
26 Cal. 3d at 434, 606 P.2d at 346, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
533. See Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at 47-48, 655 P.2d at 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 91; Velas-
quez, 26 Cal. 3d at 434, 606 P.2d at 346, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
534. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 925-27, 751 P.2d at 422-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at
364-65; Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 91-92, 744 P.2d at 1147-48, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
535. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 925-27, 751 P.2d at 422-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at
364-65; Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 91-92, 744 P.2d at 1147-48, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
536. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 751 P.2d at 422-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at
364-65. See Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 91-92, 744 P.2d at 1147-48, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
537. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 751 P.2d at 422-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
In Miranda the jury returned a finding of the truth of a felony-murder special circumstance
with attempted robbery as the underlying felony. Attempted robbery was not charged and the
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In other words, as long as the defendant's guilt of the underly-
ing felony is litigated as though he were charged with the underlying
felony, and as long as all of the requirements for a valid conviction
of the underlying felony have been fulfilled, then the absence of a
verdict finding the defendant guilty of the underlying felony is said
to be "a defect in form not substance," provided the special circum-
stance is found true. 88 But this conclusion that the defect is one in
form, not substance, under these circumstances is true only if it is
also recognized that a finding of the truth of the special circumstance
is not a "conviction" of the underlying felony. If the murder verdict
is set aside, the defendant may not be held or punished for the un-
derlying felony.5"9 Since Williams acknowledges that this is so, it is
difficult to see how the failure to charge and return a verdict on the
underlying felony under these circumstances prejudices the
defendant.
b. Lesser Included Offenses
It is the settled law of the state that the trial court must instruct
the jury on a lesser included offense, even if not requested to do so,
when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements
of the charged offense are present and there is evidence that would
justify a conviction of the lesser offense.5" This principle, of course,
applies with equal force to the felony supporting the felony-murder
special circumstance.541
In Melton, the defendant was charged with, and convicted of,
one count of murder (which was found to be in the first degree), one
count of burglary and one count of robbery.54 The jury also found
true two felony-murder special circumstances: felony-murder-bur-
glary, and felony-murder robbery. 8" With respect to the robbery,
jury did not return a verdict on attempted robbery. On a parity of reasoning with Williams,
the special circumstance finding was affirmed. But the jury was not specifically instructed on
the attempted robbery crime. Nevertheless, the finding was affirmed for the jury had been fully
instructed on the requirement for attempted robbery in connection with another charge. Mi-
randa, 44 Cal. 3d at 92, 744 P.2d at 1148, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
538. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 926, 751 P.2d at 423, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
539. Id. at 926 n.22, 751 P.2d at 423 n.22, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 365 n.22.
540. E.g., People v. Ramkeesoon, 39 Cal. 3d 346, 702 P.2d 613, 216 Cal. Rptr. 455
(1985); People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d 307, 650 P.2d 311, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1982).
541. See People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 745-46, 750 P.2d 741, 759, 244 Cal. Rptr.
867, 885-86, modified, 45 Cal. 3d 648c , cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 329 (1988).
542. Id., 44 Cal. 3d 713, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867.
543. According to the analysis presented in this article, there should have been only one
special circumstance finding made in this case. See supra notes 510-25 and accompanying text.
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Melton claimed that the trial court should have instructed the jury
sua sponte on the lesser included offense of theft. Finding that there
was evidentiary support for the lesser included offense instruction,
the Lucas court held that it was error not to instruct on the lesser
included theft offense. 5" But the error was found to be harmless
"even under the most stringent standard of prejudice which may
apply. ' 545
D. The Multiple-Murder Special Circumstance
"The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more
than one offense of murder in the first or second degree." 54
The multiple-murder special circumstance first appeared in
California death penalty law in the 1973 mandatory death penalty
statute. In that statute, it was joined with the prior-murder-convic-
tion special circumstance,"" to form a single special circumstance.548
With respect to multiple murders, the pertinent wording in the 1973
statute was identical with the current provision, "[t]he defendant has
in this . . . proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of
murder in the first or second degree. '54' This special circumstance
was adopted into the 1977 Legislation550 with no substantive change
in its wording, though the structure of the sentence defining multi-
ple-murder and prior-murder-conviction was altered." 1 In the 1978
544. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 745, 750 P.2d at 759, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
545. Id. at 746, 750 P.2d at 759, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 886. Under both the 1977 Legisla-
tion and the 1978 Initiative, any special circumstance found true may be taken into account by
the sentencing authority as an aggravating factor in the penalty assessment process. See supra
notes 86-87, 98-99 and accompanying text. Since the failure to instruct on a lesser included
offense of a felony supporting a felony-murder special circumstance thus affects the capital
sentencing process, an issue is presented under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), and its
progeny. But'since this is primarily a penalty phase issue, it is beyond the scope of the current
article. But it should be noted here that since the Court overruled the Carlos intent-to-kill
rule, the only culpability supporting the capital crime in a prosecution under the 1978 Initia-
tive (as was Melton) is the culpability required by the qualifying conviction of first degree
murder. If the only theory of first degree murder is the first degree felony-murder rule, then
the only culpability supporting the death judgment is the culpability requisite for the felony
supporting both the first degree felony-murder rule and the felony-murder special circum-
stance. Since the absence of the lesser included offense instruction affects this culpability, the
Beck issue is even more important than it was when Carlos was the law of the land.
546. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a)(3) (West 1988).
547, The prior-murder-conviction special circumstance is discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 589-608.
548. The text of the provision is quoted supra note 74.
549. 1973 mandatory death penalty statute, supra note 36, at 5 (codified as former CAL.
PENAL CODE 190.2(b)(4) (West 1979)).
550. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
551. Compare the text quoted supra note 74 with the provisions in the 1978 Initiative.
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Initiative, the multiple-murder and the prior-murder-conviction spe-
cial circumstances are separated into two distinct special
circumstances.0 52
The capital sentencing procedures of the Model Penal Code de-
fine a related provision as an "aggravating" circumstance: "At the
time the murder was committed the defendant also committed an-
other murder." 5 ' According to the commentary on this aggravating
circumstance, this "contemporaneous conduct of the defendant is es-
pecially indicative of depravity and dangerousness."55
Despite the fact that the 1978 Initiative separated the multiple-
murder and the prior-murder-conviction special circumstances into
separate provisions, the court has said that "[r]ead together, these
two provisions are plainly complementary, and were evidently in-
tended to define a single basic special circumstance-multiple mur-
der-which can be satisfied by convictions in a single proceeding or
in more than one proceeding."5 ' A few months before, the court
described the purpose of the prior-murder-conviction special circum-
stance as being "directed neither to deterring misconduct nor to fos-
tering rehabilitation.""5 6 Given the court's opinion that these two
provisions "define a single basic special circumstance," the court
would undoubtedly also hold that the goal of the multiple-murder
special circumstance is neither deterrence nor rehabilitation. This
implies that the purpose of both of the "multiple murder" provisions
is to authorize the punishment of death as a "just desert" for the
defendant's crimes.557
1. The Turner Intent-to-kill Rule
a. The Bird Court
In People v. Turner, the defendant was convicted of two counts
of first degree murder under the first degree felony-murder rule with
See infra note 552.
552. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2(a)(2) (prior-murder-conviction),19 0.2(a)( 3) (multiple-
murder) (West 1988). The relevant text of section 190.2(a)(3) is quoted supra text accompa-
nying note 546. The pertinent text of section 190.2(a)(2) is quoted infra text accompanying
note 589.
553. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6(3)(c).
554. Id. § 210.6(3)(c), Comment 6 (a), at 136.
555. People v. Anderson (James), 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1149, 742 P.2d 1306, 1332, 240
Cal. Rptr. 585, 611 (1987).
556. Hendricks 1, 43 Cal. 3d at 595, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (1987).
557. See supra notes 555-56 and accompanying text.
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burglary as the underlying felony. 5 ' Two felony-murder-burglary
and one multiple-murder special circumstance allegations were
found to be true, and the defendant was sentenced to death. The
Carlos Intent-to-kill instruction had not been given to the jury.
Finding that the Carlos error fell within Garcia's per .se reversal
rule,5" the two felony-murder special circumstances were set
aside. " "
The remaining question, according to Justice Kaus, was
"whether two first degree felony-murder convictions, neither of
which alone can justify imposition of the death penalty absent a find-
ing of intent to kill, can together open the door to a death penalty
hearing." '561 Relying entirely on Carlos, the court held that the mul-
tiple-murder special circumstance required proof that the two
murders had been committed with an intent-to-kill.562
The Turner rule was nearly a mirror image of the Carlos rule.
An intent-to-kill was one of the elements of the multiple-murder
special circumstance. The prosecution was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill the victim in
each murder before it would qualify as a murder sufficient for the
multiple-murder special circumstance. 51 3 Since an intent-to-kill was
an element of the special circumstance, an instruction on this issue
was required in the charge to the jury regardless of the evidence and
even without a request for the instruction by the defendant. 56' Fi-
nally, the failure to instruct on the intent-to-kill rule was subject to
the per se reversal rule unless one of the four exceptions articulated
in Garcia were satisfied. 565
558: People v. Turner (Richard), 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196
(1984).
559. See supra notes 399-401 and accompanying text for a discussion of People v.
Garcia.
560. Turner (Richard), 37 Cal. 3d at 328, 690 P.2d at 685, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 328-30, 690 P.2d at 685-86, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13. Although Justice
Kaus wrote only for a plurality consisting of himself and Justices Broussard and Grodin, Chief
Justice Bird separately concurred in the reversal of the special circumstance findings and the
judgment of death. Id. at 330, 690 P.2d at 686, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 213. Justice Reynoso joined
the Chief Justice's concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. Justice Mosk also wrote separately.
He concurred only in the "plurality's disposition of this appeal insofar as it affirms the judg-
ment as to guilt, sets aside the special circumstance findings, and reverses the judgment as to
penalty." Id. at 350, 690 P.2d at 700, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 227. Justice Lucas did not participate
in Turner. Thus the Turner intent-to-kill rule was supported by a five justice majority of the
California Supreme Court.
563. See, id. at 329-30, 690 P.2d at 685-86, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
564. Id. at 328, 690 P.2d at 685, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
565. Id.
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However, there was one potentially important difference in the
Carlos and Turner rules. The Carlos rule applied only to the fel-
ony-murder special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative. 6 Since the
felony-murder special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation required
the murder to be willful, deliberate and premeditated, by force of its
own explicit terms, the 1977 provision required an intent-to-kill
which was also deliberate and premeditated." 7 But neither the 1977
nor the 1978 multiple-murder provisions articulated a mens rea re-
quirement. Since it is possible to commit both first degree"6 and sec-
ond degree murder" 9 without an intent-to-kill, the Turner rule
would eliminate these non-intentional murders, in the first or second
degree, as qualifying murders for the multiple-murder special cir-
cumstance, though they were not felony-murders. On the other hand,
the Carlos rule was limited to the felony-murder special circum-
stance in the 1978 Initiative. But this was only a potential difference
between the Carlos and Turner rules because the court was never
faced with the question of whether the Turner rule applied to non-
felony based murders under either the 1977 Legislation or the 1978
Initiative. In each instance in which the Bird court applied the Tur-
ner rule, it was in the context of multiple felony-murders which
were used as the basis for the multiple-murder special
circumstance.5"'
The Turner intent-to-kill rule was followed in People v. Hayes
to invalidate three multiple-murder special circumstance findings. 7 '
The majority opinion in Hayes was written by Justice Mosk and
joined by five of the six remaining justices of the court.572 Chief Jus-
tice Lucas, then Justice Lucas, filed a three sentence opinion concur-
ring in a portion of the majority opinion and concurring in the
judgment:
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent it affirms the
judgment as to defendant's guilt. I also concur with the remain-
566. See supra notes 389-96 and accompanying text.
567. See supra note 72 for the text of the 1977 felony-murder provision.
568. For example, the first degree torture-murder rule does not require an intent-to-kill.
Implied malice will suffice under the "depraved heart" (wanton murder) theory. See supra
notes 187-91, 367 and accompanying text.
569. Second degree murder can be committed under the "depraved heart" (wanton mur-
der) theory. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
570. The two cases were Turner (Richard), 37 Cal. 3d at 328, 690 P.2d at 685, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 212, and People v. Hayes (John), 38 Cal. 3d 780, 699 P.2d 1259, 214 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1985).
571. Hayes (John), 38 Cal. 3d 780, 699 P.2d 1259, 214 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1985).
572. Id.
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ing portion of the judgment setting aside the special circum-
stances finding and reversing the penalty of death, but only
under the compulsion of People v. Garcia . . . and Carlos v.
Superior Court . . . . For reasons I have previously expressed,
I disagree with the holdings in those cases (see People v. Whitt
.), but (as conceded by the Attorney General) they do ap-
pear to control the disposition of the present case.573
The Turner rule commanded the votes of a clear majority of
the California Supreme Court and thus was part of the "law of the
land." Justice Lucas' opinion in Hayes, along with his opposition to
Carlos and his urging the court to reconsider and disapprove of
"that unfortunate decision," suggested that the rule might well be
abandoned if the composition of the court changed.574
b. The Lucas Court
The composition of the court did change, and Carlos was over-
ruled by Anderson.5 ' Anderson overruled Turner as well:
In construing section 190.2 (a)(3) to the contrary in Turner, we
relied on our decision in Carlos. But we have now rejected the
reasoning of Carlos. With its support gone, Turner must also
fail.
Accordingly, we overrule Turner to the extent it holds that in-
tent to kill is an element of the multiple-murder special circum-
stance, and adopt the following reading of the relevant statutory
provisions: intent to kill is not an element of the multiple-mur-
der special circumstance; but when the defendant is an aider
and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent must be
proved. 6'
Since Anderson, the multiple-murder special circumstance has
no mens rea requirement of its own. All that is required is that the
defendant commit more than one murder and, because a special cir-
cumstance can only attach to a first degree murder, 5" that one of the
murders be in the first degree.
573. Id. at 788-89, 699 P.2d at 1264, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 657 (citations omitted).
574. See supra notes 403-04 and accompanying text.
575. See supra notes 417-21 and accompanying text.
576. Anderson (lames), 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1149-50, 742 P.2d 1306, 1333, 240 Cal. Rptr.
585, 612 (1987).
577. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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2. Pleading And Proof
a. The Bird Court
There is, only one multiple-murder special circumstance regard-
less of the number of murders that have been committed.578 The
charging papers should allege one multiple-murder special circum-
stance separate from the individual murder counts.579 The allegation
should use substantially the same wording as is used in the statute:
"The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than
one offense of murder in the first or second degree."'5 80
b. The Lucas Court
The Lucas court has reaffirmed these rules in the automatic ap-
peals decided this year.581 In addition, a new issue was decided. De-
fendants have been claiming that, because of the wording of the mul-
tiple-murder special circumstance, it is impossible to truthfully allege
in the charging papers and establish by probable cause at the prelim-
inary hearing that the defendant "has in this proceeding been con-
victed of more than one offense of murder. ' 582 This follows, of
course, from the fact that at the time the charging papers are filed,
and at the time the preliminary hearing is held, the defendant has
not been convicted of any murder offense. These arguments were
578. E.g., People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 362, 729 P.2d 802, 819-20, 233 Cal. Rptr.
368, 385 (1987) (opinion by Panelli, J., with Bird, C.J., and Mosk, Broussard, Grodin and
Lucas, JJ., concurring); People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1273, 729 P.2d 115, 146, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 880 (1986) (lead opinion); People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 788, 726 P. 2d
113, 150-51, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 704-05 (1986); People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 67, 679 P.2d
433, 452, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 801 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) (plurality
opinion).
579. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 362, 729 P.2d at 819-20, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
580. Id. In Bloyd the multiple-murder allegation read as follows: "It is further alleged
that the murder of Martha ... was committed by the defendant ... and, in addition to such
murder, said defendant is now being charged with having murdered and has murdered ...
North . . . within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(3)." Id. at 361, 729 P.2d at
819, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 384. On appeal, the defendant raised two objections to this allegation.
First, that no special circumstance allegation apprised defendant of the murder of North with
the additional murder of Martha. Second, that the wrong code section was alleged. Although
the court found that both of these defects were technical errors, they were also found to be
harmless. The court again approved of the use of the statutory language to allege a multiple-
murder special circumstance. Id. at 361-62, 729 P.2d at 819-20, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
581. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 504, 749 P.2d at 817-18, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 163; Anderson
(]ames), 43 Cal. 3d at 1150, 742 P.2d at 1333, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612. See Williams (Keith), 44
Cal. 3d at 927, 751 P.2d at 424, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 365..
582. E.g., Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 922-25, 751 P.2d at 420-23, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 362-64; Anderson (James), 43 Cal. 3d at 1148-49, 742 P.2d at 1331-32, 240 Cal. Rptr. at
611-12.
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uniformly rejected this year. "8
In Anderson, Justice Mosk wrote,
[W]e do not ignore the actual language of the provision. That
language unproblematically defines the special circumstance as
proved. We simply decline to read that language as specifying
what the prosecution must charge: otherwise, the special cir-
cumstance could never be alleged and hence would be rendered
nugatory, and thus the intent of the legislative body would be
frustrated. " 4
In Williams, the court believed that the major problem was not
with the allegation in the charging papers, but with the quantum of
evidence necessary to establish reasonable or probable cause to be-
lieve that a defendant will be convicted of an offense which renders
him eligible for the death penalty under this special circumstance. 5 5
The court then held that the same standard applied to the special
circumstances as applied to other crimes." "
Since many special circumstance allegations overlap the sub-
stantive offense or offenses charged, and a finding of probable
cause as to the latter necessarily establishes probable cause as to
the identical elements of the special circumstance, the magistrate
and the reviewing courts need only identify the additional ele-
ments of the special circumstances and satisfy themselves that
sufficient evidence has been presented to establish the probable
existence of those additional elements." 7
These same rules apply whether the prosecution is under the
multiple-murder special circumstance provision in the 1977 Legisla-
583. E.g., Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 922-25, 751 P.2d at 420-23, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 362-64; Anderson (James), 43 Cal. 3d at 1148-49, 742 P.2d at 1331-32, 240 Cal. Rptr. at
611-12.
584. Anderson (lames), 43 Cal. 3d at 1149 n.10, 742 P.2d at 1332 n.10, 240 Cal. Rptr.
at 612 n.10 (emphasis in original).
In Williams (Keith) the court reached a similar conclusion on this point.
It is clear, however, that the requirement that the defendant 'has been convicted'
of other murders in the same trial is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the conduct
of the penalty trial authorized by former section 190.4. That finding cannot and
need not be made until the defendant has been found guilty of the murders
charged and one has been found to be of the first degree. It follows that the
Legislature could not have intended that evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause to believe the defendant has been 'convicted' of those offenses be presented
at the preliminary examination. To read the statute in the manner suggested by
defendant would eliminate multiple murder as a special circumstance.
Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 923-24, 751 P.2d at 421, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
585. Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 924, 751 P.2d at 422, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 925, 751 P.2d at 422, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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tion or the 1978 Initiative.6 88
E. The Prior-Murder-Conviction Special Circumstance
"The defendant was previously convicted of murder in the first
or second degree."" 9
Like the multiple-murder special circumstance, the prior-mur-
der-conviction special circumstance first appeared in California death
penalty law in the 1973 mandatory death penalty statute. It was
combined with what is now the multiple-murder special circum-
stance690 to form a single special circumstance in the 1973 statute.59'
The wording of the 1973 provision was somewhat ambiguous: "The
defendant has in this or in any prior proceeding been convicted of
more than one offense of murder of the first or second degree.")592
This special circumstance was adopted into the 1977 Legislation
with a change in the wording which was obviously designed to elimi-
nate the ambiguity in the 1973 provision: "The defendant . . . has
been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder of the
first or second degree." 9 ' The multiple-murder and the prior-mur-
der-conviction special circumstances are separated into two distinct
special circumstances in the 1978 Initiative. 594
The Model Penal Code's capital sentencing procedures contain
a related "aggravating" circumstance: "The defendant was previ-
ously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person." '96 The commentary on this aggra-
vating circumstance explains why it was included in the Code:
[This provision] deals with the defendant's past behavior as a
circumstance of aggravation. Perhaps the strongest popular de-
588. Williams (Keith) was a prosecution under the 1977 Legislation, and Anderson was
under the 1978 Initiative. See supra notes 584-85.
589. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2) (West 1988).
590. The multiple-murder special circumstance is discussed supra text accompanying
notes 546-88.
591. The text of the provision is quoted supra note 74.
592. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b)(4) (West 1979). The ambiguity arises be-
cause the provision can be read to mean that the defendant must have been convicted of more
than one offense of murder in the first or second degree before the prior-murder-conviction
special circumstance is applicable. The text of the entire provision is quoted supra note 74.
593. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(5) (West 1979). The text of the entire pro-
vision is quoted supra note 74.
594. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2(a)(2) (prior-murder-conviction),190.2(a)(3) (multiple-
murder) (West 1988). The pertinent text of section 190.2(a)(2) is quoted supra text accompa-
nying note 589. The relevant text of section 190.2(a)(3) is quoted supra text accompanying
note 546.
595. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6(3)(b).
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mand for capital punishment arises where the defendant has a
history of violence. Prior conviction of a felony involving vio-
lence to the person suggests two inferences supporting escalation
of sentence: first, that the murder reflects the character of the
defendant rather than any extraordinary aspect of the situation,
and second, that the defendant is likely to prove dangerous to
life on some future occasion. Thus, prior conviction of a violent
felony is included as a circumstance that may support imposi-
tion of the death penalty. " 6
As noted above in connection with the discussion of the multi-
ple-murder special circumstance, the 1978 Initiative separated the
multiple-murder and the prior-murder-conviction special circum-
stances into separate provisions, However, the court has said that
when these two provisions are read together, they were evidently in-
tended to define a single .basic special circum-
stance-multiplemurder-which can be satisfied by convictions in a
single proceeding or in more than one proceeding.597 Furthermore,
by holding that the purpose of this provision is neither deterrence
nor rehabilitation, the court has implied that the purpose of this pro-
vision is retribution. " ' Only a few cases have addressed prior-mur-
der-conviction issues.
1. The Malone Intent-to-kill Rule
a. The Bird Court
In People v. Turner 9 the Bird court relied on the Carlos in-
tent-to-kill rule to interpret the multiple-murder special circum-
stance as requiring an intent-to-kill. Although the court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether there was a similar intent-to-kill
requirement for the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance,
the court of appeal did. Relying on Carlos and Turner, the court of
appeal held in People v. Malone that the prior-murder-conviction
special circumstance also required an intent-to-kill.6 °°
Like the multiple-murder special circumstance, an intent-to-kill
was thus an element of the prior-murder-conviction special circum-
stance. 0O' This intent had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by
596. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6(3)(b) Comment 6(a), at 136 (em-
phasis added).
597. See supra notes 555-57 and accompanying text.
598. Hendricks 1, 43 Cal. 3d at 595, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (1987).
599. 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984).
600. People v. Malone, 165 Cal. App. 3d 31, 211 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1985).
601. See supra notes 558-76 and accompanying text.
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the prosecution, and the jury had to be instructed on the requirement
regardless of the evidence, and without regard as to whether the de-
fendant requested the instruction.
b. The Lucas Court
The first automatic appeal decided by the Lucas court was filed
on July 6, 1987, in Hendricks L"2 It was authored by Justice Mosk
for a unanimous court.603 Hendricks argued that the prior-murder-
conviction special circumstance should be set aside because there was
no finding of an intent-to-kill as required by Malone. This argument
was rejected in two short paragraphs. Malone was overruled, but
neither Carlos nor Turner were mentioned.60 4
Hendricks I foreshadowed Justice Mosk's opinion for the Lucas
court in Anderson, which was filed three months and one week
later."6 Anderson, as indicated above, overruled Carlos.6"6 It over-
ruled Turner as well.60 7 Despite the fact that the court found that
retribution is the sole purpose of the prior-murder-conviction special
circumstance, that special circumstance has no mens rea requirement
at all under the Lucas court's decision in Hendricks 1.608 Of course,
the same may now be said of both the multiple-murder and the fel-
ony-murder special circumstances under Anderson. Since Anderson
is the key to the court's holding that no intent-to-kill is required for
any of these three special circumstances, the mens rea requirement
for all three is best considered in connection with a discussion of
Carlos and Anderson. That discussion is deferred to another day.
2. Additional Requirements?
A prior-murder-conviction special circumstance can only attach
to a conviction of first degree murder.6"9 Does the actus reus of the
602. Hendricks 1, 43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987).
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
606. See supra notes 417-21 and accompanying text.
607. See supra note 575 and accompanying text.
608. See su pra text accompanying note 89.
609. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. This statutory requirement has
been repeated in a number of the cases. For example, in Williams (Keith), 44 Cal. 3d at 925,
751 P.2d at 422-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 364, it was acknowledged that the multiple-murder
special circumstance can only attach to a conviction in the current proceedings of first degree
murder. "For the special circumstance to be found true at trial, the defendant must be found
guilty of at least two counts of murder, and the count or counts to which the special circum-
stance allegations are appended must be of the first degree." Id.
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special circumstance consist of committing a first degree murder after
committing a prior murder in either the first or second degree, and
after being convicted for that prior murder? The Bird court was
never presented with this question, but Edgar Hendricks presented
this issue to the Lucas court in Hendricks I in two related
arguments.
Edgar Hendricks committed four murders, two in Los Angeles
and two in San Francisco.6"' The two murders in Los Angeles were
committed before the murders in San Francisco. Nevertheless, he
was tried for the San Francisco murders first. He was convicted in
the San Francisco trial of two countg of first degree murder. Felony-
murder and multiple-murder special circumstances were found true,
and he was sentenced to death.6 ' In the subsequent Los Angeles
trial the two San Francisco first degree murder convictions were al-
leged as a prior-murder-conviction special circumstance. 62
Hendricks argued that the words "previously convicted" mean
that the underlying offense must be committed and reduced to a con-
viction of murder in the first. or second degree before the offense to
which they attach as a special circumstance has been committed.
Since the San Francisco murders were committed after the Los An-
geles murders, according to his argument, they could not qualify as
"prior-murder-convictions" for this special circumstance even though
they were reduced to a conviction first.
First, he argued that the death penalty is appropriate only
when a defendant commits murder after he has been put on notice
by a previous murder conviction that if he repeats the crime he
might suffer the ultimate penalty.61 This was a mens rea argument.
Finding that the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance "is di-
rected neither to deterring misconduct nor to fostering rehabilita-
tion," and that the "language of the provision is clear: on its face, it
refers simply and unequivocally to previous convictions," the court
rejected the argument.6" "The order of the commission of the homi-
cides," wrote Justice Mosk, "is immaterial."' 6
Second, Hendricks argued that unless the words "previously
610. Hendricks 1, 43 Cal. 3d at 588, 595, 737 P.2d at 1350,1352, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 66,
68.
611. Hendricks II, 44 Cal. 3d 635, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988).
612. Hendricks I, 43 Cal. 3d at 588, 595, 737 P.2d at 1350, 1356-57, 238 Cal. Rptr. at
66, 72-73.
613. Id. at 595, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 596, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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convicted" are interpreted to mean previously committed and con-
victed, prosecutors may manipulate the order of trials to maximize
the possibility of a death penalty. The court also rejected this argu-
ment, saying: "We are not persuaded that the bare possibility of
'manipulation' furnishes sufficient reason to insert into the provision
a requirement that neither appears on the face of the statute nor is
suggested by any extrinsic aids. Moreover, defendant's concern is
purely speculative: there is no indication of manipulation in the pre-
sent case." 1
As so interpreted, the California provision differs substantially
from the related provision in the Model Penal Code. The commen-
tary to the Code clearly implies that the words "previously con-
victed," which are the same words used in the California provi-
sion, 6 " means that both the offense and the conviction for that
offense must have occurred before the current offense is commit-
ted.6"' Yet the Hendricks court treated the defendant's argument that
the words "previously convicted" should be given the same interpre-
tation as the Model Penal Code provision as being "strained."""
Thus, at the close of the first year of the Lucas court, the prior-
murder-conviction special circumstance has no mens rea require-
ment. Like the felony-murder special circumstance as interpreted in
Anderson, it is an absolute liability "offense." The only mens rea
required is the culpable mental state necessary for conviction of the
underlying offenses, murder in the first or second degree in the
prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, and first degree mur-
der for the felony-murder special circumstance. With respect to the
actus reus of the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, the
defendant need only commit two murders and have one of them re-
duced to a conviction in a separate prior proceeding to qualify for
this special circumstance. As Justice Mosk so clearly stated it, "[t]he
order of the commission of the homicides is immaterial. 6 20
3. Pleading And Proof
a. The Bird Court
There is only one prior-murder-conviction special circumstance
regardless of the number of times the defendant has been previously
616. Id. at 596 n.2, 737 P.2d at 1357 n.2, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73 n.2.
617. See supra text accompanying note 596.
618. See supra notes 613-16 and accompanying text.
619. Hendricks I, at 595, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
620. Id. at 596, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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convicted of murder in the first or second degree.62 Like the multi-
ple-murder special circumstance, the charging papers should allege
one prior-murder-conviction special circumstance separate from the
murder count to which it attaches, regardless of the number of prior
murder convictions suffered by the defendant.6 2 Though the allega-
tion should use substantially the same wording as is used in the stat-
ute, the prior murder convictions should be specifically identified.62
b. The Lucas Court
Only one automatic appeal presented prior-murder-conviction
special circumstance issues this year, and that was Hendricks I. No
pleading or proof issues were presented in that case. There is no
reason to suspect that the Lucas court will refuse to follow the plead-
ing and proof requirements established by the Bird court precedent.
F. The Financial-Gain Special Circumstance
"The murder was intentional and carried out for financial
gain.624
1. The Elements Of The Special Circumstance
The financial-gain special circumstance was introduced into
California law by the 1978 Initiative.6" It replaced the "contract-
killer" special circumstance in the 1977 Legislation. 626 The 1977
provision was, in turn, patterned upon a substantially similar "con-
tract-killer" special circumstance in the 1973 mandatory death pen-
alty statute. 12
The capital sentencing procedures in the Model Penal Code de-
621. People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1274, 729 P.2d 115, 147, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849,
881 (1986).
622. See id.
623. The court in which the defendant was convicted, the date of the conviction, and the
degree of murder should be specified for each prior murder conviction. See id. When the cur-
rent prosecution is for more than one murder, so that the prior-murder-conviction special cir-
cumstance could attach to more than one count, by analogy to the multiple-murder special
circumstance, a single allegation should be used. See id. Defects in the special circumstance do
not affect the validity of a subsequent finding, unless the allegation is so defective that it does
not give the defendant sufficient notice of the charges to adequately prepare and present a
defense. See id.
624. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988) (the 1978 Initiative).
625. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
626. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731,
750, 691 P.2d 994, 1005, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 339 (1984).
627. The text of both the 1973 and the 1977 provisions are quoted supra note 69.
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fine a similar "aggravating" circumstance: "The murder was com-
mitted for pecuniary gain." '628 There are, of course, substantial dif-
ferences between the Model Penal Code provision and the financial-
gain special circumstance. The California provision uses the phrase
"financial gain" and requires that the murder be "intentional,"
whereas the Model Penal Code provision describes the necessary
gain as "pecuniary," and does not restrict the "aggravating circum-
stance" to intentional murders.62 9
Although it may be debatable" whether "financial gain" is more
inclusive than "pecuniary gain," it is clear that the financial-gain
special circumstance is more inclusive than either the 1973 or the
1977 "contract-killer" provisions. On its face, the financial-gain spe-
cial circumstance covers a wide variety of intentional murders: a con-
tract murder,680 a murder to financially benefit a third person,6"' to
acquire an inheritance, to obtain life insurance, or simply to acquire
money or property in a wide assortment of situations, to name but a
few.
68 2
There is an apparent change in the actus reus, the physical con-
duct, of the special circumstances in the 1978 Initiative as compared
to the 1977 "contract-killer" provision. Both provisions share essen-
tial conduct which originates from the fact that the special circum-
stance applies only to a defendant found guilty of first degree mur-
der: a homicide must have been committed by the defendant (which
was found to be murder in the first degree).
However, the 1977 provision also required that the murder be
carried out pursuant to "an agreement by the person who committed
the murder to accept a valuable consideration for the act of murder
from any person other than the victim."6 Thus, under the 1977
628. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, § 210.6(3)(g).
629. The commentary on section 210.6 says virtually nothing about this provision.
"Paragraphs (e), (f), and (g) identify three further circumstances in which the death penalty
should be considered. . . . The third is murder for pecuniary gain." MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 246, § 210.6 comment, at 137.
630. As seen above, the 1977 legislation included a "contract-killer" special circum-
stance. See supra note 69. Under the 1977 provision the hirer of the paid killer was most
likely subject to this provision. See supra note 69. Under the financial-gain special circum-
stance, the hirer would be death eligible under this provision only if he intended to acquire
financial gain by the killing. The hirer would be liable, however, under the accomplice provi-
sions of the 1978 initiative. See Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d at 750 n.11, 691 P.2d at 1005 n.l, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 339 n.1 1 (dictum).
631. See People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 409 n.8, 749 P.2d 279, 296 n.8, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 860 n.8 (1988).
632. See id. at 408, 749 P.2d at 297, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
633. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1979).
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provision, additional conduct was required. The defendant also had
to enter into the requisite agreement. There is no similar additional
conduct requirement for the 1978 financial-gain special circum-
stance.63 All that the defendant must do under the 1978 Initiative's
financial-gain special circumstance is commit the homicide (which is
later found to be murder in the first degree).
Though the 1977 and the 1978 provisions share the mens rea
requirement that the murder be "intentional," the specific intent re-
quired by the two provisions is substantially different. The 1977
provision requires, in addition to an intentional murder, that the
murder be committed pursuant to the agreement to receive valuable
consideration for the intentional murder.63 5 Thus the defendant must
make the agreement and commit the murder to obtain the specified
valuable consideration. The additional mens rea requirement for the
financial-gain special circumstance in the 1978 legislation does not
require the making of an agreement and the commission of the in-
tentional murder with the intent of obtaining the valuable considera-
tion specified in the agreement.
In Howard, Chief Justice Lucas explained the additional mens
rea requirement as follows:
• . . The special circumstance focuses on the defendant's inten-
tion at the time the murder was committed. . . . [Tihe relevant
inquiry is whether the defendant committed the murder in the
expectation that he would thereby obtain the desired financial
gain. 63 6
In other words, the defendant must not only commit an intentional
murder, but she must also kill her victim with the intent, or for the
purpose, of obtaining financial gain for herself or another person.687
Since the critical factor is the culpable mental state with which the
defendant committed the murder, it is not necessary that the ex-
pected financial gain be actually received. The receipt of the gain is,
thus, not an element of either the mens rea or the actus reus of the
financial-gain special circumstance.
Chief Justice Lucas' interpretation of the mens rea requirement
fairly flows from both the language of the provision,638 and the ap-
634. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 408-09, 749 P.2d at 297, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
635. The wording of' the provision implies this additional mental element.
636. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (emphasis
omitted).
637. It is a sufficient intent if the defendant intentionally commits the murder for finan-
cial gain for another person. See infra text accompanying note 646.
638. The words "carried out for financial gain" must have been intended to mean that
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plication of the fundamental principles of the criminal law to the
financial-gain special circumstance.6 9
The remaining question concerns the definition of "financial
gain." The court has held that the phrase has no technical meaning
that is peculiar to the law. Since its meaning is commonly under-
stood by people familiar with the English language, an instruction
defining "financial gain" need not be included sua sponte in the
court's charge to the jury.64 Yet in affirming the trial court's refusal
to give three jury instructions tendered by the defense, the court has
provided a better explanation of its conception of "financial gain."
The instructions offered the following definitions:
1. The murder . . . was carried out pursuant to an agreement
by the person committing the murder to accept valuable consid-
eration for the act of the murder from some person other than
the victim.64
2. In order to find the special circumstance to be true, you must
be convinced beyond a. reasonable doubt that the person who
committed the murder was the one who did or was to benefit
financially.6""
3. In order to find the special circumstance to be true, you must
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt . . . (b) the defendant
either committed the murder or solicited someone else to do so;
(c) that the defendant either benefited financially from the act of
the killing or solicited the murder for the purpose that someone
else might benefit financially.' "
The first instruction was properly refused on the ground that
the special circumstance requires proof of the defendant's intent at
the time of the killing, proof that the defendant not only committed
intentional murder, but that he also intended to obtain the desired
financial gain." Thus, although it may be sufficient to prove that
the defendant committed a contract killing, it is not a necessary find-
ing. Since the instruction made the contract theory a necessary find-
ing, it was properly refused.64 Unlike the 1977 provision, the finan-
the murder was committed for the purpose of receiving financial gain or with the intent of
receiving financial gain.
639. See supra text accompanying notes 181-218.
640. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 408, 749 P.2d at 297, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
641. Id. at 407 n.8, 749 P.2d at 297 n.8, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.8.
642. Id.
643. Id (emphasis added).
644. Id. at 409-10, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
645. Id. at 409, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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cial-gain special circumstance is not limited to contract murders.
The second instruction was properly refused because it requires
the jury to find that the murderer intended to personally obtain the
financial gain. The special circumstance is not limited to this inten-
tion. It is sufficient if the murder is committed with the intention of
obtaining financial gain either for the murderer or a third person.646
Finally, the third instruction was properly refused because there
is no requirement that the financial gain be received by any per-
son.64 What is critical is the defendant's intent, not the receipt of the
financial gain. Since one of the two choices given to the jury was
clearly wrong, the entire instruction was wrong.
At the close of the first year of the Lucas court, the elements of
the financial-gain special circumstance can be summarized as fol-
lows. There is no actus reus requirement beyond the actus reus nec-
essary for the underlying conviction of murder in the first degree. No
financial gain need be actually received by any person as a result of
the murder, and no contract or agreement is necessary. There are
two mens rea requirements. The murder must have been intention-
ally committed; and the murder must have been committed with the
intent, or for the purpose, of obtaining financial gain for herself or
another person. The additional intent-to-receive-financial-gain
makes the financial-gain special circumstance a specific intent special
circumstance much like the torture-murder special circumstance dis-
cussed above."" It is this additional mens rea that justifies imposing
liability for the death sentence over all other intentional first degree
murders.649
The only point of disagreement between the Bird and Lucas
courts at this point is over the proper interpretation of the Bigelow
rule.
2. The Bigelow Anti-overlap Rule
The Bird and Lucas courts have consistently followed a policy
of interpreting the special circumstances so as to eliminate overlap-
ping special circumstances for the same criminal conduct.6 50 Since
646. Id. at 409 n.9, 749 P.2d at 298 n.9, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861 n.9.
647. Id.
648. See supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
649. See supra notes 192-97, 424 and accompanying text.
650. See supra notes 464-501 and accompanying text. As indicated in that portion of
this article, the Lucas court's refusal to follow the Harris overlapping-felony-murder rule is
not an exception to this statement. The court concluded that the conduct involved in the Mel-
ton case (see People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 765-69, 750 P.2d 741, 772-75, 244 Cal. Rptr.
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most robberies, as well as many burglaries, kidnappings and arsons
are committed for financial gain, the financial-gain special circum-
stance will frequently overlap with the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance. How should that overlap be eliminated?
a. The Bird Court
The task of harmonizing the financial-gain and felony-murder
special circumstances was first presented to the court in Bigelow.6"'
Jerry Bigelow was convicted of the first degree murder, robbery and
kidnapping of John Cherry. Cherry's automobile was the subject
matter of the robbery. Along with two other special circumstances,
the jury found "true" both a felony-murder-robbery and a financial-
gain special circumstance based solely upon the robbery of Cherry.
This finding was possible because the same aspect of Bigelow's cul-
pability, his murder for the purpose of stealing the automobile, ap-
parently satisfies both the felony-murder-robbery and the financial-
gain special circumstances. On his automatic appeal Bigelow claimed
that the financial-gain special circumstance should be set aside. The
court agreed:
In this context, we believe the court should construe special cir-
cumstance provisions to minimize those cases in which multiple
circumstances will apply to the same conduct, thereby reducing
the risk that multiple findings on special circumstances will
prejudice the defendant. Such a limiting construction will not
prejudice the prosecution, since there will remain at least one
special circumstance-either financial gain or felony mur-
der-applicable in virtually all cases in which the defendant
killed to obtain money or other property. We adopt a limiting
construction under which the financial gain special circum-
stance applies only when the victim's death is the consideration
for, or an essential prerequisite to, the financial gain sought by
the defendant. Since the present case does not fall within the
special circumstance as so limited, the trial court erred in sub-
mitting that special circumstance to the jury." 2
The Bird court never again had occasion to address the question
of the overlap between the financial gain special circumstance and
the felony-murder special circumstance.
867, 898-901, inodified, 45 Cal. 3d 648, cert. denied, - U.S. -. , 109 S. Ct. 329 (1988)) a
burglary and robbery, involve different conduct and thus there was no double use of the same
conduct.
651. People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984).
652. Id. at 751, 691 P.2d at 1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (emphasis added).
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b. The Lucas Court
The financial-gain special circumstance was first presented to
the Lucas court in Howard.6" Howard argued that the trial court
should have instructed the jury sua sponte on the Bigelow definition
of "financial gain." 6 4 The court rejected this argument, saying,
. . . Bigelow does not expressly require that instructions utiliz-
ing the limited construction adopted in that opinion be given in
all cases. Even though such instructions may in some instances
be necessary in order to avoid the overlap which that opinion is
intended to cure, there is no such necessity here. Our major con-
cern in Bigelow was to prevent overlapping. special circum-
stances findings based on the same conduct. Defendant attempts
to derive from that decision an interpretation of the financial-
gain special circumstance which is more restrictive than is nec-
essary to avoid application of multiple special circumstances to
one form of conduct.
Bigelow's final articulation of the scope of the provision must be
viewed in terms of the problem it sought to correct. In this case,
the victim's death was the "consideration" for the financial gain
that defendant sought; in other words, defendant killed the vic-
tim in order to benefit financially. Use of the word "considera-
tion" arguably conjures up contract law and may improperly, as
is inherent in defendant's argument here, shift the focus back-
wards towards the time that a relevant "agreement" was made.
,We conclude, therefore, that Bigelow's formulation should be
applied when it is important to serve the purposes underlying
that decision, but that it is not intended to restrict construction
of "for financial gain" when overlap is not a concern.65
This holding drew a dissent from Justice Broussard. Under
Justice Broussard's analysis, the majority's holding "gives a dual
meaning to the phrase 'for financial gain.' ,,65"
• . . When the prosecutor charges both felony murder and mur-
der for financial gain, the phrase would mean a murder in
which the victim's death is essential to the gain, but whenever
he charges only murder for financial gain, the same words
would mean something different, broader, and wholly unde-
fined. While one can argue about what the people intended
653. People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, nodified, 44
Cal. 3d 1254, cert. denied, - U.S. -. , 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988).
654. Id. at 408-09, 749 P.2d at 297-98, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
655. Id. at 410, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
656. Id. at 447, 749 P.2d at 323, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
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when they enacted a special circumstance of murder for finan-
cial gain, it is quite unlikely that they intended two different
things depending on whether the prosecutor chose to join a
charge of felony murder.""
The majority's interpretation of Bigelow is neither novel nor in-
correct. The Bigelow rule does not create or recognize an element of
the financial-gain special circumstance. Even if one assumes that the
rule satisfies the first prong of the test articulated above, it fails the
second prong of that test.6" The Bigelow rule does not address what
is to be deterred by the law, or announce the circumstances under
which punishment will be exacted when nothing more is shown.659
When a robber intentionally kills his victim because it is not other-
wise possible to gain possession of the victim's money, his culpable
mental state suffices for the financial-gain special circumstance and
that is precisely why prosecutors seek to charge both. felony-murder-
robbery and a financial-gain special circumstances in these
situations.
As Chief Justice Lucas correctly points out in Howard, Bigelow
does not interpret the mens rea requirement of the financial-gain
special circumstance."' Nor does Bigelow affect any other aspect of
the defendant's culpability, or the deterability of the defendant's
conduct.
Bigelow addresses a different concern: the avoidance of the over-
lap between the felony-murder and the financial-gain special circum-
stances. The Bigelow rule performs the same function for these two
special circumstances that the Daniels rule performs for robbery and
aggravated kidnapping; and for precisely the same reason."" Just as
the Daniels rule does not create an element of crime of aggravated
kidnapping, so the Bigelow rule does not create an element of the
financial-gain special circumstance."'
There are not two conceptions of the mens rea or the actus reus
of the financial-gain special circumstance-one which applies when
a felony-murder allegation is joined and one when it stands alone.
But to eliminate the overlap between the two special circumstances,
when "financial gain" is an integral part of the defendant's felonious
intent, the Bigelow rule seeks to provide a basis for selecting between
657. Id.
658. See supra text accompanying notes 291-322.
659. See supra text accompanying notes 291-322.
660. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409, 749 P.2d at 297-98, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
661. See supra text accompanying notes 325-31.
662. See supra text accompanying notes 325-31.
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the two competing special circumstances. 663
Although the Bigelow rule is factually based and thus should be
given to the jury to resolve under appropriate instructions when it is
an issue in the case, since there was no danger of an overlap in How-
ard, the court's holding that the instruction was not necessary seems
correct on principle." No overlap was presented in Howard be-
cause Howard's plan to acquire financial gain through the murder of
his victim did not also entail the commission of one of the felonies
enumerated in the felony-murder special circumstance.
3. A Proposal
The Bird and Lucas courts agree with Bigelow's goal of con-
struing special circumstance provisions to minimize those cases in
which multiple circumstances will apply to the same conduct,
thereby reducing the risk that multiple findings on special circum-
stances will prejudice the defendant. Since the Bird court was never
presented with the question of whether Bigelow created an anti-over-
lap rule, like Daniels, or modified one of the elements of that special
circumstance, one cannot determine whether the two courts disagree
over Bigelow's theory."6 The two members of the Bird court still
remaining on the court, Justices Mosk and Broussard, are appar-
ently divided on this question. Justice Mosk joined Chief Justice Lu-
cas' opinion for the majority in Howard."' Justice Broussard,. the
author of Bigelow, takes the view that the Bigelow rule alters an
element of the special circumstance by modifying the definition Of
"financial gain."'667 Although, for the reasons discussed above, the
majority's conception of the Bigelow rule is correct on principle, it
appears that the rule should have been abandoned in favor of a dif-
ferent rule.
If one takes its language literally, the Bigelow rule does not
eliminate the overlap which is the rule's goal. The term "considera-
tion," even when it is understood to mean that the financial gain is
"payment" for the intentional murder, is too narrow. Additionally; it
diverts the jury from its central task. It brings to mind the law 'of
663. In my view this policy is founded in the intent of the legislative body which may be
inferred from the structure of the 1978 death penalty initiative. See supra text accompanying
notes 476-87.
664. See supra notes 270-331 and accompanying text, discussing the similar Daniels
instruction.
665. See supra text accompanying notes 484-85 for a discussion of the Daniels rule.
666. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842.
667. See id. at 446-47, 749 P.2d at 323-24, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
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contracts and tends to limit the concept of financial gains to the
"contract-killer." It also shifts the focus of the inquiry from the es-
sential question of the defendant's intent at the time of the murder to
some previous time when a contract was made.668
Furthermore, the idea that the intentional murder must be the
"essential prerequisite to" the financial gain fails to draw a distinc-
tion between many felony-murders and the financial gain special cir-
cumstance unless a great deal more is added to our understanding of
that phrase. For example, suppose the defendant wishes to steal a
large sum of money from an armed courier. When the courier is
accosted by the defendant, the courier draws her weapon and fires at
the defendant. The only way the robber can get the money is to kill
the courier. He does so. The common understanding of the language
used in Bigelow (the murder is an essential prerequisite to the finan-
cial gain sought by the defendant) would indicate that the financial-
gain circumstance applies to this classic example of a felony-murder
special circumstance.
Of course, this meaning of the phrase can be altered by further
definition. One could say, for example, that the word "essential"
means that the defendant's plan should be examined in the abstract,
and thus the fact that the courier resisted with lethal force should be
disregarded.669 The point is that the rule needs further refinement
and with further refinement comes further complexity. A far simpler
solution to the overlap problem is preferable.
If the defendant's culpable conduct and his culpable mental
state qualify for the felony-murder special circumstance, then, as a
matter of law, the financial-gain special circumstance should not be
applicable. In other words, if the defendant's intent is to acquire fi-
nancial gain by perpetrating a felony enumerated in the felony-mur-
der special circumstance, then the court should hold, as a matter of
law, that the financial-gain special circumstance is not at issue in the
case. This construction of the two special circumstances gives them a
mutually exclusive interpretation as a matter of law. It simplifies the
law and avoids the submission of unnecessary issues to the jury.
The next question is whether the financial-gain and the felony-
murder special circumstances should ever both be submitted to the
jury under appropriate instructions. Certainly, when the defendant's
plan does not involve the acquisition of financial gain by the commis-
668. Id. at 409-10, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
669. This would borrow from the law used to determine whether a felony qualifies for
the second degree felony-murder rule. See supra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
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sion of a felony listed in the felony-murder special circumstance the
answer is clear: No. That, of course, is the essential teaching of
Howard. When the evidence shows that the defendant's plan does
involve the commission of one of these enumerated felonies, then the
overlap should be limited by submitting only the felony-murder spe-
cial circumstance to the jury under appropriate instructions. These
were the facts presented in Bigelow. The Bigelow court reached the
correct result by applying the wrong rule.
Could there be a situation in which the facts are sufficiently
unclear so that both special circumstances should be submitted to the
jury with instructions that it must find only one of the choices to be
true-either the felony-murder or the financial-gain special circum-
stance? An example of where this would be true is difficult, at best,
to conceive. Since the felony-murder special circumstance applies to
attempts to commit the felony, the failure to prove that the felony
was actually committed does not mean that the felony-murder special
circumstance is inapplicable. If the evidence is conflicting on whether
an attempt has been committed because of the evidence of the de-
fendant's mental state, it is difficult to see how the financial-gain
special circumstance would be applicable. Indeed, the financial-gain
special circumstance overlaps largely because of the defendant's cul-
pable mental state, his commission of the felony to acquire financial
gain, not because of an overlap in his conduct.
Conflicting evidence on his culpable mental state would not pro-
vide the jury with a choice between the two competing special cir-
cumstances. Instead, it would present the jury with the choice of
finding both special circumstances to be untrue. In other words, the
overlap between these two special circumstances is always caused by
the fact that the defendant's mental state qualifies for both special
circumstances. It either qualifies for both or it qualifies for neither.
Subsequently, under these circumstances, conflicting evidence does
not suggest that both special circumstances should be submitted to
the jury.
Under the rule proposed, the court would look at the defend-
ant's conduct and his culpable mental state and decide whether there
are sufficient facts to submit the felony-murder special circumstance
to the jury. If the felony-murder special circumstance should be sub-
mitted to the jury, then the financial-gain special circumstance is not
applicable to the case and should not be submitted to the jury under
any circumstances. This follows from the fact that the overlap is
caused because the defendant's culpable mental state qualifies for
both the felony-murder and the financial-gain special circumstances.
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In the example of the felony-murder-robbery special circum-
stance, if the jury refuses to find that the defendant intended to steal,
then the jury would also axiomatically reject finding that he killed
the victim for the purpose of financial gain. Unless facts are
presented which have nothing to do with the felony-murder special
circumstance, the financial-gain special circumstance is simply not
involved in the case.
A summary of the proposed rule should prove helpful at this
point. The court should first look at the defendant's conduct and his
culpable mental state and decide whether there are sufficient facts to
submit the felony-murder special circumstance to the jury. If the fel-
ony-murder special circumstance is submitted to the jury, then the
financial-gain special circumstance should not be submitted to the
jury for that murder. This should be decided by the court as a mat-
ter of law, even though submitted instructions are designed to force
the jury to choose between the two special circumstances.
Given the policy against finding two special circumstances for
the same conduct and the same culpable mental state, one of the two
competing special circumstances must be selected over the other.
This rule resolves that conflict. It selects the felony-murder special
circumstance as the more general of the two, and reads the financial-
gain special circumstance as applying to situations not covered by the
felony-murder special circumstance. This appears to be the probable
intent of the legislative body. If this were not true, then the court
would be obliged to find that the legislative body either intended the
overlap or that the financial-gain special circumstance was intended
to displace the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance in the
typical robbery situation.6"' Since neither of these arguments appear
to be tenable, the intent was probably to make the financial-gain
special circumstance apply only in situations in which the felony-
murder special circumstance does not.
Under this analysis, both Howard and Bigelow were correctly
decided on this issue. Since the facts in Howard did not raise the
felony-murder special circumstance, the financial-gain special cir-
cumstance was properly submitted to the jury. Similarly, since the
670. Though the intent to steal, which is one of the mental states required for the crime
of robbery, does not require that the culprit intend to acquire personal gain (lucri causa), that
is the usual intent with which robberies are committed. See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 57-
58, 609 P.2d 468, 503, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 36 (1980). Of course, when the defendant's intent is
to permanently deprive another of property by destroying the property, it would be robbery,
though the financial-gain special circumstance would not overlap. See id. at 58, 609 P.2d at
503, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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felony-murder-robbery special circumstance was involved in Bigelow,
the trial court erred in submitting the financial-gain special circum-
stance to the jury. The felony-murder-robbery special circumstance
finding was thus correctly set aside. The court should abandon the
Bigelow anti-overlap rule in favor of the rule proposed above. The
virtues of this rule are that it is easily applied in the lower courts, it
avoids further development of the vague and misleading concepts
used in the Bigelow rule, and it simplifies the issues submitted to the
jury, because the issues involved with the overlap are properly re-
solved, as a matter of law, by the court, not by the jury.
4. A Summary Of The Financial-Gain Special Circumstance
At the close of the first year of the Lucas court, the elements of
the financial-gain special circumstance may be summarized as fol-
lows. This special circumstance is defined in such a way as to add no
new element to the actus reus of first degree murder. In other words,
this special circumstance divides first degree murder into a death eli-
gible category and a non-death eligible category purely on the basis
of the defendant's mens rea "at the time the murder was commit-
ted.'' 71 There are two mens rea requirements: (1) the murder must
be intentional; and (2) the defendant must have committed the mur-
der with the intention of (or for the purpose of) acquiring financial
gain.
The first requirement is specifically articulated in the statute.73 S
The second is clearly implied from the statutory phrase "murder
• . . carried out for financial gain. ' '67 8 One point should be empha-
sized, however. A defendant may be convicted under the financial-
gain special circumstance even though the defendant does not intend
to personally acquire financial gain from the murder.7 4 Thus a de-
fendant who hires a contract killer to murder the victim is liable
under the financial-gain special circumstance.
671. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (emphasis in
original).
672. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1988).
673. Id. (emphasis added). "The special circumstance focuses on the defendant's intent
at the time the murder was committed. . . . [T]he relevant inquiry is whether the defendant
committed the murder in the expectation that he would thereby obtain the desired financial
gain." Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at. 861 (per Lucas, C.J.)
(emphasis and footnote omitted). See supra text accompanying notes 203-18 for an extended
discussion of this requirement.
674. People v. Freeman, 193 Cal. App. 3d 337, 238 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1987).
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5. Pleading And Proof
a. The Corpus Delicti Rule
In People v. Mattson the Bird court held that the corpus delicti
of the felony-based special circumstances must be proved indepen-
dently of an accused's extrajudicial statements.6 .75 The Mattson rule
was squarely based on the provision in the 1977 Legislation requir-
ing a crime upon which a special circumstance is based to be proved
''pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of
the crime. ' '6 67 The court interpreted this provision as creating an ex-
ception to the general rule that does not require independent proof of
the corpus delicti of an underlying criihe used for the purpose of
establishing the degree of the murder."
An identical provision is contained in the 1978 Initiative.678 In
Howard the defendant argued that the Mattson corpus-delicti rule
applied to the provision in the 1978 Initiative, and that the corpus
delicti of the financial-gain special circumstance had to be proved
independently of the defendant's extrajudicial statements.""h The
court properly rejected this argument on the ground that, though the
Mattson rule applies with equal force to the 1978 provision, since
the financial-gain special circumstance does not require proof of an
underlying crime, the rule has no application to this special circum-
stance.680 Unless the general law on this topic is to be abandoned in
favor of a rule requiring the proof of the corpus delicti independently
of the defendant's admissions in every case, the Howard ruling ap-
pears to be completely consistent with the settled law of the state.
It is worth noting here, however, that the Howard ruling on the
application of the Mattson corpus-delicti rule is another example of
the interpretation of the special circumstances under the law applica-
ble to the interpretation of crimes in general. The financial-gain spe-
cial circumstance is being treated in this instance in exactly the same
way as the substantive rules dividing murder into the two crimes of
first and second degree murder.
675. People v. Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d 85, 93-94, 688 P.2d 887, 892, 207 Cal. Rptr. 278,
282-83 (1984).
676. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1979).
677. E.g., People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973);
People v. McDermand, 162 Cal. App. 3d 770, 211 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984). See Mattson, 37
Cal. 3d at 93, 688 P.2d at 892, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
678. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1988).
679. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 414, 749 P.2d at 301, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
680. Id. at 414-15, 749 P.2d at 301, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
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V. CONCLUSION
Until legislation was adopted in response to Furman and its
progeny, liability for the punishment of death was governed by the
elements of the capital crime and by the "elements" of the various
forms of justification, excuse, and mitigation." 1 These rules of liabil-
ity reflected the accumulated wisdom of centuries of common law
development. They expressed the circumstances and conditions under
which society believed that punishment may be justly imposed to fur-
ther sound public policy, whether that policy is retribution or deter-
rence, or some long forgotten goal. But law is a human institution.
As the human condition has changed, so the law has been altered.
The substantive criminal law is no exception. It too has been subject
to the ebb and flow of the forces of human history.
For the most part, these changes have been produced by a pro-
cess of accretion and evolution over long periods of time.682 Never-
theless, general principles governing these liability rules have been
generated to keep the specific rules, whether new or old, within the
bounds of the purposes they are designed to serve, the goals of the
criminal law.6"'
The history of the substantive criminal law of California mir-
rors this process. The rules imposing liability for the punishment of
death for the crime of murder were not fashioned out of whole cloth
when California's first penal statutes were adopted in 1850. They
reflected the mainstream of the criminal law as it then stood.6 4
Though there have been changes in these liability rules over the
years, these alterations have been ultimately governed by the general
principles of the criminal law.686 An example is in order.
In 1856, when California divided murder into degrees for the
purpose of limiting the death penalty to the crime of murder in the
first degree, one of the rules defining liability for the death penalty
was the torture-murder rule. The statute simply said that "[a]ll mur-
der which shall be perpetrated by ...torture ...or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing ... shall be
deemed murder of the first degree."68 6
Although this statute has been altered over the intervening one
681. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
682. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 146-55.
683. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
684. See Poulos, supra note 8, at 146-48.
685. See, e.g., infra notes 688-96 and accompanying text.
686. An Act To Amend An Act Entitled "An Act Concerning Crimes and Punish-
ments," Passed April 16th, 1850, section 2, 1856 Cal. Stat. 219.
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hundred thirty years as it was carried forward from generation to
generation, the current law articulates the torture-murder rule in es-
sentially the same terms."'7 When the California Supreme Court
was faced with the task of deciding what culpable mental state was
required for death eligibility for murder by torture, the court could
not resolve the issue by simply consulting the wording of the statute.
The statute does not clearly articulate the precise mental state re-
quired for guilt under the torture-murder rule. Invoking a tradition
as old as the common law of crimes itself, the court turned to the
fundamental principles of the criminal law to define the mental state
required by the statute.
There appear to be two major reasons for delineating separate
degrees of murder and imposing different punishments ...
First, some murders can more easily be prevented than others
by the deterrent effect of severe penalties: e.g., a hired assassin
is more likely to reflect upon the possibility of imprisonment for
life than an enraged husband who shoots his wife in a drunken
Saturday night quarrel. . . . Second, society draws a moral dis-
tinction between murders: as morally wrong as murder per se
is, some murders are more deplorable than others. Society in-
stinctively senses a greater revulsion for a calculated, deliberate
murder than it does for any other type of killing. . . . Only by
appropriately circumscribing the application of first degree
murder can society preserve that pervasive moral distinction.68
Since the mental state with which the defendant performs the
prohibited acts is the linchpin of deterrence, and since it also estab-
lishes the moral culpability justifying punishment," 9 it is a funda-
mental principle of the criminal law that all significantly punished
crimes require a culpable mental state."90 Employing this fundamen-
tal principle, the California Supreme Court has held that the first
degree torture-murder rule requires, in addition to the mental state
687. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
688. People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 544-45, 546 P.2d 665, 668, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161,
164 (1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
689. See, e.g., id.; H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 60-61 (1968); ZIMR-
ING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 194 (1973).
690. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394 (1980); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 546 P.2d 665, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1976); People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1975); People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1975); People
v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 188, at 192;
Perkins & Boyce, supra note 190, at 932-35; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 246, §§ 1.13,
2.02.
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necessary for guilt of murder, an intent to torture the victim.""
Thus, though the statute does not expressly enumerate the intent-to-
torture as an element of this theory of first degree murder, it is now
the settled law of the state that an intent-to-torture is an element of
the torture-murder rule.692
Furthermore, as evidenced by this ruling, the fundamental prin-
ciples of the criminal law apply to statutes as well as to judge made
law. And, though, within the limits imposed by constitutional doc-
trine, a legislative body has the authority to change the elements of
any crime in ways that are inconsistent with these fundamental prin-
ciples, a number of rules have been created to assure that statutory
laws which seemingly flaunt them are consciously meant to do so.69
While it is not appropriate here and now for a cataloguing of
those rules, several examples are in order. The fact that a penal stat-
ute does not expressly enumerate a mens rea requirement, a culpable
mental state, as an element of the offense does not mean that the
legislative body has defined the crime without a mental element.69
The court must resolve that issue as it did, for example, with the
torture-murder rule. It is also presumed that the legislative body
does not intend to overthrow long-established rules unless the deci-
sion to do so clearly appears either by express declaration or by nec-
essary implication.695 Finally, the legislative body's use of a term
with an established legal meaning, such as the word "torture," incor-
porates that meaning into the statute unless a contrary intent is
plainly shown.696 Thus, although a legislative body has the power to
define crimes inconsistently with the fundamental principles of the
criminal law, it must do so with unmistakable clarity.
Indeed, the major task of the enterprise we know as "the pro-
cess of the substantive criminal law," is devoted to articulating a con-
691. E.g., People v. Wiley, 18 Cal. 3d 162, 554 P.2d 881, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1976);
see supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
692. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
693. The fact that we have rules to assure that legislative enactments are meant to disre-
gard the fundamental principles of the criminal law demonstrates why these principles are
thought of as "fundamental" precepts. They should prevail unless they are consciously
subverted.
694. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956);
People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
695. See, e.g., People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794(1985); Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 1, 547 P.2d 449, 128 Cal. Rptr.
673 (1976). See also People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980);
Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956).
696. See, e.g., Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985).
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sistent body of legal rules by interpreting all crimes and all matters
in defense. These interpretations must be in accordance with the
fundamental principles of the criminal law, insofar as it can be done
within the constraints imposed by the constitution and the legislative
will.
The change wrought in California by the flurry of legislation
designed to restore capital punishment in the wake of Furman and
its progeny has been different from the previous history of the legis-
lative development of the substantive criminal law in two respects.
First, it has produced more change in the law defining liability for
capital punishment in the five year period between 1973, when the
mandatory death penalty statute was adopted, and 1978, when the
Initiative was adopted, than was produced between statehood, in
1850, and the decisions in Furman and Anderson, in 1972.697 The
older changes had been produced by a process of accretion and
evolution: Years intervened between most of them, and the number
of significant changes were relatively small. But major changes were
made in each of the three death penalty statutes adopted in 1973,
1977, and 1978.698 In five years, the law was rewritten three times,
with a number of major changes being made on each occasion.
This was not an evolutionary process. The changes forged by
these three death penalty statutes were not grounded in evolving no-
tions of morality, justice, fairness, or public policy. They primarily
reflected a single goal-the restoration of capital punishment under
the federal and state constitutions. 699 Particular death penalty legis-
lation was enacted because it was thought to have the "best" chance
of "withstanding constitutional attack." ' A related death penalty
goal was added with the enactment of the 1978 Death Penalty Initi-
ative-to produce the "toughest" death penalty statute in the na-
tion." 1 Thus the first differences in these death penalty statutes, as
compared with past amendments to the substantive criminal law in
California, were in the speed with which they were adopted, in the
number of changes they made within this short period of time, and
the purpose for which this legislation was enacted.
The second distinction was in the manner in which the law was
changed. The changes made in the rules defining liability for capital
punishment between statehood and 1972 employed the familiar
697. See supra notes 7-17, 36-144 and accompanying text.
698. See supra notes 36-144 and accompanying text.
699. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
700. National Association Of Attorneys General, supra note 33, at 21.
701. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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method of the substantive criminal law. The elements of the crimes
and the various forms of justification, excuse and mitigation were
legislatively altered with the inevitable indeterminacy which causes
the courts to become full partners in articulating the nature of the
change."0 2 As we have seen, the courts have discharged these part-
nership duties by interpreting the legislative acts in accordance with
the fundamental principles of the criminal law. But this tradition of
defining eligibility for the death penalty by altering the elements of
the capital crime was formally broken by the 1973 mandatory death
penalty legislation. The legislation did not alter the definition of the
capital offense as was done when murder was divided into degrees.
The legislation did not purport to subdivide murder in the first de-
gree into a capital and non-capital variety of murder in the first de-
gree. Instead, a new, unfamiliar device was employed to define death
eligibility: the special circumstance.
The creation of this new device did not reflect a legislative judg-
ment that this was a better way to deliver justice over the way it had
been done for centuries in every jurisdiction adhering to the common
law. It did not reflect a legislative judgment that this was a better or
more just way to deter murder, or to impose retribution. It was, in-
stead, "the alternative considered most preferred as best withstanding
constitutional attack.
'7 0 3
As special circumstances were employed in the 1973 mandatory
death penalty legislation, they were undeniably substantive rules
which determined liability for the death penalty in precisely the
same way as the crime of murder in the first degree defined liability
for the death penalty before the advent of capital sentencing discre-
tion in California.70 4 But before the California Supreme Court had
an opportunity to decide that the special circumstances were capital
crimes governed by the fundamental principles of the criminal law,
the court invalidated the mandatory capital punishment statute
under the High Court's 1976 decisions in Woodson and Roberts.70 5
The special circumstance device was adopted into the 1977 Leg-
islation and the 1978 Initiative as the method for defining liability
for the death penalty. In the analysis presented in this article, the
special circumstances are crimes which are, and should be, governed
by the fundamental principles of the substantive criminal law.70 6
702. See, e.g., supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
703. National Association Of Attorneys General, supra note 33, at 21.
704. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
705. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
706. See supra notes 145-80 and accompanying text.
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The Bird court vacillated between characterizing the special cir-
cumstances as "categories of first degree murder, ' °  on the one
hand,708 and as sui generis rules on the other hand.709 Nevertheless,
the court consistently treated the special circumstances as though
they were crimes defining liability for the punishment of death. The
fundamental principles of the substantive criminal law guided the
court's interpretation and application of the special circumstances. 10
For example, when the court was confronted with the task of
defining the culpable mental element required by the Torture-mur-
der special circumstance in the 1978 Initiative, the court held that
the culpable mental state included an intent-to-torture, despite the
fact that the statute did not articulate that requirement. In this re-
spect, the Bird court's method of interpreting the torture-murder
special circumstance was essentially similar to the method employed
by its predecessor court to decide that the first degree torture-murder
rule also required an intent-to-torture.7 '
The Lucas court has refrained from characterizing the special
circumstances during this first full year of its tenure. It has not re-
solved the Bird court's ambivalence in labeling the special circum-
stances as crimes on the one hand and as sui generis rules on the
other.
Furthermore, unlike the Bird court, the Lucas court has treated
the special circumstances with some inconsistency. Wade and How-
ard were decided consistently with the theory that the special cir-
cumstances are governed by the fundamental principles of the crimi-
nal law. Nevertheless, the court neither articulated its understanding
of the special circumstances in these two cases, nor did it cite the
fundamental principles in resolving the special circumstance issues
tendered in these cases. Though these two cases are consistent with
the theory that the special circumstances are crimes governed by the
fundamental principles of the criminal law, they do not expressly
apply the method of the substantive criminal law in reaching their
conclusions.
On the other hand, the Lucas court's decision in Kimble is not
707. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 420, 429, 556 P.2d 1101, 1105, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 650, 654 (1976) (referring to the special circumstances enumerated in the 1973
mandatory death penalty legislation).
708. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
709. People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 552, 684 P.2d 826, 832, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985).
710. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
711. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
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only inconsistent with prior Bird court precedent, it is inconsistent
with the conception of the special circumstances as being crimes
which are governed by the fundamental principles of the substantive
criminal law. The Kimble opinion also suggests that the court has no
theory of the special circumstances, no overriding idea of how they
fit into the law of capital homicide in California, and how they
square with the fundamental principles of the substantive criminal
law. Yet Kimble is a single case which, under the analysis presented
in this article, is incorrectly decided.
Whether the Lucas court will ever recognize the special circum-
stances as capital crimes, and whether it will overtly look to the fun-
damental principles of the substantive criminal law to resolve special
circumstance issues remains to be seen. But from the court's record
compiled during this first year, it appears that the court has re-
frained from committing itself to either a conception of the special
circumstances, or to a method which should be employed to resolve
special circumstance issues. The fact that Wade and Howard were
decided consistently with the theory of the special circumstances as
crimes does not commit the court to that position. While this pre-
serves the options available to the court in future cases, it does little
to guide the lower courts and counsel as they struggle to resolve the
special circumstance issues in the lower courts.
After the votes were counted in the November, 1986, retention
election, it was widely anticipated that the reconstructed California
Supreme Court, as rebuilt by Governor George Deukmejian, would
overrule much of the Bird court precedent interpreting the two death
penalty statutes.712 In a series of briefs filed in the California Su-
preme Court, the Attorney General of California asked the court to
reconsider and overrule "not only Carlos . .., and Turner . . ., but
also virtually every other decision construing the 1977 or 1978 death
penalty laws."' 3
But as we have seen above, except for Carlos and its progeny,
the court declined the Attorney General's invitation. Given the views
of Governor Deukmejian on capital punishment and his practice of
appointing pro-capital punishment judges to the bench,7"4 and Chief
Justice Lucas' near promise to overrule Carlos if joined by three
other justices,715 it was no surprise that the new court quickly over-
712. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 268-75.
713. People v. Anderson (James), 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1153, 742 P.2d 1306, 1335, 240
Cal. Rptr. 585, 614 (1987).
714. See Poulos, supra note 1, at 209.
715. See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
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ruled Carlos, Turner, and Malone."16
It was the court's adherence to the remaining precedent that
was unanticipated. The court's refusal to follow the Harris overlap-
ping-felony rule represents no break with prior authority, for that
rule was adopted by less than a majority of the Bird court. As such it
had neither the binding force of precedent nor the respect conferred
by the doctrine of stare decisis.7 7 Furthermore, under the analysis
suggested in this article, the rule should be abandoned in favor of a
unitary theory of the felony-murder special circumstance. 71 8
Howard's treatment of the Bigelow rule for avoiding overlap be-
tween the financial-gain and the felony-murder special circumstances
is not accurately classified as an exception to the Lucas court's gen-
eral adherence to Bird court precedent. Howard accepts the rule, in-
terprets it, and concludes that it is inapplicable to the facts presented
in the case. 7" Howard's use of the rule is criticized in this article on
the ground that the Bigelow rule should be abandoned in favor of a
far simpler solution to the problem of the overlap between these two
special circumstances: the court should interpret the financial-gain
special circumstance as applying only when the felony-murder spe-
cial circumstance is unsupported by the evidence. 20
But this would require the court to "recognize" or "create" a
new rule with respect to these two special circumstances. And, with
one exception, the opinions of this term indicate a reticence to create
new law. The law has been applied, and it has been destroyed, but
not created. Whether the Lucas court will ever jettison the Bigelow
rule, or the Harris overlapping-felony rule mentioned above, in
favor of other rules designed to better further their policy, remains to
be seen.
The one exception to the court's apparent reluctance to create
new law is Howard's holding that the mental element of the finan-
cial-gain special circumstance includes an intent-to-obtain-financial-
gain from the murder. 72 1 In the remaining cases, the court recog-
nized no new special circumstance rules. This was true even when
the court was asked to rationalize the prior-murder-conviction spe-
cial circumstance so that the prosecution could not maximize the
chance of a finding of eligibility for the death penalty by trying the
716. See supra notes 417-21, 574-77, 599-608 and accompanying text.
717. See supra notes 473-85 and accompanying text.
718. See supra notes 509-28 and accompanying text.
719. See supra notes 636-39, 653-63 and accompanying text.
720. See supra notes 664-70 and accompanying text.
721. See supra notes 203-18, 636-39 and accompanying text.
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weaker case first. 22
Existing law was destroyed when the intent-to-kill requirement
was removed from the felony-murder, the multiple-murder, and the
prior-murder-conviction special circumstances- by the overruling of
Carlos, Turner, and Malone. Though the Green intent rule, which
applies to the felony-murder special circumstance, has survived the
first year of the Lucas court, its status has been undermined by Kim-
ble's rejection of the rule as an element of the special circum-
stance,723 and by the ambiguous treatment of the rule in the other
cases.
72 4
With respect to the other special circumstances, the heinous-
atrocious-or-cruel special circumstance72' and the torture-murder
special circumstance,726 precedent was followed in much the same
way that it would have been followed by the Bird court.
One further observation needs to be made. In each of the cases,
except for Wade's invalidation of the surplus heinous-atrocious-or-
cruel special circumstance, the court found no special circumstance
error in these cases. And in every case, except for Anderson's rever-
sal for Ramos error, the judgment of death was affirmed.
722. See supra notes 609-19 and accompanying text.
723. See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
724. See supra notes 434-36 and accompanying text.
725. See supra notes 340-48 and accompanying text.
726. See supra notes 349-76 and accompanying text.

